BEHAVIOR SCIENCE MONOGRAPHS

PAKISTAN: SOCIETY AND CULTURE

Edited by

Stanley Maron

HUMAN RELATIONS AREA FILES
NEW HAVEN
1957



PAKISTAN IN ASIA

BEHAVIOR SCIENCE MONOGRAPHS



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PUBLISHER'S PREFACE

It is the function of the Human Relations Area Files to facilitate research and comparative study in the sciences concerned with mankind, thereby promoting a general understanding of the peoples of the world, their ways of life, their problems, values, and ideas. That is the aim of this publication.

As a further aid to scholarship, HRAF maintains files at its sixteen member universities (see list below) and at its Washington office. These files are accessible to scholars and contain carefully selected source materials on many areas and peoples, analyzed and categorized according to An Outline of Cultural Materials (1950). Their use is explained in A Guide to the Use of the Files (1956), to be found at each file.

The table of contents of the above Outline is appended to the end of this volume.

Files are located at:

University of Chicago
University of Colorado
Cornell University
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Indiana University
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University of Michigan
University of North Carolina
University of Oklahoma
University of Pennsylvania
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University of Southern California
University of Utah
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Yale University

Comments on this publication are welcome since the Human Relations Area Files is constantly undertaking to add to and improve its research materials.

An expression of appreciation is extended to Muriel B. Lechter, editor; Michael Lazna, technical director and designer; and Roberta E. Rogers, secretary, for their efforts in overseeing the preparation of this volume in its final stages.

FOREWORD

This book grew out of a research project undertaken at the University of California for the Human Relations Area Files. The chairman of the project was Dr. John H. Cover, on leave from his post as Director of the Bureau of Business and Economic Research at the University of Maryland. The supervisory committee was headed by Dr. Thomas C. Blaisdell, Jr., Director of the Bureau of International Relations at the University of California. To both men go my sincere thanks for their enthusiastic support and cooperation.

Sincere thanks are also due to Professors Elizabeth K. Bauer and Richard L. Park, both of the University of California, for their kind help and encouragement; and to Ynez Haase for her fine cartography.

New Haven, Connecticut
April 1957

S. M.

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JOHN AIRD, sociologist, collected the data for his chapter during a one year visit to East Pakistan as a member of a UNESCO mission from 1952 to 1953.

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ZEKIYE EGLAR, anthropologist, has based her chapter on materials collected from field work in the villages of West Pakistan, particularly the Punjab, from 1949 to 1955. Her research was made possible by fellowships from the Social Science Research Council, the Wenner-Gren Foundation, and the Institute for Intercultural Studies.

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INTRODUCTION

Pakistan is one of the major countries to emerge out of the ferment of World War II. It rivals Indonesia as the largest predominantly Muslim nation, and it stands as a link between the Middle East and Southeast Asia. The strongest historical and cultural bonds are with India, but strained political relations have led Pakistan to seek closer ties elsewhere. At the present time, Pakistan looks to the United States more than to any other country for help and protection during the difficult years of nation-building which now face the people of Pakistan. It is important that the American people, in particular, should become more familiar with the social as well as the political and economic problems of Pakistan in order that help and friendship may be guided by enlightenment and sympathetic understanding.

Pakistan is a land of many complex problems which do not lend themselves to easy solutions. There has been a serious lack of competent national leadership with resultant confusion and a failure to make a balanced and well conceived approach to social and economic improvement. Belated efforts are being made to cope with the serious problems of agricultural and industrial growth through the Planning Board, and in conjunction with various American aid programs, but only a relatively small beginning has been made. The steadily growing population means increasing demands on a limited food supply and a still greater problem of unemployment. Further tensions of a serious nature are bound to arise from the insatiable demands of a small but growing middle class. The inability of past cabinets to cope with the needs of the people for food, clothing, and shelter during much of the first decade of Pakistan's existence has resulted in an atmosphere of political instability. In view of the limited prospects for significant improvements during the second decade, it is likely that conditions of political instability will continue to prevail.

Perhaps the most serious charge which can be laid against the national leadership in Pakistan has been the failure to inspire unity and joint action. Personalities and limited interests have dominated the political scene at the expense of service and genuine devotion to duty. A particularly pernicious practice has been the tendency to glorify prominent leaders while they are

in office and then to subject them to vicious castigation and political oblivion when they no longer hold the reins of power. In view of the serious shortage of qualified leadership in the country, and the unequaled training which actual practice in the conduct of government affords, the disregard of leaders no longer in power is a grave waste of a vitally needed human resource. If integrity and honor were stronger, length of service might be longer.

To point out the shortcomings of leadership in Pakistan and the multitude of problems which face the nation is not a condemnation. These are real problems which arise out of historical conditions. There are relatively few people in Pakistan today who have been prepared by background and training for the roles which they are called upon to assume. It cannot be expected of human beings that they should succeed in meeting all exceptional demands which are made upon them. Rather it is important to seek an understanding of why the problems exist in order to make an accurate appraisal of the present situation and the extent to which there has been success. For this, some knowledge of the historical background is essential.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The triangular projection of land south of the Himalayas, frequently referred to as the subcontinent, has a long history of civilization which extends back some five thousand years or more. Invasions from without have occurred with almost regular frequency and have resulted in a mixed population. In some cases, the earlier inhabitants were either killed or driven into the hills where their descendants still survive in very small numbers. In other cases, intermarriage took place and led to a fusing of races. This was particularly the case in the northern-most part, where invasions from central Asia were most frequent. However, a system of social stratification into endogamous castes largely curtailed the extent of physical assimilation. A more potent factor was Hinduism, a broad and sweeping religion of such universal character and variety that it could be hospitable to almost any spiritual path one might choose. In this sense of spiritual assimilation, Hindu India has indeed been a Mother gathering diverse beliefs and believers into her fold.

A notable exception have been the followers of Islam, despite the fact that there has been cultural interchange almost since the days of Muhammad. Arab traders landing along the Malabar coast were the first to introduce Islam into the subcontinent. Of greater significance was the invasion of the region including Sind in the early eighth century, which marked the first establishment of Muslim political power in what is now Pakistan. The invasion remained localized and ultimately, divorced from

the former seat of strength in Baghdad, the power of the Muslim rulers disintegrated. About three centuries later began a series of massive invasions from the north which eventually swept the Muslim Turks and later the Mughals over almost the whole of the subcontinent, and kept large areas under Muslim rule until the arrival of the British.

The height of Muslim power was attained in the sixteenth century under Akbar, whose reign extended over two-thirds of the subcontinent, and lasted until the time of Aurangzeb, a century later. Aurangzeb pushed the frontiers of the Mughal empire to include almost all the territory that is now Pakistan and India, except for a small area in the south and Assam in the east. However, in the course of his military campaigns and iconoclastic domestic policies, Aurangzeb impoverished his government and created conditions of dissension and instability which led to a crumbling of that empire shortly after his death.

The Muslim courts were famous for their art and architecture and both music and poetry flourished, largely under Persian influence. The nobility, of Turkish and Persian descent, tended to remain aloof from the subject peoples. They formed a largely endogamous ruling elite, with traditions of martial valor and contempt for the inhabitants of the subcontinent. Their literature and poetry looked for inspiration to the remarkable achievements of Persia and to the glorious days of the great Khalifs of Baghdad and other centers of Muslim culture. Persian remained the court language, and was used by both Muslim and Hindu intelligentsia.

At the same time, widespread conversions to Islam took place among the masses for a variety of reasons. Some people were undoubtedly impressed by the religious fervor of the conquerors and found their strong belief in one God more attractive than the diffuse and vague beliefs which characterized Hinduism during the centuries of its degeneration which followed the Mughal invasions. A strong force in promoting widespread conversion was the number of Sufi mystics who preached that love is the path to God, and love transcends all dogma and ritual. Some efforts at synthesis took place, with spiritual devotion as the common core for all believers, whether God be called Allah or Ram. The influence of the Sufi missionaries appears to be a major factor in explaining the large-scale conversions which took place in areas where the Muslims did not have effective military control.

Forced conversions no doubt contributed to the growing number of Muslims, intermarriage also was a factor, and expediency must have provided the motivation for still others. Under the Hindu caste system of social stratification, the lowest members of society were made to bear a terrible burden of oppression and exploitation. Conversion to Islam, which preached

the equality of all men, was a means of escape often given some measure of enforcement by Muslim rulers.

For the ruling elite of foreign origin constantly faced with the problem of maintaining control over an infinitely larger, and latently hostile, indigenous population, the need for cohesion and solidarity was evident and was successfully translated into an effective esprit de corps. In consequence, the ruling elite perpetuated their identification with traditions alien in origin to the subcontinent and thereby resisted tendencies toward cultural assimilation. At the same time, the masses who had converted to Islam sought to emphasize the distinctiveness of their new identity in order to resist slipping back into the caste system. The fact of their identification with a tradition essentially the same as that of the ruling elite lent some measure of prestige even if there was no actual change in their social and economic status. Among both Muslim groups, the ruling elite and the converts, desire for a distinct identity militated against spiritual and social assimilation and led to the rise of a problem which ultimately had its solution in the political partition of the subcontinent and the establishment of Pakistan.

When the British arrived in South Asia, they came as traders prepared to do business with whatever governments existed. They arrived at a time when the Mughal empire was rapidly crumbling, public order and sound fiscal policies were not enforced, and political control was threatened by a coalition of Hindu rulers. In order to protect their commercial interests, the British found it increasingly necessary to pacify by force of arms the regions in which they traded. By the end of the first quarter of the nineteenth century, the British had effective political and economic control of India, and after the uprising of 1857, India formally became a part of the British empire.

The reaction to this turn of events by the former Muslim ruling elite was one of withdrawal. Without official sponsorship, the traditions of Persian scholarship and art, and all that went with it, quickly declined. Descendants of the Muslim nobility tenaciously retained their identity with the declining tradition, with consequent deterioration in the level of education and other accomplishments. The Muslim converts, generally representing the poorest and most neglected elements of society, also had little or no contact with the new culture imported by the British. It was left to those Hindus who looked upon the British during the early years as natural allies against the Muslim rulers, to absorb the new ideas and new traditions which soon came to be synonymous with government. Under the British, many Hindus rose to positions of power and eminence, while the Muslims generally declined to poverty and political impotence.

When World War II signaled the twilight of British rule in South Asia,

consternation filled the hearts of many Muslims. The remnants of the elite, still guarding their identity with a foreign tradition, anticipated with fear an independent India where they would be compelled to assimilate and accept subservience in a land they once proudly ruled. For the masses of Muslims descended from converts the prospect of being forced back into the caste system—and at the lowest rung of all in punishment for their apostasy—equally called forth a response of apprehension.

For the Muslim peasants who formed a majority in eastern Bengal, where landlords and traders were predominently Hindu, the prospects of increased exploitation seemed appalling. Some beginning of an agrarian movement had been made under Muslim leadership during the nineteenth century and it gained impetus with the rise of representative government under the British. The handful of Muslim members of the elite that once ruled Bengal cleverly exploited the agrarian pressures in order to weld a powerful electorate behind Muslim candidates. The situation was much the same in the northwestern part of the subcontinent, although there the members of the elite were relatively far more powerful and were more concerned with protecting their landholdings which might have been jeopardized under a Hindu-dominated government.

Efforts toward a political reconciliation of Hindus and Muslims failed because there were no adequate common interests which could bridge the gap left by non-assimilation into a common tradition. In 1940, with the day of independence obviously approaching, the major political instrument of the Muslims, the Muslim League, adopted a resolution calling for partition of the subcontinent and the establishment of a separate homeland for the Muslims to be known as Pakistan.

The movement for Pakistan which ensued provided a convenient rallying point for most of the Muslims of South Asia, regardless of their particular interests. For the elite, it meant a country where the tradition of the Delhi Court could be perpetuated and developed, while for the Muslim masses it meant a land where they would be free from exploitation and where the Islamic principle of equality would prevail.

THE STATE OF PAKISTAN

Pakistan became a reality on August 14, 1947. Almost immediately, it was subjected to a continuous series of shocks and tensions which have remained largely unabated.

More than seven million refugees poured into the country from India; while a similar number of Hindus left, including many key personnel. The apparatus of government had to be established with inadequate staff and

equipment. Public order had to be restored and maintained, and public confidence assured. Meanwhile, an atmosphere of tension prevailed as serious disagreements between Pakistan and India brought the two nations to the verge of hostilities. The early years saw many acts of heroism and devotion, particularly on the part of the younger generations who were determined to see Pakistan succeed.

But as even the abnormal conditions came to assume some semblance of normalcy, conflicts temporarily submerged came to the surface. Political power rested in the hands of the elite, with inadequate representation, and almost no understanding, of the interests and problems of the masses. Concomitantly, serious tensions developed between West and East Pakistan. The explanation for this situation is again to be found in the historical background. The area of what became West Pakistan was a center of Muslim power from the very first invasions. The proportion of Muslims there who trace their origin to the foreign invaders is high and has resulted for many years in a feeling of separation from the rest of the subcontinent.

On the other hand, almost all the Muslims of East Pakistan are the descendants of converts, and the influence of the elite is quite restricted. As the political situation crystallized, the conflict of interest between the elite and the masses in Pakistan became translated into a conflict of interest between West and East Pakistan. In view of the fact that East Pakistan had relatively few leaders with education and ability to contribute to national leadership, the posts went largely by default to persons from West Pakistan or to refugees whose sympathies were with the prevailing culture in West Pakistan. Bengalis, the inhabitants of East Pakistan, began to protest vehemently against the preponderance of non-Bengali government officials who seemed to show no understanding of their problems and no sympathy for them.

The conflict of interests between the elite and the masses, in the guise of a conflict between West and East Pakistan, was considerably irritated by a tendency among non-Bengali officials to adopt a deprecating attitude toward their Bengali countrymen. Concomitantly, there was a struggle between orthodox and liberal factions, the one seeking a theological and the other a socialistic orientation for the state. A period of particularly severe strain was reached in 1951 following an official decision to make Urdu the national or state language. From the point of view of the elite the decision was a natural and logical one. Urdu, a language which has borrowed heavily from Persian, was used by the Mughal Court during the last years of power. For a revival of that tradition, and unification of the nation around that authentic Muslim tradition, Urdu seemed the ideal instrument. Consultation with Bengali leaders, representing the infinitely small elite of East Pakistan who had managed somehow to continue the use

of Urdu or at least a respect for it, resulted in agreement and the basis for what appeared to be a truly national policy. When the decision was publicly announced in East Pakistan, the response was one of emotional and violent opposition. More than 98 per cent of the population of East Pakistan, who form the majority in Pakistan, speak Bengali as their mother tongue. The shift to Urdu would have meant handicaps in competitive examinations and other national activities for generations to come. In the larger picture, it would have meant the firm entrenchment in power of the elite (for whom Urdu is either the mother tongue or the language of social intercourse) with little possibility of removing them.

The language problem clearly revealed how little the Bengali leadership understood the problems of their own people, and how poorly they represented Bengali interests. For the leaders in West Pakistan, whose limited contacts with the Bengali elite had led them to believe that Urdu was much more widely spoken and favored in East Pakistan than proved the case, the widespread and forceful demonstrations of protest from East Pakistan came as a surprise. When the first provincial elections were held in East Pakistan in March 1954, the ruling Muslim League was virtually eliminated. The opposition parties gained their victory on a United Front platform which had its foundation in the agrarian movement of the province. The new Bengali leadership which is emerging is much more closely identified with the masses and is proving much more responsive to the needs and demands of the people.

In West Pakistan, the plurality of provinces and princely states which first made up West Pakistan have been consolidated into a single province. Effective political and economic control is still largely in the hands of the large landholders and businessmen who form the articulate elite. Their interests continue to conflict with those of East Pakistan, and the tensions between the two provinces will probably continue until the peasants and laborers of West Pakistan gain greater power, through free exercise of the ballot, for only then can there be a popular basis for a national policy of social and economic development.

A serious weakness in Pakistan has been the failure to build a common national tradition because of the conflict in allegiance between the elite and the masses. Pakistan continues to be held together largely for the same reason that Pakistan came into existence—reluctance to be absorbed into a Hindu community. So far it has proven a strong enough bond to keep Pakistan viable during very trying times. However, if India makes greater economic and social progress and tends to become more secular in character, the aversion to assimilation may weaken or become attenuated. Surely this process would be considerably accelerated if Pakistan were to continue to be politically unstable and unable to provide adequate social and economic progress for its citizens.

GEOGRAPHY

Pakistan has the unique distinction of being the only country with two separate areas divided by more than a thousand miles of foreign territory. Alaska and the United States probably form the closest parallel, but the problems involved are by no means comparable.

East Pakistan is a deltaic region lying between latitudes 20° 45' North and 26° 30' North, and between longitudes 88° East and 92° 30' East. It is surrounded on the west, north, and east by the Indian States of West Bengal and Assam, with a short border on the extreme southeast adjoining Burma. The southern border is a coast facing on the Bay of Bengal. Two of the largest rivers of Asia, the Ganges and Brahmaputra, flow through East Pakistan and join to form the Padma before emptying into the Bay of Bengal. The Sarma River, which rises in the Assam hills, flows through East Pakistan as the Meghna and finally joins the Padma. Another important river is the Karnafuli which cuts through the Chittagong Hill Tracts and empties into the Bay of Bengal near the port of Chittagong. Together with these major rivers are many tributaries and canals which combine to make East Pakistan an alluvial plain, with frequent floods. The total area is 54,501 square miles.

West Pakistan, lying between latitudes 24° North and 37° North, and between longitudes 61° East and 75° East, has a more varied topography. To the west and northwest lie Iran and Afghanistan, while to the south and southwest is the Arabian Sea. The Indian states of Bombay, Rajasthan, and Punjab are to the east, with the disputed State of Jammu and Kashmir to the northeast. Three main topographical sections may be distinguished. The first comprises the mountain wall including the Karakoram and Himalayan ranges, with peaks as high as 28,250 feet and 25,263 feet. Overland trade routes to China, Afghanistan, and Iran extend through the mountain passes. The second section is a barren plain which stretches along the foothills of the mountains. The third section is the Indus plain, which is well watered by the Indus River. It is an important agricultural area and thickly populated. The Indus has four chief tributaries in West Pakistan: the Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, and Sutlej, which originate in the Himalayas and flow into the Indus which empties into the Arabian Sea. The total area of West Pakistan is 310,236 square miles.

West Pakistan also includes the Federal Capital Area of Karachi, which has an autonomous status somewhat like the District of Columbia. Karachi is the main port of West Pakistan and handles all shipping. There is a free port, Gwadar, on the coast of West Pakistan and under the

administration of the Arabian state of Oman. Its major significance appears to be for purposes of smuggling.

The main port in East Pakistan is Chittagong. Some shipping is also handled through an anchorage at Chalna.

CLIMATE

For the major part of the year, from early March to October, East Pakistan experiences a subtropical climate with high temperature and humidity. The monsoon usually begins in June and lasts for about four months with exceptionally heavy rainfall. From November to February the climate is very pleasant, with low humidity and little rainfall. On the whole, East Pakistan averages more than 80 inches of rainfall annually, and is second only to Assam for the heaviest rainfall in the world. In the regions nearer the hills and the sea, rainfall reaches as much as 140 inches in a year. The mean temperature varies from around 64° Fahrenheit during the colder months to 83° Fahrenheit in the hot months.

Dryness is a characteristic of West Pakistan, with much greater extremes of temperature except for the coastal strip of Sind. The plains of West Pakistan are among the hottest in the world during the summer months, but in the winter the temperature falls below freezing. January and February are the coldest months, with freezing nights but days when the temperature may rise to 75° Fahrenheit or more. The summer months, starting in March, are hot and dry, and the day temperature may range between 90° Fahrenheit and 120° Fahrenheit, although the nights are usually cool until the monsoon period. Rainfall is scanty and most of the agriculture is dependent upon irrigation. The water is brought from the main rivers by an extensive network of canals in the Punjab and Sind regions. The northern and western parts of the province average two to eight inches of rain annually, while the Punjab has an annual rainfall of about ten to fourteen inches.

POPULATION

The population of Pakistan at the time of the census in 1951 was 75,842,000. According to projections made by the Planning Board, the population probably reached 83,440,000 in 1956, and should reach 88,420,000 by 1960.

Paradoxically, the majority of the population are crowded into tiny East Pakistan, while large areas of West Pakistan are virtually uninhabited. The population density varies from a high of almost two thousand persons per square mile in several subdivisions of East Pakistan to a low of one per



FIG. 1 — POPULATION AND WATERWAYS OF PAKISTAN

square mile in Dalbandin Tehsil of Baluchistan in West Pakistan. The estimated population density for 1957 is 850 per square mile in East Pakistan and 120 per square mile in West Pakistan.

A further paradox is that East Pakistan, despite the density of population, had only four urban centers with more than fifty thousand inhabitants in 1951. In the same year, there were fourteen urban centers of fifty thousand inhabitants or more in less densely populated West Pakistan, in addition to Karachi.

Altogether, more than 90 per cent of the population is rural. A program of industrialization is tending to promote urbanization, but the movement of population to urban centers does not appear to be keeping pace with the general growth. Perhaps the largest single problem involved in the movement toward urban centers is the lack of housing. Considerable attention has been given to the problem by the Government of Pakistan, and a number of large housing projects have been constructed, mostly for the use of government employees. Lack of suitable materials and skilled builders probably will make the problem a continuing one for some time to come. In West Pakistan, there are large settlements of refugees living in primitive shelters, which has proven a persistent political irritant. Efforts are being made to construct housing colonies for these refugees, but only limited progress has been made thus far.

A significant feature of present population movement seems to be the tendency of intellectuals to move to urban centers. College and university graduates are very reluctant to return to the rural areas, and will frequently accept almost any clerical employment in the cities rather than return to their village homes. This trend, if continued, may be expected to have unfavorable repercussions upon the development of local self-government and upon the system of political representation at the provincial and national levels. A marked tendency to center intellectual activity in the cities and larger towns would tend to accentuate the distance between the urban elite and the rural masses, particularly in East Pakistan where the distinction is still largely blurred due to limited urbanization. A counter tendency is the deliberate policy of East Pakistan to decentralize industrialization, thereby placing a limit on urban growth. Urban culture is much more likely to flourish in West Pakistan, as it has in the past.

The population is made up of a very uneven distribution of components. West Pakistan is made up almost wholly of Muslims, while in East Pakistan Hindus form nearly one-fourth the population. On the other hand, almost everyone in East Pakistan is a Bengali, while West Pakistan is made up of Panjabi, Pathan, Baluchi, Sindhi, and other ethnic groups. The result is an ambivalent social structure wherein ethno-cultural and religious

loyalties are sometimes in conflict. In the struggle for Pakistan, the religious bonds coincided with identical political and economic ends and resulted in phenomenally strong unity among the Muslims. However, subsequent tensions have tended to accentuate differences between Bengali and non-Bengali in one province, and between Panjabi and non-Panjabi in the other. With strong demands being made on both loyalties, and a general confusion of religious and political issues in order to strengthen or weaken formation of groups around particular interests, the strain on the individual apparently tends to result more in frustration and anxiety than in constructive thought. The emotionally charged atmosphere which seems to prevail in Pakistan probably has its source in this basic dilemma.

SOCIAL STRUCTURE

Muslims comprise more than 85 per cent of the population. Again, there is a complex system of grouping. Socially, the Muslims of Pakistan are either ashraf or ajlaf, depending on whether they are descended from the invaders and high caste converts or from lower caste converts. There is also grouping by occupation. In terms of belief, the Muslims are divided into Sunni and Shi'a.

Among the ashraf, or nobility, there are four caste-like groups known as Syed, Shaikh or Quraish, Mughal, and Pathan. The Syeds usually claim descent from the Prophet through his daughter Fatima, but some base their claim on descent from Ali, the husband of Fatima, through one of his other wives. The Syeds tend to regard themselves as the highest aristocracy in the Muslim community, although economic conditions often compel them to follow many kinds of occupation including the most humble. The wealthier Syeds carefully preserve their genealogies and usually they will intermarry only with other Syeds.

A Shaikh or Quraish is one who claims descent from the same tribe as the Prophet, although the term Shaikh has been extended to indicate anyone of Arab blood. Many of the Sufi missionaries responsible for the large-scale conversions in the subcontinent were Arabs and were called Shaikhs. As a gesture of appreciation and affiliation, converts frequently adopted the designation as part of their new names, so that the number of persons claiming to be Shaikhs today far exceeds the number who can be assumed to have some Arab blood. Justification for the practice can be found in the explanation that a disciple becomes the spiritual child of his teacher and guide, so that the convert can, in a sense, claim to be a descendant of the spiritual mentor.

The Mughals claim descent from Central Asian ancestors who came

into the country with the invading army of Babur or arrived during the reign of one of his descendants. They are a comparatively small group, but their numbers have been somewhat augmented by a tendency in the Punjab, and particularly in Hazara district, for men of low social status to assume Mughal names.

The Pathans claim descent from the Afghans who came into the country under Mahmud of Ghazni and his successors, and subsequently spread over much of northern India as government officials and mercenaries. However, as with the designation Shaikh, converts freely adopted it and rendered the designation largely meaningless. One result is a confusion between Pathans as a social group and the Pathans who inhabit the Peshawar valley and tribal area. These latter Pathans are the ones referred to in chapters five and six.

Muslims are also grouped by occupation, although without the rigidity of the Hindu caste system. In almost every village there are barbers, potters, weavers, and others as indicated in chapter three. Members of these groups retain many special customs corresponding to those of the Hindu castes to which they must have originally belonged. For example, endogamy is almost universally practiced within each group. Also, each group has its own system of government or control in the form of a committee or panchayat, which deals with breaches of trade, religion, or morality and generally functions as a regulatory body in the community. The power of the panchayat is almost invariably recognized and their decisions, usually limited to fines, are respected.

There are two major religious divisions among Muslims. Those who follow the orthodox tradition are called Sunni. They accept the Qur'an and Hadith as the basis of all Islamic belief and teachings, and they recognize the legitimacy of the first four Khalifs. The Shi'a differ in that they believe Ali, the son-in-law of the Prophet, to have been the rightful successor and that further succession continues through his descendants. There are numerous and intricate differences in beliefs which further separate the Sunni and Shi'a. Each group tends to be endogamous and even to maintain separate mosques. Most of the Muslims of Pakistan are Sunni, but the Shi'a hold economic power far beyond the proportion of their numbers. Within the past century a third group has emerged comprising the followers of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad. Their beliefs are based on radical orthodoxy in some matters, active proselytism, and the heterodox view that an inspired reformer appears every thousand years.

Observance of ritual and adherence to the injunctions of Islam form only one part of the religious life of many Muslims. Perhaps one half or more of all adult male Muslims in Pakistan are also spiritual seekers. Islamic mysticism, or Sufism, has a long history which some believers trace

back to the Prophet. Today, there are four major mystic orders in Pakistan, based on spiritual allegiance to one or another of four great religious divines who lived and taught in the subcontinent. These orders are the Chishtiyya, Qadiriyya, Suhrawardiyya, and Naqshbandiyya.

There is no priesthood in Islam but those who have received special training in Muslim theology and law are called ulema. The ulema represent the tradition of orthodox scholarship, and formerly they were accorded much respect. Educational standards have dropped considerably and today the ulema are often referred to by the less flattering appellation of mullahs.

Somewhat in competition with the ulema are the pirs or spiritual guides. Those who believe in Sufism hold that a man cannot pursue the path to spiritual salvation without the help of a spiritual guide. It sometimes happens that individual ulema or mullahs are also pirs.

Among the Hindus, social stratification is determined largely by caste. It has become a common practice to make a two-fold division into Caste Hindus and Scheduled Castes. The latter are considered to be the more economically backward and repressed groups and are given special help by the government. The major groups among the Caste Hindus in East Pakistan are the Brahmans, Kayasthas, and Vaidyas.

If caste lines can be regarded as horizontal, there are also vertical lines which divide Hindus in terms of beliefs. The two major groups are Shakta and Vaishnava devotees. A smaller number of Bengali Hindus are members of the Brahmo Samaj, a reform movement of the last century. There are also about a third of a million Buddhists living in East Pakistan.

In addition, there are groupings based on degree of adaptation to Western or modern customs. Some members of the Christian community, which numbers over half a million, speak English as their mother tongue and dress in the European fashion. The Parsi community, although quite small, has made a notable place for itself through its progressive approach to social and economic matters.

In a land of overwhelming illiteracy, education is one of the most important factors in determining social status. The infinitesimally small group of foreign-trained university graduates are the major articulate social and political elite. They are also usually the leading "modernists". Between them and the masses of peasants is a gap which comparatively few national leaders have learned to bridge. Orthodox religious leaders and scholars also form an elite, and often provide effective social and political leadership, though it has usually been opposed to the objectives of the "modernists" and is generally regarded by the latter as unenlightened.

The diversity of social and cultural groups, with their corresponding differences in points of view, has resulted in considerable resistance to

unified action within the country and a failure to make full use of national resources. Marked economic and political differences have produced additional fragmentation, so that today it is not possible to speak of the mind of Pakistan, or to make any satisfactory generalizations about the whole country. Some indications of the diversity, and its consequences, are given in the chapters which follow.

CHAPTER I

BENGALI URBAN GROWTH AND VILLAGE LIFE

JOHN AIRD

Although the ecology of urban growth is much the same the world over, there are three important differences between Asia and the West in the circumstances under which urbanization takes place. First, the urban-industrial pattern evolved out of Western culture, while in Asia it was largely a colonial imposition on the indigenous agrarian culture. Second, industrial urbanism in the West has covered a period of over three centuries, with time for contingent adjustments, while in the underdeveloped countries of today the process is sharply accelerated by outside capital and technical help. Third, the urban social system inevitably led to falling death rates, followed only after great population increase by declining birth rates. In the West this expansion occurred in rather sparsely populated regions, and the excess overflowed into less developed areas, whereas the Asian countries of today begin with an already dense population in a world reluctant to accept any appreciable immigration.

These differences indicate a need for continuing study of the social dynamics of industrialization in underdeveloped countries. The following pages deal with one aspect of the phenomenon in one limited area: the effects of urban growth on village life in East Pakistan.

THE BACKGROUND

The rise and fall of cities is nothing new in the history of Bengal. The earliest historical records of the province tell of the commercial centers of a once prosperous trade empire; such names as Sonargaon, Vikrampur, Satgaon, Gaur, and Rajmahal appear in the chronicles of merchants and world travelers, together with descriptions of the wealth and prosperity of the province in an era when Bengal was sought out for trading purposes by the rest of the world.

Nevertheless, it is unlikely that commercial towns in the past had much effect on the life pattern of the rural hinterland which supplied their food and raw materials. They were instead glorified market places, retailing the products of the back country without passing on to it much of the ferment of culture contact generated in their own streets and bazaars. Such towns were neither urban nor industrial in the modern sense, for the industries they nurtured, including even the highly developed weaving industry, were little more than a multiplication of the labors of individual craftsmen. These craftsmen, with their inherited status, skills, and traditions, were hardly the forerunners of a new urban social order.

Rural-urban contact in modern Bengal derives its significance from the fact that modern industrial urbanism with its complex and varying division of labor is a social revolution, constantly changing within itself and disturbing traditional lifeways wherever its influence is felt. The modern city requires and achieves a much closer integration with its rural hinterland than the older commercial trading center; the consequences of urban development inevitably penetrate the village area in one or another of five different ways: (1) through the indirect reverberations of political and economic decisions made in the city, (2) by the invasion of urban products and institutions into the rural areas, (3) through the urban employment of temporary rural-urban migrants, (4) through the urban employment of resident labor from the villages in the immediate vicinity of the city, and (5) by the physical expansion of the surrounding rural areas.

The indirect effects of urban development would be difficult to trace without extensive time-series analyses of sample village areas. Such studies have yet to be made. Still there can be little doubt about the consequences of urban events which affect the market price of the villager's cash crops and bazaar purchases. The integration of the city with the world market exposes the villager from year to year to the vagaries of national finance, economic policies, and world trade without much awareness on his part of the forces which shape his destiny. Lack of understanding may lead the villager to invest heavily in jute in the most unpromising season or to discourage the production of more than his local rice needs at a time when the world situation favors an export crop. Where the Jute Board intervenes to reduce his production or the government urges him to grow more food as part of a national program, he may accede to the outside authority as an unwilling participant in a scheme beyond his comprehension. If the whole economy succumbs to hard times, he suffers silently with the infinite resignation for which the Bengali cultivator has long been renowned.

However, even the long succession of devastating famines and the vicissitudes of political oppression or beneficence have not profoundly altered

the life pattern of the villager. Not even Partition, with its attendant riots, the flight of Hindus from some areas and their occasional replacement by Muslim refugees from India, could have a lasting effect on the life of the cultivator, except insofar as the social structure of the village lost one type of diversification and acquired another. For the fundamental fact of the villager's life is his livelihood; as long as the source of his living remains unchanged, the mainstay of his existence is still intact.

The invasion of urban products and institutions has a greater impact on the village, though their significance is also easily exaggerated. This is particularly true in the case of urban products which find their way into the mofussil, or back country, bazaar. Certainly some items—the bazaar umbrella, the hurricane lantern, matches, buttons, shoes, shirts, —and a host of other small amenities may represent a partial or total displacement of village crafts and skills and thereby an increase in the dependence of the villager upon the urban economy. They may also stand for some change in the customs of dress and status and perhaps in the use of leisure and the cycle of diurnal activities. But these changes are mostly superficial.

The effect of urban institutions or urban-directed changes in village institutions may be more profound, though at times the village shows a remarkable capacity for resistance to external impositions. There is general agreement that the Permanent Settlement of 1793 in Bengal greatly altered the system of land tenancy, along with the social structure of the province, for the next century and a half. Recent efforts to bring about changes in sanitation, agricultural methods, and educational level as part of village development schemes thus far have been more spectacular in conception than in execution. It frequently happens that "pilot" projects tend to wander from their prescribed course when the outsiders who have been piloting them leave the village and go back to the city. If this is true of planned improvements in which the villagers apparently concur, it is truer still of those they reject. The famous Sarda Act of 1930 to restrict child marriage, with its consequent rash of infant nuptials throughout Bengal (including even some troths plighted between the unborn, conditional upon their sex), illustrates the futility of direct assault on the more sacred rural institutions.

Influence for change which is sustained over a long period is more likely to overcome the inertia of agrarian life. An innovation such as the imposition of regularized law and order has served in the past to increase the value of land in Bengal and the security of life and limb. From these may be traced a whole sequence of changes leading through population increase and subdivision of landholding to disturbances in land inheritance and family structure and ultimately to increasing employment migrations. The development in Bengal of a provincial transportation network along

the inland waterways supplemented by the overland rail network, together with a system of communication between regional government officials and the district and provincial capitals has provided the framework for prompt detection of famine conditions and administration of famine relief, resulting in a general decline in the frequency and severity of famines in Bengal. The immunization of the rural population to a few epidemic diseases through an extension of urban public health facilities, has also contributed to a drop in the death rate. These three developments over a period of time have set in motion in East Pakistan, as in the rest of South Asia, an unpremeditated demographic revolution which must ultimately leave very little unchanged in village life. In these instances the gradually cumulating force of urban institutions is significant.

Not only does the city come to the village but, in more perceptible fashion, the village often goes to the city in the form of temporary labor migrations. Migratory labor in East Pakistan is not a new phenomenon. There has long been a seasonal migration of agricultural laborers from poorer districts to participate in the harvesting of the more prosperous areas. Every major catastrophe has precipitated a large movement of destitutes toward the towns and cities. More recently, the expansion of employment possibilities in the city has provided a needed alternative for villagers whose labor is superfluous on their family homestead or who are no longer able to support life on their share of the excessively subdivided inheritance. This is not to imply that the village people regularly and easily take to this alternative when they need it. The cultural bond between the villager and his land is a powerful and largely non-rational one, and the villager can hardly be blamed for his reluctance to leave the limited certainty of an inadequate landholding for the uncertainty of urban jobs. If his home situation is marginal, he is probably in debt, and his creditors will seek to prevent his escape. Despite urban wage levels, in the past it has been necessary for industrialists to expend much effort in recruiting a labor force in rural areas. Once hired, the migrant laborer is difficult to hold. He is inclined to become homesick for the familiarity of village and kin. Absenteeism and a high labor turnover reflect his divided loyalties.

On the other hand, the urban centers of Pakistan hardly compare favorably with the village as places to live. For the village migrant and his family the prospect is dismal and grossly overcrowded housing in the suburban bustees or slums, unless space can be found in the better but still inferior accommodations available in one of the degenerate villages that surround most growing urban centers. Bad sanitation, filth, noise, lack of privacy, excessive food and housing costs—the usual catalog of urban miseries—make the city in the villager's view a good place to avoid.

Under these conditions it is not surprising that he is reluctant to bring his family with him.[1] An unknown but probably considerable proproportion of the migrants to urban areas retain their parcel of land in the home village, upon which their dependents remain, and to which they themselves return for every holiday, local celebration, illness, death, or other event which can serve as the excuse for a trip home. They may even continue to cultivate, seeking urban employment only during the winter season when agricultural activity is slack. No one who has seen the East Pakistan village in the unique charm of its various seasonal and diurnal modes can fail to grasp something of the basis for the villager's preference.

In the end, he may have rather little choice. While he might resist the attraction of urban employment opportunities, demographic pressures within the village are not so easily denied. Certainly there has been increasing rural-urban migration in East Pakistan since Partition. Since the trend is likely to continue, there is an extremely urgent need for a systematic program of social science research to determine the consequences of this development both for the city and for the village. Lacking this, only certain broad inferences may be put forth here.

High labor turnover obviously means a relatively high labor cost despite low wages for the urban industry dependent upon village migrants. It is necessary to hire and pay a larger work force than can actually be employed to be sure that key plant and mill operations will not be left undermanned by a sudden increase in the rate of absences without notice. A transient labor force also means less chance for effective and responsible labor organization, less support for labor legislation, a weaker position in wage bargaining, less likelihood of acquiring and developing worker skills, and a number of related problems.[2] To the employer, not all these consequences may seem equally regrettable, but in the long run the depressed conditions of labor affect the employer directly through lowered morale and efficiency, pilfering, sabotage, and other devious expressions of discontent. He may be indirectly affected by the failure of depressed laborers to contribute to the growth of a local consumer market.

More devious, and in some ways perhaps more important, is the impact on urban social life and morale of a large transient, predominantly male, worker population. So long as the worker retains his village tie, it is obvious that he will be inclined to spend as little as possible of his city-earned wages in the city itself. While this may retard somewhat the enhancement of the urban living standard through industrial development projects, it nevertheless helps to solve the problem of a more equitable distribution of the benefits of industrialization throughout the rural areas.[3] Village loyalties undoubtedly prevent the villager from identifying himself

with the city and limit his assimilation into city life. The transition from small community to large community participation would be difficult even for a migrant with no village commitment. The temporary migrant is more likely to regard the city as a massive competition of predatory agents in which his personal survival rests on calculated advantage. Cut loose from the continuities and restraint of village routines and village moral surveillance, he becomes a highly volatile unknown quantity. The migrant who is deprived over long periods of a domestic release from sexual tensions as well as from the manifold social and economic frustrations of city and factory is subject to sudden and violent explosions of aggression on slight provocation. He blends readily into the emotional chaos of the rioting mob, particularly when the civil authority is absent or visibly irresolute.[4] In time, of course, a large portion of the migrant group will settle down permanently in the city and begin to accept urban ways, but the social and economic cost of the assimilation process, both for the city and for the migrants themselves, may be crucial in an unstable society with a marginal economy.

The effect of this type of migration on the villages cannot be asserted with equal confidence. It has been suggested that the influence of the returning migrant, with his superficial veneer of urbanism, would instill throughout the rural countryside "the urban intellectual ferment—above all, the urban conception of individualism, efficiency, and relativity".[5] However, the common laborer in a South Asian city is affected very little by the intellectual ferment, and can hardly be expected to act as the prophet of efficiency when he returns to the mofussil. Perhaps a few urban habits of consumption and leisure may be imported into the back country by the returnee, but beyond this no surmise is warranted.

It has already been noted that the influx of urban capital in the form of wages to the migrant may have the effect of sustaining or perhaps of raising the rural living standard. It is sometimes argued, on the other side, that the departure of the migrant means a loss to the village during their best working years of young people who had their early nurture at village expense, and that the village economy is thereby disadvantaged. However, the Bengal village usually cannot provide full and profitable employment to the labor it has. It suffers no ill by being deprived of another hungry mouth during the long idle season. If the migrant eventually sells his remnant of land and moves his family to a permanent residence in the city, his departure contributes some relief from the mounting tendency to uneconomic small holdings. It is thus reasonable to suppose that the city contact of the migrant worker represents a net economic gain for the village.

Where a joint family has a labor force too large for its landholding,

urban employment for one or more of its members may be a convenient way of retaining the family land and organization with a minimum of dislocation, even though the land is no longer sufficient to support the family in purely agricultural pursuits. Migrant agricultural labor has already provided a similar escape from the exigencies of excessive population increase. Urban employment involves a greater wrench with the past insofar as the individual is concerned, but it may offer less seasonal and, under stable economic conditions, a more secure source of supplementary income.

The over-all effect of this type of rural-urban contact is probably to preserve rather than to upset the traditional agrarian life pattern. It ameliorates some of the social consequences which have resulted from interference with the once comparatively stable balance of births and deaths. Nevertheless the temporary migrant pattern is limited both in extent and in duration; it is only a short-term expedient, a phase in the transition from rural agricultural pursuits to urban service or industrial employment.

The last two of the five forms of rural-urban contact, the urban employment of the residents of fringe villages and the extension of urban land uses into these areas, constitute the most extreme forms of village-urban contact. As the first of these proceeds the village becomes a kind of residential suburb. The second brings upheaval, movement, and the elimination of agriculture as a means of subsistence for the former residents of the expropriated land. The villages involved are relatively few in number, yet they experience most violently the grinding force of urbanization. Here the human costs of urban development are exacted in fullest measure.

The type of land which surrounds the city has a good deal to do not only with the type of industrial expansion that is possible in a given direction but also with the type of residential uses to which the land may be put while the advancing urban growth is still at a distance. In some places the fringe land is low-lying flood plain in which even the cultivator's huts must be constructed on specially built mud islands which remain above water during the monsoon. Industrial sites may be built on such terrain only at the expense of constructing first the high ground on which the plant is to be erected, with the inevitable problems of anchoring foundations in the newly laid soil. Only if no better sites are available, or if the particular location is essential for river transport connections, as in the case of the Adamjee jute mills on the Lakhya River, will industry be inclined to spread over into these lands. Even residential uses may not be expanded easily on such lands. The dry area is limited, and the non-local worker seeking to move closer to the city can seldom afford to invest much in housing.

High ground is more easily converted to both residential and industrial

uses, hence the two functions are frequently engaged in a competition in which the latter always has the ultimate advantage. While the city is growing there is a mounting demand in the surrounding village areas for housing. Since housing is a more intensive land use than highland agriculture, the latter tends to give way, tradition and sentiment to the contrary notwithstanding. As the city expands still further, industrial and public land uses thrust out into the very areas which have become crowded with the huts of urban workers. Once again the higher intensity land use prevails. Its advantage is more than economic, for not only the public installations but also many of the industries are government-sponsored projects with the legal power to possess the land with or without the owner's consent. This tendency for both residential and industrial land uses to seek the same type of land makes growth an expensive process for the government agency or industry which must compensate owners for the loss of land heavily invested in housing. It also means a human cost to the workers, many of them in marginal economic circumstances, who must experience a periodic uprooting. There is evidently no easy solution to this problem.

A CASE STUDY

For a more intensive study of the effect of urban expansion on fringe villages, we turn now to an analysis of some data collected by the writer and a Bengali colleague[6] in two Muslim villages on the northern outskirts of Dacca City in the spring of 1953. The nearer of the two villages, Kafrul, is about four miles from Dacca at its closest point, and borders on the grounds of the Dacca Agricultural Experiment Farm. The farther village, Senpara Parbata, is adjacent to the first on its northern edge. Both villages contain the mixture of dry and wet lands which characterizes the region, though the terrain is generally high and suitable for uses other than farming. In the northernmost part of the farther village the land is too high and dry for the best cultivation and resembles somewhat the barren region of the Madhupur Jungle. Between the two villages is a funnel-shaped lowland area which is narrow and shallow at the eastern end but which deepens and widens to the west as it approaches a tributary of the Burhi Ganga River. During the wet season this is filled with water and forms a barrier between the two villages. It is not impassible by any means, but the farther village is a little more remote and isolated because of it.

The relative isolation of Senpara Parbata has given it some immunity from the influence of Dacca until very recent times, so that the comparison of the two villages gives a rough indication of the direction of social change with increased urban contact. The present status of Kafrul may be



FIG. 2 — DACCA CITY AND ITS ENVIRONS

taken as a forecast of the impending fate of villages not yet within the grasp of the city's threatening tentacles.

There is some reason to believe that the present encroachment is not the first in the history of these villages. During the "Golden Age" of Dacca under Shaista Khan in the latter half of the seventeenth century, the city is reported to have extended continuously from the Burhi Ganga River all the way to Tongi, a town about fourteen miles north.[7] Thomas Bowrey declares that Dacca in his day was "not lesse in Circuit then 40 English miles",[8] but it is hard to believe that the "circuit" had a uniform radius. Most likely the extension of Dacca to Tongi was principally a built-up area of continuous residences, shops, and bazaars in a swath a few hundred yards wide on either side of the Dacca–Tongi road. It is unlikely that the present areas of Kafrul and Senpara Parbata were much involved. Certainly, today they present no traces above ground of Mughal terra cotta construction. They may have served in those days too as an urban residential fringe: the perishable huts of mud and matting, perennial feature of the Bengal landscape, would quickly have vanished as the city waned. But it is unlikely that they were ever completely enveloped in a thronging metropolis.

With the removal of the Mughal provincial court in 1702, Dacca passed through a period of alternating decline and growth until the creation of the short-lived province of East Bengal and Assam from 1905 to 1912. Growth was moderate for the next two decades, but a rapid expansion took place in the 1930's, when the population increased by 50 per cent. During the 1940's, the population increase was about 40 per cent. This rate of growth appears to have continued.

To the village people of Kafrul and Senpara Parbata this growth has meant a gradual penetration of urban influences in several forms: (1) the physical displacement of the villagers by urban types of land use, (2) increasing urban types of employment, and (3) the gradual encroachment of urban folkways. These influences may be distinguished only for analytical purposes, for in reality they are closely related to one another, and their penetration was simultaneous.

Because Dacca is bounded on the south by the Burhi Ganga River, and on the east by very low-lying lands, the logical direction for expansion of the city is across the high grounds lying to the north and west. Expansion to westward is shortly cut off by a bend in the Burhi Ganga and by one of its tributaries, the Turag River, so that the northward highlands are the most promising. Their topographical advantages are enhanced by the Tongi Road and the single track line of the East Bengal Railway which together provide transport connections between the city proper and other Bengal towns. As

a result, villages immediately adjacent to the city on its northern flank are threatened with urban inundation. The first penetration occurred over forty years ago with the establishment of the Dacca Farm. It took up all or part of the land of about ten different villages, including the southern and most densely populated end of Kafrul. Villagers whose land was claimed by the government were paid some compensation, but according to a contemporary Kafrul resident, very few of them had the foresight to invest their money in the purchase of new land. Some went on spending sprees at the end of which they were reduced to abject poverty. There was little in the cultural background of the villager to prepare him for the conversion of land wealth to money wealth, and accordingly some were unsuccessful in meeting the crisis. Others suffered only a moderate decline in living standard and were able to check further loss by the purchase of land from residents in the unaffected part of Kafrul and other nearby villages. A few moved to Sylhet and other parts of Assam. The rest scattered to places unknown. Some villagers emerged from the upheaval with too little land for independent cultivation and they have since become a part of the large force of agricultural wage laborers. In sum, the displacement was a shattering experience and is remembered as such by those who lived through it.

The next major dislocation came with the construction of the airport during World War II, which pre-empted another part of Kafrul and a smaller neighboring village. Once again the area occupied was fairly densely populated by villagers, some of whom had already been displaced by the previous invasion. This time, however, the money promised villagers in compensation for lost land was not paid. According to village accounts, the British Government of India responded to anxious inquiries with many assurances but no money. After five years of delay, the confusion of independence and subsequent events descended and the villagers' claims seem to have been lost entirely in the shuffle.

These were the major land acquisitions at the expense of Kafrul, but there have been several others. One took place in 1953 while the data for the present study were being collected. Within the year previous, a section of Senpara Parbata in the vicinity of Mirpur was taken over for a rubber products factory, resulting in a displacement to less satisfactory land of fifteen or twenty families. Just beyond the northern edge of Senpara Parbata a new brick factory had been laid out in the next village, and the service road for the factory passed through the northwest corner of Senpara Parbata. Shortly before the interviewing was concluded in April of 1953, there was a flurry of rumors to the effect that the Dacca Farm itself might have to give way to more intensive industrial land uses, depriving of their livelihood those villagers who had become dependent upon the Farm for

employment. Whatever the substance of the rumor, the rapid expansion of urban institutions in the whole Tejgaon region had begun to take on, in village eyes, the character of an ominously irresistible force. However trivial their landholdings, the land still means security, and the threat of loss at what appears to villagers as the ever alien and unfriendly hand of government, creates in village people a deep sense of uneasiness.

The invasion of urban land uses had other, more tangible results for the balance of Kafrul and Senpara Parbata. Many of the displaced persons settled in the remaining parts of Kafrul and surrounding villages. The same institutions which had displaced them attracted increasing numbers of migrants, seeking work, who also bought land and settled in the villages. The result was a considerable increase in population on a shrinking land area. Access to the village lists of earlier census reports, which was not possible in this case, would be required in order to measure this increase exactly, but some notion of its scope is gained from the recollections of older villagers about the former population density in Kafrul. Twenty-five years previously, according to this testimony, there had been only about seven or eight households in the middle hamlet of Kafrul, where there are now about 140.[9] At the time of this study, the total number of households in Kafrul was 277, and in Senpara Parbata, 390. In several cases there are as many as twelve households located on a single plot. Here the village resembles the closely packed types found elsewhere in South Asia more than the dispersed pattern usual in Bengal.

The density of Kafrul, 1,188 persons per square mile, is considerably higher than Senpara Parbata's 465 per square mile, but there is some indication that the latter is having a more rapid relative growth.[10] A count of households plotted on the agricultural survey map of 1919 indicates a relatively greater increase for Senpara Parbata over a thirty-year period. We may infer that proximity to the city had given Kafrul an early advantage, but that further urbanization in the region has tended to neutralize this advantage. However, Kafrul has probably always had a higher density because of the large section of Senpara Parbata which is too dry for intensive cultivation. Unless there is serious underenumeration in the census lists for 1951, the two villages have grown about 5 per cent in the two years from April 1951 to April 1953. This is a fairly rapid rate for an area still largely agricultural.

The increasing population density has led inevitably to a decreasing average size of landholding. Owners of land in the remainder of Kafrul apparently felt either a moral or an economic compulsion to sell to their displaced fellow villagers and also to migrants. These were able to purchase at least enough land on which to build a house. Some acquired enough

to supplement the family income with cultivation of a little rice or other foodstuffs, but very few were able to re-establish themselves as self-sufficient cultivators.

The first influx of new settlers must have had little effect on the pressure of population on land, for twenty-five years ago, according to villagers' recollections, only about one-third of the land of Kafrul was under cultivation in any one season. All of the relatively few families had enough to leave a large share fallow, and the aman (winter) rice crop alone sufficed for their needs. Each family had its own milk supply and its sugar needs were met by extracting date palm juice. The struggle for food was much less intense and the annual labor of the cultivator much lighter than at present. Under conditions of such affluence, with due allowance for the bias of nostalgia, it is likely that the villages were able to absorb additional population for some time without being aware of the ultimate consequences.

Present conditions contrast sharply with this idyll of village life a generation ago. Instead of abundant land, 20 per cent of the households in Kafrul and 14 per cent in Senpara Parbata today have no land at all. Another 22 per cent in Kafrul and 8 per cent in Senpara Parbata have only small amounts of high ground, usually just enough for a house site, and grow no crops at all. The remaining 56 per cent in Kafrul and 78 per cent in Senpara Parbata have enough land to grow at least some crops, though in both villages the amount is often very small. More than one-third of the households grow less than ten maunds[11] of rice annually. In Kafrul only 23 per cent of the households grow the diversified crops which characterize the traditional agricultural pattern, while in Senpara Parbata the figure is 46 per cent. These figures show that landholding in Kafrul, despite generally better land for cultivation, is shifting toward a residential pattern and that the trend is much farther advanced there than in Senpara Parbata.

Not all of the subdivision of landholdings can be ascribed to the influx of new settlers. Population increase through a higher birth rate also played a part. There are undoubtedly households in Kafrul and Senpara Parbata once able to support themselves entirely by agriculture which have now grown so large that they cannot subsist by this means alone. If all households whose eldest consanguinal members were born in the village where they now reside were classified as "indigenous", it would be found that in Kafrul less than 40 per cent of such households gain their living mainly or entirely from agriculture. Nearly 30 per cent of indigenous Kafrul households depend entirely upon nonagricultural incomes, while only 4 per cent of Senpara Parbata families are in this category. Even the "non-indigenous" households, those whose living elders were born elsewhere, are more

dependent upon nonagricultural incomes in Kafrul than in Senpara Parbata.

This tendency toward increasing dependence upon sources of income other than agriculture is almost certainly involuntary on the part of most of the indigenous families, and it may be largely so with the others as well. The cultural bonds which tie the Bengali cultivator to the soil appear to be broken in most instances only under force of direct necessity, and the break is postponed as long as possible. This seems to explain the practice, both for old and new residents, of holding onto a small parcel of cultivable land, long after the household wage earners have given up regular work in the fields, even though its yield is only three or four maunds of rice annually. The tie is not merely irrational or quasi-religious emotionality. To be separated from the land means abandoning the inherited skills of past generations. It compels a change in the rhythm of life. The life of the cultivator, with its weather-determined cycles in which periods of intensive activity alternate with periods of leisure, spent in gossip at the regional markets complete with the pleasures of chewing pan and smoking the hookah, has an appeal not to be found in the routine of industrial work. There is also a loss of control over the conditions of work which must be especially significant for a man who aspires to the position of headship of a household and master of its labor force. When such an individual takes employment under an industrial foreman, a loss of status is involved for which the economic reward cannot fully compensate. In view of all this, the shift from agriculture seen in these villages attests the inexorability of the social forces at work. Only the pressure of population growth beyond the capacity of local resources can compel such changes.

The transition from agriculture appears to be made as gradually as possible. The first stage of transition occurs when the family land is no longer sufficient to support the household and provide employment for its labor. One or more of the young males of employable age may be sent out to live with a more prosperous cultivator and his family as an "agricultural servant". Usually he will receive in return for his labor board and lodging and sometimes two or three rupees per month as wages, an expedient mainly for the young boys of indigent families. Older males may earn a fixed wage by working for larger landholders as agricultural labor, or in Kafrul and the nearer edge of Senpara Parbata they may be employed on the Dacca Farm. In these situations, at least, a minimum of personal readjustment is entailed. The laborer is able to retain the techniques which he has learned from his elders, and the cycle of activities is close to that which he has known previously. The owner or foreman takes the place of the household patriarch, and the worker supplies much the same kind of labor he once gave to the household economy. But the locus of

employment has shifted, the worker and his family have become dependent upon the will of others, and the control of the job is no longer in family hands. Furthermore, the significance of the fixed wage as a new form of incentive for work is not to be overlooked. It means that the job has more claims on the worker and the worker less claim on the job than was the case where he cultivated his own land. Although the shift to agricultural laborer deceptively appears to be a simple one for the peasant, in reality it entails considerable change.

The next stage in the transition is toward traditional nonagricultural employments. Some forms of business activity, notably the sale of home produce, fruit, vegetables, milk, bamboo, thatch, and firewood fall into this category, along with a few locally saleable skills and services such as housebuilding, roof thatching, cart hire, cattle brokerage, produce wholesaling, herb medicine, and other village arts and trades. Also among the traditional employments are those which can be classed as domestic service occupations, including bearer (houseboy), peon (messenger), mahli (gardener), chowkidar (watchman), darwan (doorman), and the like. Though some of these occupations mean that increasing proportions of the villager's time are spent in activities other than cultivation and often take him outside the village, they do not demand a complete break with the collective past of Bengali rural culture. Still, the individual who makes the change is being partially divorced from the land without prospect of return.

The final stage takes the villager entirely into urban activities. These include urban types of business (wayside tea stalls, shops, and hawker routes), urban skills (mechanic, electrician, bricklayer, rikshawala, truck driver, clerk), and finally manual labor. These villagers have no economic tie to the village apart from its significance as a place of residence or their position in a household some of whose members still cultivate the family land. As far as their personal life pattern is concerned they are no longer rural at all, and the transition is complete.

The outline of stages just given is not intended to describe the life history of the typical villager whose village is in transition. Few villagers would actually move through occupations in this order. Many households show considerable flexibility in combining occupations from several different stages. However, the village as a whole does seem to pass through this sequence. Kafrul is much farther advanced in the transition than its outlying neighbor. Only 19 per cent of its employed males are mainly engaged in cultivating their own land, compared with 41 per cent for Senpara Parbata. Nearly twice as high a proportion of Senpara Parbata residents are agricultural servants. More Kafrulis give "agricultural laborer" as their

principal occupation (22 per cent compared with 18 per cent in Senpara Parbata), but three out of four are employed on the Dacca Farm compared with less than one out of four in Senpara Parbata who are employed outside the village itself. In the domestic, skilled, clerical, transport, and manual labor occupations Kafrul also leads by a fair margin. Only in business does Senpara Parbata exceed Kafrul (11 per cent as against 8 per cent for Kafrul), but here more than four out of five of Senpara Parbata's businessmen carry on their business in the village, while only one in ten in Kafrul does so. In every respect the data are consistent in showing Kafrul more urbanized than Senpara Parbata.

Further support for the idea of a sequence of stages is found in the data on the mean number of years employed outside their own village of men with different types of outside occupation. These data do not cover the duration of employment of persons who are able to work within the village, and there are too few cases to control effectively for age, but despite these limitations it is quite clear that the agricultural laborers at the Dacca Farm and the domestic workers, most of them also employed at the Farm, have the longest average periods of service (means of 12.0 and 12.1 years respectively), while the business group are intermediary and the manual labor group the most recent (10.0 and 7.2 years respectively). These figures are for Kafrul only. In Senpara Parbata, the cases are too few for analysis except for manual laborers who averaged 5.6 years worked outside with about half the cases in the less-than-one-year category.

The two villages may also be contrasted in the degree of outside contact their workers have through their jobs. In Kafrul only 35 per cent of employed males were able to carry out their occupations within the village, while in Senpara Parbata 78 per cent were employed within their own village. The Dacca Farm is, as noted, more important for Kafrul than for Senpara Parbata but apart from this, 30 per cent of Kafrul workers are employed in Dacca City and the fringe towns, while only 17 per cent of Senpara Parbata workers are employed in the city and nearby towns.

If income were the major factor behind the shift from agricultural to nonagricultural occupations, the transition would be much further along than it is. In both these villages the median income from agricultural pursuits is lower than that for any other type of occupation. In order to obtain median incomes for cultivation of own land which would be in some degree comparable with those for occupations with fixed wages, it was necessary to divide the market value of the total annual agricultural product of a household by the number of persons in it giving cultivation as their primary occupation, and to enter the net figure for each cultivator. This method probably overstates the relative income from agriculture since many of the

workers giving nonagricultural jobs as their primary employment also helped out during planting and harvest, while the resulting agricultural wealth was assigned only to those listed primarily as cultivators. No data were obtained on the wages paid out by large-scale cultivators to hired help during seasons of heavy employment. On the other hand, there is probably some under-reporting of secondary crops, especially in Kafrul. The influence of extreme cases may be minimized by using only median values, but income from cultivation may still be exaggerated by as much as ten or fifteen per cent.

Even with these figures, cultivation does not compare favorably with any other occupation except agricultural labor. Kafrul, with its superior land and proximity to urban markets, affords a better annual income than Senpara Parbata. The medians are 417 and 381 rupees. The agricultural laborer gets even less, and the difference is relatively greater in Senpara Parbata, where there are fewer job alternatives at hand. In Kafrul, the median for agricultural laborers is 400 rupees, in Senpara Parbata 298 rupees. The most prosperous cultivators reported incomes of over 2,000 rupees, whereas the best paid agricultural laborers rarely exceeded 700 rupees in Kafrul and 500 rupees in Senpara Parbata. Obviously, the cultivator who becomes an agricultural laborer suffers economic hardship. Probably no one would make the change unless forced to do so because of loss or excessive subdivision of the family land. On the basis of income alone manual labor would seem to be more attractive. In Kafrul the median income of manual laborers was 494 rupees and in Senpara Parbata, where the new industries have set a somewhat higher standard wage, the median is 520 rupees. If income alone were operative, there would be a high turnover in agricultural labor, which in fact there is not. The inference is that the amount of culture change required in giving up agriculture is too great an obstacle for many villagers.

Business is a highly diversified job category, ranging from real estate sales and labor contracting to pan and biri hawking. Kafrulis have more sophisticated urban businesses while Senpara Parbata businesses are mainly small operations catering to local needs. This fact is reflected in the median incomes: 713 rupees for Kafrul, 383 rupees for Senpara Parbata. Domestic and skilled occupations are also relatively high-income. Senpara Parbata has too few cases to warrant separate figures, but in Kafrul these occupations have medians of 652 rupees and 850 rupees respectively.

Generally speaking, the influence of urbanization has been to produce a rise in the cash income of village families. Without the additional income from some members employed outside the village, many families which are still primarily agricultural could not support themselves. There are instances in which a single son with a clerical job in the city

is able to contribute more to the family income than all the rest of the family who continue to work the land. In quite a few instances the income of the younger sons from manual labor exceeds that of the elder from cultivation. For such families, the economic support from urban employment is at least a stabilizing influence; frequently it is their salvation.

Though Kafrul is closer to the city, the percentage of all Kafrulis born outside the village is smaller than the corresponding figure for Senpara Parbata — 30.4 per cent compared with 35.5 per cent. But these figures by themselves are not very meaningful since they do not distinguish by age or sex. In both villages a high proportion of the female migrants come in as brides from immediately surrounding villages in keeping with a widespread but not universal pattern of village exogamy. Such migration is not a product of urban influence. Male migrants generally come from greater distances, sometimes whole groups of families moving at one time from the same place. In the past, Kafrul has seen a large influx of migrants from Mymensingh. Senpara Parbata has had a similar but smaller invasion from Tippera. Recently the migration has been more individualized occupationally. The earlier group migrations were mainly made by households seeking land for cultivation. Virtually all this migration occurred thirty or more years ago in Kafrul, where the median years since migration of male migrants now engaged in cultivation is thirty-six years. Those early migrants who could not afford sufficient land to provide for their families passed sooner or later into agricultural labor. In Senpara Parbata the stream of migrants seeking land has continued to the present, with a considerable influx of cultivators and agricultural laborers occurring ten to fourteen years ago. In both villages, recent migrants are increasingly engaged in urban types of employment. The tendency has been for the occupational objectives of migrants to shift in time from agricultural to nonagricultural pursuits, and the trend is more advanced in the nearer than in the remote village. As a result, the households of migrants are more dependent upon nonagricultural income than are those of nonmigrants, though the contrast is diminishing because so many sons of nonmigrant cultivators are compelled to seek other types of employment.

Literacy in some language was reported by nearly 12 per cent of the people of Kafrul and almost 8 per cent of those in Senpara Parbata. These figures are not low for rural areas, but they cannot be taken at their face value. No doubt many of those reporting themselves literate in Bengali could in fact read very little and write less. The same may be true of the few people claiming literacy in Urdu and English. Claims of literacy in Arabic usually denote only the ability to read the words of the Qur'an for purposes of prayer without comprehension. This is obviously not literacy

in the usual sense of the term. Removing the cases reporting only Arabic from the count reduces the percentages of those literate for the two villages to 10 per cent and 5 per cent respectively. The majority of cases of literacy in Arabic only are women, in whom this gracious embellishment enhances the opportunities for marriage. In Senpara Parbata, thirty-four out of the forty-two women reported as literate were readers of Arabic. In Kafrul, however, more women are literate in Bengali, alone or together with Arabic, than in Arabic only, and one ambitious lady is reported literate in Arabic, Bengali, Urdu, and English. The higher literacy rate and the greater emphasis on the vernacular in Kafrul probably are due to urban influence.

Further evidence of the relation of literacy to urbanization is gained by comparing the literacy rates for males of educable age by the principal occupation of the head of the household in which they reside. In every significant category the rates are higher for Kafrul than for Senpara Parbata. In Kafrul the business, domestic, and skilled categories have higher rates than do the cultivators, with more than half of the males in skilled workers' households literate. In Senpara Parbata, however, the skilled are the only group to exceed the cultivators, and the cases are insufficient for reliability.[12] Three general facts emerge from these data: the prosperous cultivator was traditionally the one villager who educated his children, but in the urbanized village he is falling behind his non-agricultural neighbors, except for manual laborers, who have not kept pace.

Too much importance should not be attached to the growth of village literacy as a symbol or source of social change. For the present, at least, it is a mistake to imagine the village literate as a channel for the communication of urban ideas and folkways to the rural hinterland. Such a view would overestimate his proficiency and misconstrue his motivation. He does not become literate, or provide for the education of his sons, in order to expose his family to the tradition-corrupting influence of urbanism. The village literate, or sponsor of literacy, sees education as a mark of status recognized and respected within the established culture of the village community. If he can afford it, he will offer board and lodging to a student from the nearby college or university in return for reading lessons for his children. In Kafrul there were a number of young "tutors" in residence from the Agricultural Institute whose pupils could sometimes be heard behind mud walls of an evening, chanting their lessons at full cry in the best tradition of Bengali primary education. The graduates of such schooling do not at once become avid subscribers to the urban vernacular press. Until village life is more fully integrated with the urban world, so

that a knowledge of reading and writing becomes a daily necessity, village literacy cannot be an important medium for social change.

Much has been written about the dissolution of the joint family upon urban contact, and many a commonplace observation has been cited in proof. Concrete data are harder to find. It has been suggested that the lament over the collapse of the joint family in the village is both premature and, from some vantage points, ill considered as well,[13] but by and large the joint family and its manifold virtues have been unstintingly romanticized. The patriarchal family, extended kinship obligations, and the need for a sizable household labor force have combined with the system of equal land inheritance to produce and maintain this type of family organization, and at its best the joint family undoubtedly fulfills important needs for all its members. Nevertheless it has its abuses, and while in marginal cases it may prevent excessive subdivision of landholdings from resulting in the reduction of one barely subsisting parent family to four or five utterly destitute conjugal families, the respite can hardly exceed one generation. Once the household population has grown beyond the capacity of the land to employ and feed it, the joint family system avails little. The sudden abandonment of the system on a village-wide scale could seriously disturb village social organization, but the joint family, like most agrarian family patterns, is persistent and would not disappear without good reason.

In Kafrul and Senpara Parbata there is no evidence that any rapid dissolution of joint families has taken place. The percentage of all households which are joint, even by the most generous definition, is small and about the same in both villages: Kafrul 15 per cent and Senpara Parbata 14 per cent. It is possible that the process has reached an equal stage in both villages, but even if this doubtful conclusion be entertained, the trend may not be ascribed to urban influences. When these are classified by the principal occupation of the head of the household, the joint family system is more often found where the head is engaged only in agricultural work, much less frequently when his employment is entirely nonagricultural, but a fair proportion of heads of joint families are partly employed at nonagricultural jobs. In fact, in Senpara Parbata the joint family heads employed at least partly in nonagricultural pursuits actually outnumber those who are exclusively agricultural. The number of joint families whose entire labor force is engaged in cultivation of the family land is few indeed. Of the total joint family labor force 38 per cent in Kafrul and 39 per cent in Senpara Parbata were employed mainly in cultivation. The balance were engaged either in agricultural labor or in some nonagricultural job. These figures do not take account of the high incidence of nonagricultural secondary occupations. Not only is the joint family a minor feature of the family structure of these

villages, but it is also dependent upon nonagricultural support in many instances for its continuance. This is not to say that the joint family will survive the complete urbanization of these villages, for probably it will not. But in the transition period its demise has in many instances been postponed in part by the very forces usually supposed to be its undoing.

There is no significant difference between Kafrul and Senpara Parbata in the fertility rates of the women ever married, even when variation in years of marriage during the childbearing ages are controlled and the disturbing effects of divorce and premature widowhood eliminated from the analysis. Even without such controls the average number of children ever born per woman ever married show little difference. Nor does distance from Dacca City have any consistent effect. Occupation of husband does appear to affect fertility. Wives whose husbands combine an agricultural with a nonagricultural occupation have a higher fertility rate than those whose husbands are entirely one or the other. However, the differences between occupational groups are significant only in the case of the "agriculture only" group, which is distinctly below expectation based on married years during childbearing ages. Income also seems to affect fertility, low incomes depressing it and higher incomes raising it by a small amount. These data lead to a tentative suggestion that urban contact, by improving the living of marginal cultivators, may initially raise the fertility of the rural population above the level to which extreme adversity had depressed it. It is too early yet to trace in these villages the decline in fertility usually associated with urbanization. Generally speaking, fertility is only indirectly responding to the effects of urban contact and only in limited degree.

Closely related to fertility is age at marriage. Early marriage in Bengal is an elemental part of family practice, deeply embedded in Bengali culture and yet so strongly condemned by Western values prevalent in urban culture that contact between city and village must sooner or later bring conflict. If such a conflict exists already, one expression of it might well be a reluctance to admit to outsiders the extreme youthfulness of a village wife or to reveal the age at which she was first married. At least one of these biases is known to be operating in the present data. In view of this, the facts as given are all the more remarkable, for they show that the practice of early marriage is universal today in Kafrul and Senpara Parbata. In all of Kafrul there is not a single female above fourteen years of age who has not been married at least once, while in Senpara Parbata there are only four, and they are under twenty years. The age at marriage reported for women under thirty years ranges from birth to twenty-three years in Kafrul and from three years to twenty years in Senpara Parbata.[14] The mean age

at marriage for all Kafrul women is 11.7 years and for Senpara Parbata 11.1 years. Because of several defects in the data these figures are certainly too high, and it is doubtful that the difference between villages can be considered significant. It is due chiefly to village differences in age at marriage inaccurately reported for women of advanced age. Bias in reporting probably was greater in Kafrul, where the attitudes of outsiders are presumably better known than in Senpara Parbata. Mean ages at marriage for women of different age groups do not show any consistent trend toward either higher or lower ages at marriage within the lifetime of women now living.

Age at marriage for males is somewhat higher than for females. In Kafrul it is 19.4 years, in Senpara Parbata 19.6 years. Once again the figures for age at marriage show no consistent trend when the means for different age groups are compared. Since the same biases are probably present in the data for both sexes, the actual mean age at marriage in the villages today may be nearer to seventeen to eighteen years for men and ten years for women. None of the data indicate any change in age at marriage which can be ascribed to urban influences in the village.

Like child marriage, polygyny is one of the practices of rural Bengal which might also be expected to undergo some repression with the spread of urban culture. Western cultural influence pervasive in the cities is equally opposed to both practices, though polygyny is not unknown in the higher reaches of educated urban society. The frequency of polygynous marriages is usually low in any polygynous society, due largely to economic limitations. Therefore, apart from the doubtful force of alien cultural interdiction, the enhanced economic status of the urbanized village may actually enable more villagers to partake of the luxury. In Kafrul the proportion of such marriages to the total is about 14 per cent and in Senpara Parbata 12 per cent. This does not provide enough cases for a reliable breakdown by occupation. However, the data suggest that the economic factor is indeed the major one. In Kafrul, where cultivators who remain at cultivation usually enjoy moderate prosperity, the rate is higher than in Senpara Parbata. In both villages the incidence among the lower paid categories of agricultural labor and manual labor falls below the village average, while the business, domestic, and skilled categories are generally above. Thus it appears that where urban influence raises the standard of living here may be some increase in polygyny, but it is impossible to say how much and for how long.

Divorce in these villages is more frequent among young women than among older women. Many child marriages end in divorce by the time the wife has reached age fourteen or fifteen years, usually while the wife is still

childless. Remarriage is comparatively easy, and most if not all women divorced while still young soon find another husband. Despite verbal condemnation, divorce is not at all uncommon, and the data given here surely understate the actual frequency. The percentages for both sexes of persons ever married who have been divorced at least once are slightly higher in Senpara Parbata than in Kafrul: for males in Kafrul 26 per cent and in Senpara Parbata 30 per cent; for females 17 per cent and 20 per cent. The difference between villages is not significant, and part of that between sexes may be due to the fact that the informants were always husbands who must occasionally have failed to mention, or possibly did not know about, a previous divorce by one of their wives. Having two or more divorces appears to be more frequent in Senpara Parbata than in Kafrul, and more common for men than for women, but the number of cases is very small. There are no meaningful differences in divorce rates by occupation. In short, divorce does not seem to be influenced so far by urban contact.

Widowhood is more apt to reflect changes in the asperity of living conditions than changes in family culture patterns, except insofar as the latter affect conditions of work and health of wives within the house. We would expect that since urbanization first changes the conditions of male employment, the chances of widowhood for females would be more affected by urbanization than those for males, and this is in fact the case. Widowhood rates for males are practically identical in the two villages, Kafrul 25 per cent and Senpara Parbata 26 per cent, indicating that a shift to urbanized employment for husbands has had little effect on the wives, whose regimen must be much the same as it always was. For women, however, there is apparently much less chance of being widowed in Kafrul than in Senpara Parbata. Of women ever married in Senpara Parbata, 28 per cent have been widowed at least once, compared with only 17 per cent in Kafrul. Without controls for age it is dangerous to infer too much from these figures. Still the obvious interpretation is supported by other data showing that mortality generally is somewhat higher in Senpara Parbata than in Kafrul, regardless of age.

There is also the fact that multiple widowhood is more common in Senpara Parbata, and that a higher proportion of Senpara Parbata widows were able to marry a second time, 46 per cent compared with 29 per cent in Kafrul. It is questionable whether these last are cultural changes due to urban influence. If so, it is noteworthy that the remarriage of divorcees has not been so affected. In both villages 86 per cent of women ever divorced had been able to remarry, and most of those who had not yet done so probably will eventually remarry. Since widows are much older, on the average,

than divorcees, and especially in the more urbanized village, over-all remarriage rates for widows are probably declining. Young widows may still have a fair chance of remarriage but they will constitute a smaller proportion of all widows as working conditions become safer and healthier for young husbands. Already the proportion of widows over fifty years is higher in Kafrul than in Senpara Parbata, being 55 per cent and 46 per cent respectively. In these cases, urban influence is brough to bear on widowhood and widow remarriage for women through demographic factors affecting the life expectancy of their husbands.

Family structure has shown a considerable resistance to the forces of social change brought into the village by urban contact. Only those facets which are closely tied to the economic aspects of urbanization seem to have undergone any change, and even this is slight. Village social structure in general has not, by popular account, been as immune to the surrounding forces as has the family. Some of the changes reported by old residents are trivial, others no doubt exaggerated, but there is no denying the fact that they have witnessed some vicissitudes which have considerably altered the traditional character of village social relations.

The first great period of change in the memory of living inhabitants of Kafrul was the establishment of the Dacca Farm. The change in occupations which came with the Farm must have brought about a major rearrangement in the status structure of the village. We have already noted how unwise spending of the compensation paid by the government to the villagers displaced by the Farm led to their reduction, in many instances, from affluence to beggary. The provision of other sources of employment greatly weakened the control over the village life once exercised by the wealthier villagers. Those already reduced to the status of agricultural laborers were able to escape dependence upon the village aristocrats. Since these villagers were both the formal and informal leaders of the village, the political and social controls were probably lost along with the economic. More and more of the village families have lost their former agricultural self-sufficiency, but the increased economic dependence on the urban economy has weakened dependence on the village. The diversification of occupations and the attendant economic upheavals may also have tended to increase the social distance between rich and poor, while at the same time creating a bewildering array of new social categories of which the relative social standing cannot be immediately established.

The invasion of migrants added another element of diversity. The earlier migration was mainly composed of agriculturists from other districts seeking new land to cultivate. Their arrival could not have done much to change the employment pattern of the village. Since not merely whole

families but whole clusters of families moved from the same village into Kafrul and Senpara Parbata, it would be a mistake to picture these migrants in conventional Western terms as detached from all former associations, secular, uncontrolled, and unpredictable aliens in a strange world. They brought with them intact an island of their home culture. They settled closely in the new village, establishing here and there little Mymensinghs and little Tipperas.[15] However similar their living habits to those of native residents, common origin apparently set them apart from old village families and led to the formation of a substructure of cliques within the village. They became a focus for village antagonisms. Even today their fellow villagers remember them as those who destroyed fruit trees in their quest for fuel, who refused to cooperate in village-wide activities, who would not forget their quarrels on feast days, initiated changes in dress, and generally disturbed the traditional harmony of the village. No doubt the distinctions ascribed to them were not entirely of their own doing, for the village probably does not open its arms readily to strangers. The migrant is always a convenient scapegoat, and may be called upon to bear the brunt of hostilities generated elsewhere in the village. But either way, the presence of migrants adds a new facet to village social structure; an element of change has been introduced.

If such cleavages could be laid to the migrant cultivators of thirty years ago, the rift must be even greater between older residents of the village and the modern nonagricultural migrants with whom there is less to share. The casual nature of contacts with the newer migrants is epitomized in the case of three families of Bihari muhajirs, or refugees, who had settled in the village six months prior to the investigation. Even after this period, the names of the three heads of the households were still unknown to neighbors living within a hundred yards of them. They in turn were apprehensive and suspicious of villagers and strangers alike and had kept strictly to themselves. Their situation was one of extreme anonymity, with unmistakable signs of tension. It implies that the new migration may produce a more disturbing social upheaval than the old, particularly if the migrants are not merely noncultivators but also refugees. In such cases little assimilation has taken place, and there is nothing implicit in village structure or tradition which might make the process voluntary or easy.

Local informants among the older population of the village claim that recent years have seen a decline in the number of village-wide social activities. Nostalgic memory records a greater frequency of festivals and public entertainments in the past. There were "king's plays" staged by local talent, and the feasts that accompanied weddings and other occasions were more sumptuous than at present. Much more time is spent nowadays in litigation and quarrels between villagers, chiefly over land tenure and

property limits.[16] New residents lack interest in village development schemes and feel little loyalty to the general welfare of the village. There has been a decline in respect for elders and in the authority of the appointed leaders of the community. So runs the list of complaints of old residents against the contemporary generation.

Much of this must be discounted as the usual attitude of elders toward an age which has abandoned part of the heritage which was to have been their legacy. It is not impossible that a similar list of complaints might have been obtained from villages still completely isolated from urban influence. Certainly community action is far from dead in Kafrul and Senpara Parbata. During the period of this investigation many villagers in both villages contributed land for a road which was to be constructed through Kafrul and into Senpara Parbata, and then undertook the construction of the roadbed, working for the most part after hours by moonlight. A number of Kafrulis in the middle hamlet contributed timber, grounds, and money for a school house. The erection of the main pillars was the occasion for a village-wide celebration with sweets for the children. Both these efforts were largely village inspired, financed entirely by villagers, and directed by village leaders. Other examples could be cited, all occurring within the space of about six weeks. Most instances of community cooperation now in evidence were in fact a community response to urban forces impinging from without. Nevertheless, they were usually promoted and managed by village elders of long residence who felt the strongest identification with the village. Most of the opposition and a good deal of indifference was shown by outsiders who had recently come to the village and by those sons of original families who had been weaned away from the traditional calling by urban employment. Undoubtedly the lamentation over present evils rests upon a measure of truth.

The fate of Kafrul and Senpara Parbata is already determined. Within a few years the developing industries of Dacca will spread out farther along the Tongi and Mirpur roads, then begin to encroach little by little on the land between. The Dacca Farm will probably be displaced eventually. The last cultivators will disappear from all but the margins of the deep lowlands which separates the western parts of the two villages, as they became first residential and then industrial. The resident population will first be compressed into smaller, more densely packed areas, then expelled to relocate still further from the city.

Long before the physical identity of the villages has been destroyed, the last vestiges of the older social order will also have been obliterated. Many of the later residents will be temporary, stopping only long enough to look for employment in the city, renting briefly while they try to make

a success of industrial work, or until they have saved enough money to return to more remote home villages. Already temporary renters "looking for work" have begun to appear in Kafrul. They are no doubt the forerunners of an increasing stream. As this flow accumulates, the character of the village will be altered inevitably to something much more complex and much less stable. Inhabitants no longer tied to the soil cannot be expected to identify themselves with a house site which has at best an uncertain future. Improvements in their physical surroundings and social conditions will have to be undertaken mainly on the initiative of the civil authority from without. Sooner or later some civic effort must be applied to the problem in order to assure the steady and efficient labor supply necessary to modern industrial development. Meanwhile, those of the original villagers who are unable to adjust to the changes will either succumb to indigence or be dislodged from land and home to drift off in pathless ways of their own. The rest will remain, become city dwellers, and learn to resolve within themselves the exchange of a stable rural lifeway for the rewards of an urban living standard.

CONCLUSION

The fringe village is the extreme case of rural-urban contact, for here the rural and urban lifeways are in direct collision. In more remote villages the social effects of urbanization are slight and may be absorbed without destroying the continuity of village life, while the economic effects may actually help maintain village social structure by relieving temporarily the acute demographic pressures which accompany modernization. In the fringe, the same economic benefits accrue in even greater abundance, but at the expense of acute social upheaval. In Kafrul and Senpara Parbata the price of urbanization included periodic disastrous displacements of village residents, the confusion of social relations and loss of village unity with in-migration, abandonment of traditional agricultural skills, and a variety of less definable changes which adversely affected the security of the villager.

So far, family structure appears to be undisturbed. Perhaps even complete urbanization could take place without immediately changing the traditional role of women and other basic familial relations. The data suggest that village social structure is persistent, acceding only to the direct impact of powerful economic and demographic forces. But the tempo of change is accelerating in East Pakistan and many institutions which have survived unscathed until now may soon be caught in the maelstrom.

Ultimately, social change in many aspects of rural life is unavoidable. The main concern is that the human costs be kept within bounds and

that no single segment of Bengali society be called upon to bear an excessive share. Since fringe residents are a politically inert minority, their interests might easily be disregarded in a region where the claims on public sympathy are many and smaller voices are often unheard above the tumult. However, they are more important than their numbers suggest. As the fringe area retreats outward before the advance of the city, its impression is left upon many people who later join the urban labor force. Some are the original villagers, whose connection with the land has been abruptly severed, others are migrants who have taken up temporary residence in the fringe while making their first tentative trial of urban life. If fringe living is a disorganizing experience for both these groups, the city may inherit from them a population unstable in its living and working habits, susceptible to irrational fears and volatile emotions, inefficient to employ, costly to police, and difficult to assimilate. The highly coordinated mechanism of modern industrial society does not operate well when manned by such personnel. Thus the city may solve its technical problems only to be defeated by human problems of its own making.

The solution to this dilemma lies in some form of social planning to eliminate, or at least modify, the more destructive effects of sudden urbanization in an agrarian social order. Effective social planning, in turn, presupposes an adequate program of social research. In East Pakistan, such research is almost totally lacking. The UNESCO study of industrialization in the Narayanganj area,[17] just completed and unfortunately not available at present writing, is a promising beginning, but much more must be done. Dacca, Khulna, Chittagong, Chandraghona, and a number of other towns and industrial sites manifest different stages of urbanization in a variety of local situations, all of which must be analyzed before the process can be understood on a province-wide scale. Only then can social planning be carried forward with due regard both to the requirements of national development and to the welfare of village people.

NOTES

1. The resultant disproportionate concentration of males in urban centers is a distinct feature of social life in East Pakistan, as the following table indicates. The sex ratio for the province as a whole is 1,101 males per thousand females.

TABLE

SEX RATIO IN URBAN CENTERS OF EAST BENGAL*

	Males per thousand females
All urban centers	1,507
Dacca	1,652
Chittagong	1,827

*An urban center is defined as having five thousand inhabitants or more.

Source: Census of Pakistan, 1951, Vol. III, pp. 62; 64.

2. Kingsley Davis, The Population of India and Pakistan, Princeton, 1951, p. 136.

3. Processes and Problems of Industrialization in Underdeveloped Countries, New York, United Nations, 1955, p. 1.

4. According to this thesis, such worksites as the Adamjee jute mills or the Chandraghona paper mill tend to remain centers of tension, requiring a constant watch and delicate handling.

5. Davis, op. cit., p. 136.

6. Mr. M.A. Sami, then of the East Bengal Agricultural Institute, whose genuine feeling for the village people inspired in them an unusual degree of confidence and cooperation. Without this, and his unfailing patience and energy, there would have been no data.

7. Francis Bradley-Birt, The Romance of an Eastern Capital, London, 1906, 349 pp.

8. Thomas Bowrey, A Geographical Account of Countries Round the Bay of Bengal, 1669 to 1679, edited by Lt. Col. Sir Richard Carnac Temple, Cambridge, 1905, p. 150.

9. The survey map of 1919 is probably more accurate in showing fifteen to twenty houses, but the increase is still extreme.

10. The average population density in East Pakistan was 777 persons per square mile in 1951.

11. A maund is equal to 82.29 pounds.

12. The rates for families of agricultural laborers and the manual laborers are below those for cultivators in both villages. The over-all rates for educable males in Kafrul and Senpara Parbata are 23.3 per cent and 14.5 per cent.

13. Census of India, 1921, Vol. I, Part I, Report by J.T. Marten, Calcutta, Superintendent Government Printing, 1924, pp. 46-47.

14. Some of these very early marriages are attributed to the marrying panic which broke out in Bengal in 1930 just before the Sarda Act took effect.

15. Mymensingh and Tippera are two densely populated districts adjacent to Dacca district.

16. Formerly, villagers were shy with strangers and lacked the courage even to dispute among themselves. Now feuds and disagreements are more frequent.

17. Atwar Husain, Human and Social Impact of Technological Change in Pakistan, (Typescript), Dacca, 1956. An abridged version has been published by the UNESCO Centre in Calcutta with the title, The Social Implications of Urbanisation and Industrialisation. It is reported that the larger study is to be published by the Oxford University Press.

CHAPTER II

CHITTAGONG HILL TRIBES

DENISE and LUCIEN BERNOT

The peninsula-like strip of land which lies to the southeast of East Pakistan comprises the two districts of Chittagong and Chittagong Hill Tracts. That portion which borders the Bay of Bengal has long been settled by fishermen and traders, mostly centered around the port of Chittagong. Beyond the coastal plain rise the lower hills of the Manipur area, cut by many rivers and valleys. The settled area forms the district of Chittagong, which is administered much like any other district of the province. But the hilly region, known as the Chittagong Hill Tracts, forms a unique administrative unit, inhabited and governed to a large extent by tribal peoples.

To the south lies the Naf River, which forms a natural boundary with the Burmese Arakan. On the eastern and northern borders lie the Lushei Hills district and Tripura state of India. Although the river and hills seem to form barriers to communication with the lands beyond, history reveals that there was a frequent movement of people among what are now Burma, India, and Pakistan. The hill tribes from the south and the north have settled in the Chittagong Hill Tracts along with Bengalis from the plains and Muslim refugees from India, all of whom live side by side.

Means of communication within the district are very limited. It is easier to travel along the rivers which cut through the hills and through the jungle. The rivers form a very compact network of waterways high in the eastern hills where most of them flow north and south before draining westward into the Bay of Bengal. The main river flowing east to west is the Karnafuli. It empties into the bay just beyond the port of Chittagong, which is located on its right bank. Another river is the Sangu, which rises in the hills bordering Arakan and flows northward to Bandarban and then westward past Dohazari and into the bay.

There are very few roads in the district, and they can be used by jeeps only during the dry season. The main road is from Chittagong to Rangamati, the district headquarters. There is also a road from Rangamati



FIG. 3 — CHITTAGONG HILL TRACTS

to Bandarban, a subdivisional headquarters, which extends to Khagrachari. Another extension of this road leads to the top of Chimbuk hill and will eventually be linked to Dohazari, the eastern terminus of the East Bengal Railroad.

In addition to the rivers and roads, there are a multitude of footpaths connecting the many small clusters of houses with one another and with the jungle clearings used for the cultivation of rice and other foods. There are seldom more than ten households in a village, and the villages are often widely scattered. The Hill Tracts district covers about five thousand square miles with only little more than a quarter of a million inhabitants, or less than sixty persons per square mile. Population density in the other districts of the province varies from four to fifteen hundred persons per square mile. [1]

The main commercial product of the Chittagong Hill Tracts is bamboo. There is a fairly large demand for it by the people of the plains, where intensive cultivation has absorbed most of the land formerly given over to forests. Bamboo is used for many purposes, and particularly for constructing houses and shops. In recent years a large mill has been built at Chandragona on the Karnafuli River to utilize the extensive resources of bamboo in making paper. When the paper mill reaches full production, it is estimated that it will be able to meet all the domestic requirements of Pakistan and still have a surplus for export.

The hill people either cut the bamboo themselves and float it down the river to the nearest market, or they allow plainsmen to enter their territory and cut bamboo in exchange for an agreed sum of money. In turn, the Bengali merchants from the plains have been active in establishing themselves in most of the local markets or bazaars, where they trade largely in cloth and cheap manufactured goods. Continued contact with the Bengalis through commercial intercourse has deeply affected the habits and dress of the hill people, many of whom have even learned some Bengali, though their basic patterns of life have not yet been affected.

THE PEOPLE

The differences which divide the hill people from the Bengalis are very great. Linguistically, Bengali is related to most of the other tongues of the subcontinent, while the languages of the hill tribes are Tibeto-Burmese in origin. About three-fourths of the Bengalis are Muslims, and one-fourth Hindus, while most of the hill people are Buddhists, Christians, or Animists, with the exception of the Tippera who are Hindus. The history of the hill people indicates that some of them originally migrated from

southeast Asia, and possibly from as far as South China.

The Chittagong Hill Tract district is administered by a Deputy Commissioner with headquarters at Rangamati. There are three subdivisions, each headed by a subdivision officer posted at the headquarters in Rangamati, Ramgarh, and Bandarban. Corresponding to these subdivisions are three circles—Chakma, Mong, and Bohmong— which roughly approximate the main tribal groupings and which are headed by hereditary tribal chieftains.[2] The subdivision officers and the circle chiefs have equivalent rank, but different functions. The subdivisional officer is the representative of the provincial administration, and is there largely for purposes of supervision and liaison. The circle chief is responsible for the maintenance of law and order and the collection of taxes within his territory. The circles, in turn, are divided into a number of mauza, each represented by a headman. There are a total of 373 mauza in the entire district. Each mauza is composed of about ten villages or groups of huts more like a parah, each headed by a karbari. The offices of headman and karbari are hereditary.

There are special taxes on cultivable land, shops, bazaar transactions, and tobacco, as well as an almost universally paid jhum (cultivation) tax. Every household is assessed a tax of six rupees per year, plus two days of labor for which a small payment is made. Each householder gives the money to the karbari, who turns it over entirely to the headman. He keeps one-third for himself and passes the remaining two-thirds on to the circle chief or rajah. The rajah keeps one-third and passes the remaining two-thirds on to the subdivisional officer who remits it to the government treasury.

The hill people are divided into a number of different groups of varying size, origin, and identity. Among the smaller groups are the Banjogi, Pankho, and Lushei, who probably comprise no more than fifteen thousand persons, mainly concentrated in the Chakma Circle. They appear to be descendants of the oldest inhabitants of the area. Although some of them are still Animist in belief, a large proportion have become Christian (Adventist or Baptist). The Christian influence is particularly strong among the Lushei, who have gone so far as to transcribe their language into Roman characters.

Another small group, the Khyang, numbering about five hundred persons, are settled in Bohmong Circle. They have the same origin as the Chin of Burma. According to H. N. C. Stevenson, the Chin started raiding in the Chittagong Hills late in the eighteenth century. Their language is similar to that of the Southern Chin, but has a large mixture of Marma and Bengali terms.[3] Most are Buddhists, although some have become Christians under the influence of the Baptist Mission of Chandragona.

The Mro are also located in the Bohmong Circle. They number

around four thousand, and usually live on the tops of the hills where they often fortify their villages. Lewin suggests that this tribe came from Arakan, but Hutchinson regards them as the "true aboriginal of the district". Their language as a rule is not written, although some members can read the Burmese and Bengali scripts.

The Mrung in Bohmong Circle and the Tippera in Mong Circle seem to have the same origin although they are now classified separately. The Tippera migrated slowly from the Tippera Hills in the north in a general southward direction. The Mrung, according to legend, were captured by an Arakanese king who brought them southward forcibly. Both have the same language and general customs, although the Tippera show a considerably greater Hindu influence.

All of these groups have tended to intermingle, so that they cannot be classified properly as tribes but only as ethno-linguistic groups. They do not display any formal tribal organization, although there are definitely recognized clans. On the other hand, the Marma and Chakma are numerous enough and sufficiently organized to warrant being called tribes.

The Marma (sometimes called Maghs) are divided into two groups, one in Mong Circle numbering about forty thousand persons, and the other in Bohmong Circle with about fifty thousand persons. There are also a few thousand Marma in Chakma Circle. The Marma originally came from Arakan and even, according to some accounts, from as far south as Talaing or Pegu. Burmese as well as English documents of the latter eighteenth century make frequent reference to Marma refugees as numerous and troublesome. By the end of the eighteenth century, as a result of Burmese invasions, two-thirds of the population of Arakan is supposed to have fled to the Chittagong Hill Tracts.

Those Marma who now inhabit the Mong Circle apparently were one of the groups of refugees driven out of Arakan by the Burmese invaders of 1783-84. They came through the Matamuri Valley and first established themselves on the plains around Cox's Bazaar, then moved northward to Sitakund between 1787 and 1800. By 1826 they had left the plains for their present homes in the interior of the hills.

The southern Marma came by a different route and at an earlier period. In 1599 the king of Arakan helped the Burmese to conquer Pegu and was rewarded with several thousand Talaing prisoners. Among them was the son of the king of Pegu who was later sent as governor of Chittagong, where he was accompanied by a number of the other prisoners. His descendants continued to rule Chittagong as petty rajahs for several generations. The southern Marma claim that they are the descendants of these Talaing rulers,

but doubt is cast on this theory by the fact that the Talaing language is unknown to them and it is not plausible to assume it could have been forgotten.

At the present time, the Marma of both the Bohmong and Mong Circles are zealous Buddhists as well as Animists. Their language is an Arakanese-Burmese dialect, usually written in Burmese characters. In addition, they often speak Bengali, and some of them are able to write it. Although administratively they are a part of Pakistan, they continue to regard Burma as the center of their cultural life. This does not reflect any hostility toward Pakistan, for in fact they live on very good terms with the local authorities.

They call themselves "Marma", which means "Burmese", and dislike the more popularly used "Magh", a term which, as used by the Bengalis and English, has come to be synonymous with pirates. Each of the two groups has its own king. For the northern group, most of whom belong to the Palengsa clan, he is the chief of the Mong Circle. For the southern group, most of whom belong to the Rigryesa clan, he is the chief of the Bohmong Circle. Contrary to the smaller groups mentioned above, the Marma tend to stay close to the streams and valleys and some are even settled on the plains.

The strength of the Chakma tribe is estimated at one hundred thousand. It has been affected by Bengali influence more than any other of the Chittagong tribal groups. Although ancient manuscripts reveal that the original Chakma language was written in Burmese characters, and probably was a Burmese dialect, the common tongue today is a corrupted form of Bengali. It is possible that the Chakmas were part of the Marma refugees who migrated early in the eighteenth century, but they claim to be of Indian Kshatriya origin. Despite the fact that they are officially Buddhists, Hinduism is very popular among them. Like the Marma, they tend to live in the valleys and plains.

Among the other smaller groups in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, there are the Chak and Shendo or Lakher, about whom very little is known. The most recent of the peaceful invaders of the area are the Bengalis who have infiltrated into most of the market towns and larger villages, where they have built houses, shops, and mosques or temples. Since 1947, there has been an appreciable settlement of Muslim refugees from India.

FARMING

The characteristic method of farming is known as jhum cultivation, and the farmer is called jhumyah. In January or February the men climb the hills surrounding their villages, select likely sites, and then cut down

all the bamboo and trees on them. These are allowed to remain for a few months in order to dry, and are then burned. Afterward begins an active period which may require the jhumyah and his family to live in a temporary hut on the hill in order to devote full time to preparing and seeding the soil. All the brush and undergrowth which remain unburnt must be cleared. Usually they are piled up along the edges of the field to provide a demarcation line between neighboring plots.

The women sow the seeds with the help of a dao or large and heavy-bladed knife with which they dig holes in the earth. Various kinds of seeds are mixed in a basket, with a ratio of ten parts of paddy to one part of maize, sesame, cotton, pumpkin, or chili. Sometimes maize is sown a little earlier than the others. At the end of May or the beginning of June the weeding begins and is repeated at least twice before harvesting. For weeding, the Chakma, Marma, and Tippera use the dao while the Mro and Kuki use a hoe.

While the jhum is being prepared, the villages are partially emptied, with only the young children and aged left behind. But members of the village keep in close touch through frequent feasts and sacrifices to the deities, which may be undertaken for the sake of a family, of a group of families, of a village, or even of a group of villages. In addition, the continuing needs for salt, spices, fish and other items make trips to the bazaar necessary. Illness or any other occasion of need or offer of help provides further opportunities for meeting fellow villagers.

In August, the animals become a danger to the growing crops. Many devices are used to frighten them away, particularly the noises made by the wind-bell, empty cans hanging from vines, or shouting. Traps and poisons are also used. The animals are not very numerous, but a single bear, for example, can destroy an entire crop.

The harvest begins in September. It is not done systematically, but rather as the individual plants ripen. Paddy stalks are cut down as and when ready, and the same procedure is followed for other crops. Cotton is plucked the last of all. Threshing and winnowing takes place during November and December.

Tobacco is a popular item with the hill people. Those who have gardens raise tobacco, and almost everybody uses it in large quantities. It is either mixed with molasses and smoked in a hookah or water pipe, or alone it is smoked in ordinary pipes or rolled in cigars like the Burmese cheroots.

The following year, the jhumyah will clear a different plot of land, and will continue to rotate while the other fields lie fallow. At the end of a five or six year cycle, he will return to the first plot and begin again. There is no fixed term for the cycle, and if the pressure for food is high

he may be forced to return to a field earlier cultivated before the five or six years have elapsed.

Despite the seemingly large expanse of land, the Chittagong Hill Tracts are densely populated in proportion to the available area of cultivable land. Partly due to the destructive character of the jhum farming, the government has established 1,413 square miles of "reserved forest" which cannot be utilized by the hill people. That is almost one-third of the whole district. Pressure on the land sometimes forces the hill people to clear fresh land from the remaining jungle, but most prefer to stay near their villages, extracting whatever they can from the soil.

Jhum holdings are not property in the same sense as land on the plains. There are no formal deeds or legal titles. Forked sticks mark the boundaries of the jhum plots, and they are respected by other villagers. Disputes over crops, or even the theft of crops, may take place, but no one will attempt to occupy a plot already cultivated by another villager, or a plot another person has decided to cultivate, without obtaining permission.

Besides the traditional jhum farming, some of the Chakma, Marma, Tippera, and Khyang have flat land for the cultivation of paddy. They use the same methods as the Bengali peasants, and they tend to use the Bengali vocabulary to a greater degree than the other hill people. Like the peasants of the plains, they use a plough which is pulled either by men or by oxen.

The Chengri Valley and the lower part of the Sangu Valley are suitable for flat land cultivation. Such land is regarded as private property and the landowner takes the title of zamindar. Often his authority is enhanced by some administrative function like headman or karbari, and frequently he becomes the local moneylender, so that he is surrounded by a "clientele" of debtors and dependents. Nomadic habits are given up, and the wealthier landowner exchanges his bamboo hut for a more sturdy one of clay, built by Bengali contractors.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The district is greatly handicapped by a lack of technical facilities and means of communication, but a program of development has been undertaken by the Government of Pakistan which should lead to considerable improvement. In 1952, the only electricity available was provided by the three private generators installed in the palaces of the three circle chiefs, and the larger generator which provided power for the town of Rangamati several hours each day. There was a single telephone line linking the deputy commissioner's headquarters in Rangamati with Chittagong.

A large hydroelectric power plant is being constructed on the Karnafuli River which should provide enough power to electrify large portions of the Chittagong Hill Tracts. Extensive irrigation would become possible, and with it would come a complete change in social and economic patterns for the local inhabitants. Migrants from other parts of the province will probably increase in numbers and may ultimately inundate the hill people.

Traditions of craftsmanship with clay, iron, and wood are still remembered among the hill tribes, particularly the Tippera, Chakma, and Marma, but tribal handicrafts are almost totally nonexistent at the present time. There are no potters, blacksmiths, or carpenters, although these can be found in virtually every Bengali village. All pots and similar items must be brought in from the plains and sold in the bazaars. However, almost every bazaar has a Bengali blacksmith who prepares dao blades, sharpens tools, makes trucks out of old kerosene tins, repairs umbrellas, and even acts as gunsmith. Some hill people retain a facility for working bamboo, but most of the carpentry is done by Bengalis. Weaving used to be very widespread, and almost every household still has a loom, but cheap milled cloth is plentiful in bazaars and is rapidly replacing the handmade product, even for feasts and other special occasions. Marketing is not restricted solely to the bazaars, for there are many itinerant Bengali hawkers who plod the footpaths from village to village with their baskets of cloth, alarm clocks, combs, costume jewelry, salt, fish, umbrellas, spoons, plates, glasses, cups, and similar merchandise.

The bazaars are sometimes located near a road, and always near a river so that the goods can be transported by boat. The number seems to be increasing rapidly. Lewis reported in 1869 that there were four bazaars in the district, while there appear to have been thirty-one bazaars by 1952, with five or six more under construction and an additional ten or more planned. The bazaar is held once or twice a week on a fixed day. Hill people from miles around attend and there are often thousands of people in the marketplace. Each bazaar has about thirty to fifty shops, mostly run by Bengalis, although some Marma and Chakma are beginning to engage in trade.

VILLAGE LIFE

Bengali infiltration in the Chittagong Hill Tracts has not yet affected basic patterns of village life, nor is there much mixture of population. The villages almost exclusively tend to show a remarkable degree of cohesion in function, structure, and organization. Tradition plays a strong

role in village life, even though modified by external influences.

As soon as day breaks the villages and the paths connecting them swarm with men, women and children, except during the jhum season when activity is confined to the hills. The women are particularly busy, for they must fetch the water, cook the meals, and care for the children. Although the diet is limited, cooking is a long and laborious process. If there is a vegetable garden near the house, the woman will tend it. In some villages spare time is given over to preparing cotton and weaving. Another home product is an alcoholic beverage brewed from rice which is bottled and kept for special occasions and guests.

The men spend their time in a more leisurely way. Most of their time during the dry months is spent in the Buddhist temples or in the men's house, where they smoke their hookahs or cheroots, drink salted tea, chew betel, and talk endlessly. It is only during the rainy season, when they are working their jhum plots, that they are kept busy.

Each tribe is characterized by distinctive dress, and even clans sometimes can be distinguished by the dress of their members. The similarities and differences in dress tend to reflect the historical affinities of different groups, or the lack of them, and therefore are quite important. For example, among the Marma the feminine costume consists of a skirt reaching to the heels and a blouse. A few generations ago, the color of the skirt identified the clan. A woman of the Rigryesa clan wore a skirt with black stripes predominating over red. For a Tongsa woman, the black stripes were separated by thin white lines. Among the Palengsa, the dominant color was red. Now the various combinations of stripes are disappearing, but red is still used to distinguish Marma women from others.

The men wear a skirt the same length as the women, but the color has no special significance. They also wear a long sleeved high-buttoned shirt and a turban. This costume is similar to the one described by Lewin more than eighty years ago, indicating that there has been no change in style.

Among Tippera women, the arrangement of the colored beads of her necklace used to indicate her clan, but the practice is rapidly giving way before the widespread introduction of bazaar necklaces. For the Mrung the women's ear ornament served to identify the clan, and for the Mro it was the string of colored beads which trimmed the scanty piece of cotton used as a skirt. While these distinctions are breaking down, it is still possible to distinguish the main tribal groups.

Hair style is also distinctive for each group. Marma and Chakma women usually wear their hair in a knot at the back of the head, though some still wear it on top in Burmese style. Their men have begun to cut

their hair within the last few generations. Banjogi women wear the knot on top of the head, while the Pankho women wear it at the back. Shendo men and women both wear their knot of hair on the forehead. Mro women knot their hair at the back and Mro men on the top of the head. For the latter, cutting the hair is a serious social deviation. In one case, a Mro who had become a minor government official had succumbed to Bengali influence and cut his hair. As a result the other members of the the tribe refused to allow him to marry a Mro girl until he let his hair grow again.

Among the Marma as well as the Tippera, clan endogamy is practiced. An exception is made for a Marma widow who may marry a man of an inferior clan, and very often it is a man younger than herself. On the other hand, clan exogamy is obligatory among the Mro. In the case of the Marma, genealogies must be studied carefully in order to assure that there is not relationship which might cause the marriage to be incestuous, something the Marma fear greatly.

The man usually maintains a joking relationship with his wife's younger sister, and the wife with her husband's younger brother. In both cases, the two parties are potential mates in the event of the death of either spouse. However, under no circumstances may a woman marry her husband's elder brother, with whom she must maintain an avoidance relationship. They rarely speak to each other and must never touch one another.

The marriage ceremony is very simple. A few gifts are exchanged, mainly pigs and cash. Among the Kumi the dowry is still one hundred spears, and among the Khyang it is in chickens. The gift of a pig by the bridegroom is common to all tribal groups.

It is customary for the inhabitants of a village to be related, by marriage, but there must be no common ancestor, even three generations removed, between spouses. Usually the karbari is the man who founded the village, and who serves as the focal member to whom the others are related. Most villages of the Marma, Mro, Khyang, and Tippera have two family components, grouped around cross and parallel cousins. The karbari is the village spokesman for higher authorities, and the leader for the people. Among the Marma and Chakma he is the temporal head of the Buddhist temple. Very often he is the most advanced in adopting new ideas and practices, and apparently the most susceptible to Bengali influence.

The Chakma have foregotten their original language and now speak a corrupted Bengali and use the Bengali script. The Marma have retained their own tongue and use Burmese script, while the Lushei have kept their own tongue but transcribe it in Roman characters. Other groups, including the Mro, Tippera, and Khyang, do not have a written language.

Bengali is generally used as a second language. It is required in

order to communicate with both traders and government officials, who are mostly Bengalis. Since the Chakma and Marma tend to live along the rivers and on lower land, the Mro on the tops of the hills, and the other groups scattered between, it is the Chakma and Marma who act as intermediaries between the Bengalis and the other hill people. As a result, the other hill people often find it more useful to know Chakma or Marma rather than Bengali, while the Chakma and Marma find Bengali more useful for outside contacts. Marma seems to be the tongue most often used as a lingua franca among the smaller tribal groups. It is an Arakanese dialect belonging to the Tibeto-Burmese family, like most of the other hill tongues, and therefore it is easier to master than Chakma which is much closer to the Chittagonian dialect of Bengali.

The Marma, because they have their own script and Buddhist schools, tend to be more literate than other groups and are respected for it. The Mro, Khyang, and Kumi, in particular, trust the Marma and often use them as intermediaries between the authorities and themselves. However, the pressure of social and economic development in the area is steadily bringing these people into closer direct contact with outsiders, and Bengali becomes increasingly important to them. Since English is also used to a considerable extent, it means that a knowledge of at least three different scripts will be required——Burmese, Bengali, and Latin——and at least as many tongues. For a period of time, when some political leaders urged the adoption of Urdu as the official language of Pakistan, it appeared that still a fourth script would be added.

The plurality of languages has resulted in considerable borrowing. Many Bengali and English terms for implements and manufactured goods have entered the tribal vocabularies. Even some fruits and vegetables have names of foreign origin. The tomato, among the Marma, is called the "European sweet fruit" (bilati kareng kyo si). English weights and measures have generally been adopted, along with the terms. Sometimes transmission takes place indirectly, as the English word table which in Bengali becomes tabil and for the Marma tabili. Similarly, glass becomes goloy? with a different ending because in the Marma tongue as well as in Burmese a final consonant other than nasal is never pronounced but is given either a glottal stop (here transcribed by ?), is completely suppressed, or is followed by a vowel as in tabili.

There are about thirty primary schools in the districts, located near the main bazaars. They are built of mud and are of somewhat sturdier construction than the village huts. Wooden benches and tables are used, which is another departure from village homes where no furniture is customarily found. Bengali is used as the medium of instruction and the schoolmaster

often is Bengali, although some are Chakma, Marma, or Tippera. There is a secondary school at Rangamati, where English is used as the medium of instruction.

Most of the pupils in these schools are the children of a headman or karbari, for the average villager cannot afford the expense. Since the schools are located only near the larger villages, pupils from elsewhere must find board and lodging away from home. It is only the wealthiest, and usually just the family members of the three circle chiefs or rajahs, who can be sent for higher studies tc Chittagong or Darjeeling.

Among the Marma there are village schools in the Buddhist temples where the priests teach reading and writing of Burmese characters. They also teach some Pali prayer verses. The kyong, or Buddhist temple school, is quite different from those run by the government. There is one in almost every Marma village, usually built on the highest ground. It is made of bamboo, on posts or stilts like any village hut, but the shape is somewhat different. There are no furnishings and the pupils recline on the floor while studying. Girls are not admitted to these schools, and it is rare for them to receive an education at home.

No fees are paid to the Buddhist priest for his instruction, but the boys provide service in the traditional manner. They fetch water and fuel, clean the kyong, bring the priest his food in the morning, and perform the ritual ringing of bells and striking of cymbals. It is customary for the Buddhist students to beg for their food, and each morning they can be seen making the rounds of the village and returning with their bowls full. Every household is expected to give something.

Older boys return to the kyong for varying periods of retreat, which is obligatory for all Buddhists. They study more advanced Pali texts than the younger boys, but the routine is not very different for they also share in the duties connected with the kyong. Those who have an inclination for the monastic life may remain in the kyong for an extended period. Individuals with a particular interest in Buddhism may go on to spend several years of study in one of the larger temples or monasteries and ultimately become priests.

Despite the incidence of literacy in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, limited as it is, there is very little knowledge about current affairs and other parts of the world.. Although some hill people read Burmese, no Burmese newspapers circulate in the district. Bengali newspapers, and even a few Urdu copies, enter the area but are read almost exclusively by the government officials, contractors, and merchants. Even a few English language newspapers published in Pakistan and India can be found, but they are confined to the larger towns. The number of hill people who can be regarded

as regular newspaper readers is negligible.

Lack of general historical and geographical knowledge is widespread. Some of the stereotyped notions include the belief that English is the language of all Europeans, and that England and Europe are the same. Such schools as there are devote most of the class time to the study of languages, which is a more immediate need. However, there is a thirst for knowledge, particularly among the minor government officials like the headman or karbari. They display great curiosity about the world beyond their hills and they are especially attracted by pictures of distant places. Often they will cut photographs out of the newspapers used for wrapping purchases brought home from the bazaar. These will be mounted on the wall of their houses and every detail will be minutely studied in order to form some idea of the outside world. In one instance, an advertisement for a Milwaukee beer cut out of Life magazine was found hanging in a headman's home. It was regarded as a brilliant illustration of Euro-American modes of living, and the people shown on it were assumed to be princes.

One of the most popular forms of entertainment, and also a source of education, is the theatrical performance. The performance usually lasts all night and is invariably attended by huge crowds from far and near. A stage is set up out of doors and the performance goes on in the open air, with the audience chatting, smoking, and drinking, and with some women spectators even suckling their babies. All members of the family attend, and usually the children stretch out and sleep on the open ground.

The villagers used to play the various parts themselves, especially among the Marma where almost every big village had its own troupe with all the young men included in it. They retained long texts by memory which they recited for hours on end, always to the accompaniment of the same tune. The custom is now vanishing and the new fashion is for the theatricals to be given by Bengali troupes. An occasion for a particularly large entertainment is the jhum tauzi or time of collection of the jhum tax. The circle chief or rajah sponsors a huge public celebration, and it is becoming increasingly common for Bengalis to be invited in from outside to perform, rather than to rely on the local groups.

The theatricals are usually accompanied by an orchestra with Bengali instruments. The Marma used to play the Burmese oboe or hnein and the cither or mwi gyong chan, but both are now out of fashion. One of the few remaining cithers of the Chittagong Hill Tracts is now in the Musée de l'Homme in Paris. On the other hand, the Mro have kept all their own instruments, and their own dances.

The southern Marma have still retained some of their own tunes, which are quite unique. There are a wide variety, including epic songs or

kapya, love songs or redu, and a particular kind of love song where the singer waves a fan and which is called eng. There are also special tunes for lullabies and for religious recitations. Phonographs are not unknown in the larger villages, and Burmese, Indian, and English records are available to a limited extent. On one occasion, a gramophone was heard playing a cowboy song during a religious ceremony in the main kyong of Bandarban. The priest knew Marma, Burmese, and Pali, but not English. Those present who did understand English paid no attention to the words, for to a Marma it is only the tune which is important and which indicates whether the subject is about love, legend, or religion. This particular tune was foreign to them, and seemed to fit most readily in the religious category.

The northern Marma also retain some of their own songs, particularly those which are sung by boys and girls during the season of jhum cultivation. The singing used to be accompanied by an instrument like a jew's harp made of bamboo. Now metal ones imported from Germany are purchased in the bazaars.

CONCLUSION

The introduction of Bengali fashions, customs and mode of living is a serious challenge to the stability of tribal society and culture. While their own traditions are still vital, Bengali culture and the elements of Euro-American culture which have been transmuted by it are new and attractive. In addition, there is the pressure of population. While the hill people now form a majority in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, they number less than quarter of a million in a province of more than forty-two million Bengalis. If there is a significant population movement from other districts, as seems very likely, the hill people will probably be absorbed in such a way as to lose their separate identity, or they will be driven out.

The challenge of Bengali culture is already a problem for the more highly educated among the hill people. The varieties of response can be typified by three actual cases, all sons of circle chiefs. All three have attained important posts in the local bureaucracy. One has turned resolutely to the Bengali side, and has attempted complete adaptation to Bengali customs. The second is proud of tribal traditions and staunchly maintains them. He is thinking of leaving the country for Rangoon. The third has attempted reconcile the Bengali and tribal traditions.

Whether a synthesis will ultimately prove lasting is doubtful. But known instances indicate most clearly that those individuals who absorb some Bengali influence while remaining fundamentally attached to their own traditions rapidly become members of a newly emerging leadership elite.

NOTES

1. The Chittagong Hill Tracts covers an area of 5,007 square miles and has a population of 287,688 persons, according to the Census of Pakistan, 1951, Volume 3, Table 1.

2. In the Mong Circle, the title is transmitted from the father to either son or daughter. A Rani was the chieftain until her death in 1952. Among the Chakma, only sons may inherit the title. There has been some disturbance in the Bohmong Circle, and the Government of Pakistan has had to make the choice from among the male kin of the former chieftain.

3. Denise and Lucien Bernot, Les Khyang des Chittagong Hill Tracts, matériaux pour l'étude linguistique du groupe Chin. (In press.)

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CHAPTER III

PANJABI VILLAGE LIFE

ZEKIYE EGLAR

Punjab means the land of five rivers: the Sutlej, the Beas, the Ravi, the Chenab, and the Jhelum. The Beas is now in India, but the remaining four rivers are in West Pakistan. Three of them have their sources in Kashmir, and all of them flow into the Indus which empties into the Arabian Sea. It is primarily an agricultural region and had a reputation as the granary of India before independence. Much of the fertility of the land derives from the network of canals which branch off from the rivers and form one of the finest canal irrigation systems in the world. The land system is a thoroughly organized branch of the provincial administrative machinery.

The region is known for its lyrical folk songs, its music, and its epic poetry. The Panjabi language is very expressive and when spoken sounds like the tinkling of bells. There are so many dialects that a Panjabi proverb holds, "Language changes every fifteen miles."

The Punjab is the most progressive part of Pakistan in administration, trade, and learning, with the exception of Karachi. It has been settled for centuries and has a well organized society. There are clearly defined social and occupational groups, division of labor, traditions of entertainment such as poetical contests and music, and religious festivals such as urs. Another regular feature is the mela or seasonal fair, where city and village people go to enjoy music, horse races, wrestling, and to see the great display of cattle, horses, and local products.

The Punjab is a vast plain with thousands of villages. To study the Punjab, one has to study its villages, for a village is the heart of the province. The roots of most of the city people lie in the villages. They never cut off their connections and, while living in a city, still maintain a house in the village as a symbol of their status. They get their grain, ghee, cotton, and perhaps a buffalo for milk from the village. They usually return to the village to perform a marriage, or if the ceremony is

held in the city, the village craftsmen who are traditionally attached to the household are called to the city to serve during the festivities. In some cases, the dead are taken back to the village graveyard for burial.

DESCRIPTION OF A VILLAGE

The village of Mamola is one of the thousands of villages of the Punjab and, with some exceptions may be taken as representative of many of them. Mamola lies seventy miles to the northwest of Lahore, three hours ride by bus or train, and twenty minutes walk from the nearest railroad station.

From the station one walks toward the west through the barren fields, past the village graveyard, along the narrow path separating the ploughed fields, around the ponds and hollows dug out by the villagers to get mud for building their houses, until the trees at the entrance to the village are reached. From there it is possible to get a first view of Mamola.

To the right is a long serrated mud wall of varying height bordering the main street of the village. Directly ahead at a distance, standing all by itself behind the tall graceful acacia arabica trees, is a brick house with an arched verandah and a low wall around a paved compound. This is the guest house of the village headman or chaudhari. It is a symbol of wealth, power, and high status of the local landowner who is also headman.

There are a few lanes that branch off from the main street, with houses on both sides hidden behind the mud walls.

Each house has a courtyard and a tree under the shadow of which women do most of their work. The main street, flanked by the mud walls on the one side and open to the fields on the other, runs past the bungalow, the beythak or the place to sit, which is the guest house. The main street is a thoroughfare leading to the villages beyond and those villages, in their turn, have paths and roads joining them to the other villages and the neighboring towns.

The houses in the village are grouped together and have walls in common, for in this way people feel safety against floods and theft. The houses are made of mud, but a few are made of brick. These belong to the village chaudhari, to a few other wealthy landowners, and to some well-to-do craftsmen in the village.

Since this is a Muslim village, there is a village mosque and as the day goes on there are different activities which take place there. Before daybreak, azan, the call to prayer by a village imam or prayer leader brings a few villagers to the mosque. After having said the morning prayer, they go to work. A little later, the village boys and girls come to the

mosque to learn to read the Qur'an under the imam. Girls go to his house opposite the mosque, where his wife teaches them. Men may visit the mosque at various hours of the day to say their prayers. A small public bath is attached to the mosque where any man is free to bathe at any time of the day. There is a separate place for ablutions which must be made by all Muslims before they pray.

An open space surrounded by trees is the place where the weavers of the village, protected by a mud wall on one side and a roof above, set their handlooms in the pits and weave the coarse, native cloth. All around the village, there are ponds with standing water for the buffaloes and cattle. There are twenty wells in the fields with Persian wheels drawn by oxen and by buffaloes. The most frequented one is behind the guest house, where women wash their clothes and bathe in a small enclosure. The villagers get drinking water from the hand pumps of which there are thirty-one in the village. In addition, there are two open wells, one in the mosque courtyard from which people draw water for drinking and the other at the weavers' place.

The village lies in the midst of its fields which merge into the fields of the neighboring villages. To the south, the fields extend to the river Chenab, which to them is The River. The life of the people is closely connected with the flow of the river. Sitting in their homes, they feel its throb. During the summer months, when the river rises, they ask the people who come and go to the river: "How is The River?", just as if they were asking: "How are you?" To those who have their fields on the banks of the river, it may mean that though the father might have spent his life in poverty, his son will become rich; for the lands that have submerged in the father's time may emerge from under the water during the son's life. They are never sure of the river. They say: "To live by The River is like entrusting your child to a witch. She may play with him, she may love him and the next moment, she may throw him down and kill him." So it is with the river. Floods come and go and the fields once full of life may become a wasteland, and still the farmer does not know. For the river might have brought the rich soil which will compensate him for the loss of a crop or it might have washed away all the soil and left the sand behind. Yet, the river is a source neither of fear nor hate. It is a source of romantic love, the love which is sung in all the Panjabi songs and in their love epics.

The population of the village is about 350. There are sixty compounds, but seventy-four households, which means that there are seventy-four hearths on which food is cooked. When food is distributed in the village, each hearth gets its share and when there is a demand for labor for communal work, one man from each hearth or household is required to

work, although in one household there may be more than one mature male.

The main division of the people, all of whom are Muslim, is into zamindar or landowner and kammi or village craftsman. There are different categories of landowners. Some of them may not own land at all, but the very fact that they belong to that group is an indication that at some time their ancestors had owned land. Their share might have been reduced to nothing by subdivision among the descendants, or they might have disposed of their land, or it might have submerged in the river sometime during their ownership, but they continue to be recognized as landowners. The village craftsmen belong to different castes. Each of the castes is associated with a certain profession which had been practiced by their fathers and forefathers and may be followed by their sons.

This village, like many others, has the following set of kammis or village craftsmen:

village bard (not in all villages)
barber, who is also a cook on ceremonial occasions
carpenter, who is also a mason
blacksmith
potter
cobbler
baker, who is also a fisherman
tailor, who is also a washerman
weaver
musalli or unskilled laborer

With the exception of the weaver, these craftsmen are called ghar da kammi, or house craftsmen, because they have yearly contracts with the different families in the village. The house craftsmen are the only men from the outside who may come into the house of the families for whom they work. No other men, except close relatives, come into the house where the women live. Weavers do not have any contracts. People give them cotton to spin or to weave for them, and they may sell woven cloth or cotton blankets in the village or the nearby town.

Every zamindar family has a yearly contract with a set of different kammis This contract is called seyp and the two parties are seypees. The relationship between the families of seypees may last for generations. A family may not be satisfied with the barber of a particular generation, but they will not discard or change him for another barber, for it is a matter of prestige to both parties. The change will not occur unless one of the parties,

after having repeatedly failed to fulfill his obligations, withdraws of his own accord. The same kind of contract exists among the kammis themselves. For example, the family of a potter has a contract with a barber, baker, carpenter, cobbler, and the others. The payment is in accordance with the amount of work done.

Zamindars pay in grain at the time of the harvest. From year to year, the amount may change in accordance with the rise and fall of the prices of the food products. If flood has destroyed the crop, the craftsmen are paid at the next harvest. As to the craftsmen, they pay their seypees mostly through their craftsmanship. In payment, the amount of work done reciprocally is taken into consideration. A potter provides his seyees with pots and they, in turn, shave him, cook for him at the weddings of his children, bake his bread, sew his shoes, do the carpentry work for him, and sweep his house on special occasions. For example, if the value of the pots which the potter provides for the barber does not correspond to the amount of work rendered by the barber, then, in addition to the earthenware, he pays the barber some money or pays him in grain. Weavers alone are paid in money, but they, themselves, pay some of their seypees in money and some in grain.

All of the kammis, besides their regular work, have special functions on the occasions of birth, circumcision, marriage, and death among their seypees. On these occasions they receive laag money, the amount of which is regulated by the custom and which they receive by right.

There is a close relationship between ghar da kammi and the families of zamindars for whom they work. To those kammis, the children of the zamindars are their fields. They watch their growth the same way as a tiller of the soil watches the growth of his crop. To them, their marriages are the harvest at which they get the laag.

Among the kammis, the barber is a refined craftsman. To keep his seypees well groomed, for the villagers of Punjab are certainly well groomed, is but one of the many duties of a barber. He is the most trusted confidant in the families of his seypees and the most important and immediate problems are discussed with him. He is concerned with finding a suitable husband or a wife for a daughter or a son of his seypees, and also with engagements, marriages, circumcisions, and deaths. At the performance of nikah or the marriage ceremony, at least three persons should be present, the imam, the barber, and the guardian of the girl. The barber is a messenger, who carries important messages. Little is written in the note to be delivered by the barber, for he conveys the details of the message himself. Lastly, the barber is a receptionist and a cook He cooks on all the ceremonial occasions—birth, circumcision, marriage,

death—and whenever his seypees have guests. He knows a little surgery and also massages the chaudhari, the guests of the chaudhari, and the visitors of his other seypees.

Among the various kammis, the barber may be considered the highest in rank and musalli the lowest. This distinction applies only to the relative importance of their work, for group distinctions among the kammis have to do only with the division of labor. In all social dealings, sitting and eating together, smoking a common hookah or water pipe, receiving from and sending food to each other's houses on ceremonial occasions, bathing in the same place, and above all praying together, there is no difference between man and man. The idea that before and above everything else man is a human being is put into practice by the people and transgresses the boundaries that might be set by a caste system. Islam, which propagates the equality of man, is a living force in the everyday life of the people and has imbued them with the spirit of tolerance.

The village chief is called chaudhari. He is of the zamindar group and often is the wealthiest of all the zamindars in the village. Perhaps it is his ancestor, who founded the village. However, to maintain the status of or to be recognized by the people as a chaudhari, is up to an individual. Being a son of the village chaudhari qualifies a man for that position, but unless he proves able to comprehend the complicated functions of the position, the title of chaudhari will become merely an honorary one. Some other zamindars who would help the people and would have influence and recognition beyond the village will take his place and become the real chaudhari of the village.

In a village which has more than one wealthy and powerful chaudhari, the center of the village is a dara, or the common guest house of the village. But in Mamola, there is one chaudhari and his guest house is the most prominent feature of the village. It is the center of the men's activities. The marriage parties are entertained there. Men who expect condolences to be offered to them spread their mats and receive their visitors there. The parea, the village council, meets there. It is a regular club for men where they can meet, smoke their hookah, play cards, gossip, tell stories, and bring news from far and near. The traveling musicians give their concerts there and the religious faqirs stop by on their never ending wanderings. There is a servant who takes care of the guest house and has a hookah ready for any one who comes in or stays there. The visitors of the chaudhari are served food and also sleep in one of the rooms of the guest house.

There are certain qualities expected of a chaudhari. First of all, he has to be generous. He may give away most of his property and his

children may not be well off, but that never will be held against him. Instead, he will always be remembered for his generosity and his children will be respected. Secondly, he has to be able to give impartial and sensible decisions in settling disputes. He has to have power, either in terms of manpower by having numerous male relatives and friends, or by having good connections in official circles, so that he may help the other villagers in times of trouble.

The other zamindars in the village may also be addressed as chaudhari, but for them it is an honorary title which does not carry the meaning of the status of the chief nor the responsibilities that go with that position. Those responsibilities to the people of the village are not carried by the chaudhari alone, but by his whole household as well. His household usually includes his mother, wife, sisters, sister-in-law, and children as well as servants. Those of the villagers who have no buffaloes, or those whose buffalo has gone dry, get their milk from the chaudhari's household all year round. People borrow grain, ghee, brown sugar, and money. Plenty of food is distributed from the house on various occasions throughout the year. People go there whenever they are in trouble. At the birth of their children, people get presents from the house, and at death the poor get their shrouds. At all the village ceremonies, the presence of the village chaudharani, the eldest woman of the house, brings great prestige to the people.

In a zamindar's household, the eldest woman controls the grain and all the agricultural products that come to the house as well as the money. She plays the most active part in customary dealings with the immediate family, relatives, friends, seypees, and with other people in the village. The same holds for the neighboring villages with which she may be on terms involving the exchange of food at weddings, and where she may go to offer condolences at the death of people and of buffaloes. She knows when and how to distribute food and how much is to be sent to each household in the village.

Similarly, the wives of the different craftsmen complement the work of their husbands. The wife of a barber is the hairdresser for the chaudharani or wife of the village leader, and also for her seypees. In addition to this duty, the barber's wife massages the body of the chaudharani every day, entertains her by bringing the news from the village and from the outside, and accompanies her on her visits to her relatives on special occasions such as birth, marriage, death, and when she goes to the city. She has to know how to cook meals as they should be cooked in rich houses and for guests. A cobbler's wife embroiders shoes with golden thread. A baker's wife bakes bread and roasts grain, while her husband provides the

fuel. A potter's wife helps him to knead the clay, paints the earthenware with black clay, helps him to bake it and then distributes it among her seypees and receives the payment. The potter and his wife together collect dung from their seypees almost all year round as a fuel to heat their kiln. A weaver's wife cards the cotton, spins the thread,and prepares it for him to weave. A musalli's wife sweeps the houses and the courtyards and shapes the dungcakes. Since the musalli works in the fields for the zamindars with whom he has a seyp, she helps him there as well.

The combined work of a man and a woman together enables them to fulfill the obligations of the profession which is associated with their occupational group. A baker cannot be a baker unless his wife knows how to bake bread, a skill which she should have acquired from her childhood as a child of bakers. But this kind of a partnership is not limited only to matters of everyday life, for there are several important occasions in their lives when each one of them is required by custom to play his or her particular role so as to make the whole function complete. At a wedding there are activities going on in the men's section and at the very same time there are a different set of activities in the women's section of the compound. These two sets of activities are of an entirely different nature and do not overlap. For example, when a bride is about to leave, in the women's section some women crowd around the bride and bridegroom and give them salaamee or money bestowed by relatives and friends as a token of congratulation and of welcome. Some of the women note down the amount given by each of the friends and relatives, for it is to be returned at some later time on a similar occasion. Some prepare the sweets to be taken along by the departing guests and some see to the last preparations for the bride's departure. On the other hand, in the men's section some of the bride's male relatives entertain the barat or bridegroom's party. Others prepare the palanquin in which the bride is to leave, some pack her dowry which had been displayed and is to be sent along with her, and still others attend to the laag or money to be distributed among the kammis of the village.

The birth of a boy is an occasion for rejoicing. A boy is considered to be a young man from birth; therefore, power is added to the family. The birth of a girl raises mixed emotions. If there were no children before, the family is pleased. In a poor family, if they already have boys, they need to have a girl to exchange her later for a wife for one of the sons. In a rich family, she is the means to form new links with another family through marriage. She also provides the means to display wealth and generosity at the time of her wedding and all through her life and thus enhance the status and prestige of the family. Besides, there is a feeling of com-

pleteness in the family when there is a girl, for she is the closest person to her mother and to her brothers all through her life.

On the other hand, to have a girl is a great responsibility for her family. As long as she is at home, there must not arise any occasion in which her name might be involved, because any blemish on her name makes vulnerable one aspect of the honor of the family, the aspect known as ghayrat or dignity. When she is of marriageable age, her parents and her brothers must find a suitable family into which to marry her. Not to arrange marriage for a girl is a bad reflection on the family because it means they have not fulfilled their duty. If, after the marriage, her in-laws do not treat her well, her parents feel very sad and humiliated.

From the time a child begins to speak, he knows his group and gives it along with his name. He would say, if asked his name: "I am Badro the baker", or "I am Amina the julahi" (a girl of the weavers group). At six years of age, the child knows that he or she will marry within his or her own group. From the time a boy begins to walk, his father or his older brother may carry him along when he goes to work and, by the age of eight, he knows something about the work and helps his father. Girls, in their turn, help their mothers. Both girls and boys carry lunch to their fathers in the fields.

A child learns very early about his father's family, dâdke, and his mother's people, nānke. He knows and loves his father's people because he lives in his father's village, and he knows his mother's relatives because she visits her parents regularly and brings her children along.

Mother's village, nānke, is very important for the child. At her marriage, a girl receives a part of her dowry from her mother's people. A boy, at his marriage, gets a substantial present from his mother's brother. When inquiring about the young people, with the purpose of marriage, people invariably ask where their mother's village is. Besides, if a mother's father dies without leaving any male issue, his daughter and her sons will inherit the land and the other property which is called nānki virsa.

It is very important that a child should learn about the line of his ancestors on the father's side and all its branches, for this is a group of people known as a biraderi. It is the immediate group, the members of which help his father on all the ceremonial occasions and it is a source of power against similar biraderi of other people. It is the child's little world within which he learns cooperation, competition, and rivalry. It is a touchstone for his immediate family against which they test their rise and fall in prestige.

In a family, the mother has a very important place. There is an Islamic injunction that "Paradise lies under the feet of mother." Daughters

take great pains to avoid a bad relationship with their mother, for she always favors them, as they are considered to be guests in the house. Sons have great affection for their mothers and cannot be disobedient to them, for to be on bad terms with one's mother means for a man the loss of status and prestige among his kinsmen and the people of the village.

A woman has a high position as a father's sister or paternal aunt. No important decision is taken in the family of her brother without consulting her. She is the closest and most sympathetic person for her brother and his children. In marriage patterns, one repeatedly sees that a girl is married into the same family or into the same village as her paternal aunt.

The daughter of a family has a special position as well. She is never scolded for she is a guest and will be leaving the family. Nevertheless, after the marriage, she regularly visits her parents and receives presents from them and her rights on her father's house are never ended. People say that "a girl counts the beams in her father's house", in the sense that she never relinquishes her rights as a daughter of the house.

The position of a woman as a wife and as a daughter-in-law cannot easily be defined. She is loved and respected in the family, but at the same time, she undergoes a period of rather rigorous training under the guidance of her mother-in-law. Her position in a joint family is not emphasized because the responsibility of managing the household and fulfilling the duties of kinship obligations lie with her mother-in-law. But as a sister, as a daughter, and as a paternal aunt, the woman has an exalted position in her own village. By the time she has grown up children, she has all the privileges of a mother and a mother-in-law.

For every Panjabi villager there are certain desires which he works throughout his life to fulfill. His main desire is to maintain and increase his prestige or honor, for which he uses the word izzat.

A village bard, whenever he greets a man, will recite:

> May the root of your plant be firm and green,
> May your plant be green forever.
> May your honor never be exposed,
> Nor suffer any blemishes.

This greeting is a constant reminder to the man of what is expected of him.

For Panjabi men and women alike, izzat means high status, prestige, honor, and power. To achieve an ever higher degree of izzat, one has to have wealth in accordance with one's particular status. However, wealth is not for personal glory, it is for distribution. As people say: "One

has to collect either property or izzat." Both the zamindars and the kammis can reach higher status and attain more prestige in their respective spheres. The way to achieve that status is open to both and the means are the same.

A kammi can achieve a higher izzat by being a good worker, by dealing properly with friends and relatives on ceremonial occasions, by entertaining his guests well, and by distributing food in the village on those occasions. It adds to his izzat to bring his children up properly. On the other hand, the misbehavior of a son or a daughter may considerably lower his izzat. In the same way, a zamindar, and especially a chaudhari who is one not in title alone but a real chieftain, achieves a higher izzat by being very generous with his wealth as with his time and influence. He should conduct himself properly on all ceremonial occasions and should feel responsibility towards the other people in the village.

When praising a man or a woman, people say that the person is neyk. Neyk means righteous, or to be good, just, and humble. People are proud if any of their ancestors are still remembered and referred to as having been neyk and everyone has a longing to have such a reputation. A man who performs his religious duties and has acted discriminatingly and dealt fairly at every stage of his life, as a son, husband, brother, parent, neighbor, member of his kin group, and of his community—and who has earned his rizk (livelihood) honestly, has the satisfaction of having fulfilled the purpose of his existence and gains the recognition of all the people who know and who hear about him. The same is true of women. People may also speak of them as being neyk.

In addition, a great wish cherished by men and women alike is to perform hadj or the pilgrimage to Mecca. Another goal in life as expressed by a Panjabi is saddhr. There is a saddhr, a hidden desire in the heart of every parent to see all of his children well married and to have grandchildren. It is a desire to live to the age when, after death, he will be carried to the grave on the shoulders of his sons and sons-in-law. Thus, his death should be an occasion for rejoicing.

It is an occasion for rejoicing because he has left behind sons and sons' sons, which means that his line will continue. To die without issue causes great grief both among the zamindars and the kammis. To a kammi, having a son means that his name will live and to a zamindar, having sons means that his land and property will remain in his line. In the land record books, where the genealogies of the men are recorded for several generations, those who have left no issue are marked with red and underneath is written na valeed (issueless). To call a man na valeed is a curse. If a man leaves a daughter and no sons, the sign of a leaf marks her place in the land records and along with her name is written baht bari (the lucky one).

To realize his saddhr, means to a parent that he has completed his life cycle and has fulfilled his responsibilities on earth. This completion of a life cycle starts a new cycle for his children. By having fulfilled his responsibilities the parent has achieved a new high status for his children and this, for them, is the most cherished heritage.

According to the Muslim conception, with all his failings, man has a unique place in creation, for he carries within him a great trust:

> Verily we proposed to the heavens and to
> the earth and to the mountains to receive
> the trust (of personality), but they refused
> to receive it. Men alone undertook to bear
> it, but have proved unjust, senseless.
> (Qur 'an 33:72)

In the belief that he is the crown of creation, man knows that he was destined for a higher purpose. But the earthly needs, which are not different from those of the lower creations, and the strife to fulfill those needs, has involved him to the extent that he seems to have gone astray from the real path. That is a source of sadness for him.

The Panjabi villager's highest spiritual aspiration is that of reaching God. To reach God is possible through contemplation, through prayer and through love. Love is symbolized in their most popular epic poetry Hir Randja. This epic describes the love of a man and of a woman as symbolic of the love of God. The strife the lovers go through is the hardship one encounters when seeking God. As the villagers read or recite Hir Randja, those who are spiritual seekers, recognize the stages of spiritual advancement which they have attained in the symbolic love of the lover and the beloved. The ones who know themselves to be in the initial stages feel sad for there is still so far to go, while others who have passed the beginning phases smile and laugh with satisfaction for they know that they are already beyond many difficulties.

The spiritual path to God is long and arduous. Few are able to reach the goal and, on their way, they need the guidance which is given by pirs, or spiritual guides. Pirs themselves are seekers and only a few are able to unite with the Whole. Once united they are not bound by either time or space. But, everyone has to reach the goal through his own efforts, for that experience cannot be explained or taught.

The stage of initial struggle is long and hard and one never knows when he will pass to the next stage and enlightenment will come. When it does come, it comes suddenly like a flash and then the seeker knows.

That is the most sublime experience and it is sought by many. The road of the seeker is open to all, regardless of position or wealth. A poor cobbler may be much further ahead on his path than a rich landowner and he will have the respect of his fellow travelers for they know the hardships of the journey. Often in their spiritual struggle, they pray to the bright star, the polar star in which resides the soul of the one who has united with the Whole, the soul of the pir of pirs, Hazrat-Gauz-ul-Azam.

Man feels close to nature and in Panjabi songs and epic poetry the changing seasons find their reflection in the moods of the people. The buoyancy of spring brings out all the exuberance in man. Spring festivals are frequent. At those melas, the Panjabi villager rejoices, sings, and listens to the music played and the songs sung by the professional musicians. To the lover separated from his beloved, spring brings out all the poignancy of separations, for the thorns in his heart, like the blossoms outside, send forth sprouts which make his heart bleed. To a young bride, new in her in-laws' house, winter means darkness, loneliness, and sadness.

People have great attachment to the moon. It is closely connected with their religion and the various lunar months have different religious connotations. Ramadan is the month of fasting. Shab-i-Barat, the Precious Night, falls in the month of Shaban preceding Ramadan. It is believed that on that night, the destinies of those who are to live are set for the coming year and the names of those who are to die during the year are taken off the List in heaven. The villagers pray, meet their friends, and make up all their quarrels, for some of them may be on the List of those who are not to live.

Every month people scan the skies for the appearance of the new moon. The first sight of the silver thread in the evening sky brings joy to them. They greet each other, pray on seeing the new crescent, and make their wishes while looking at the new moon. They count the days as the moon waxes and wanes for to them it is their calendar. The eleventh day of the new moon is the day for charity and the more prosperous people cook much rice and other food to distribute among the poor in the village. People love the moon for its beauty. The fourteenth day, when there is a full moon, is never passed unnoticed. During the warm weather, people enjoy the moonlit nights. There is a saying about the full moon in winter: "The beauty of the full winter moon is like the beauty of a youth who is poor. Neither is given recognition, yet real beauty lies in them." In Panjabi, the word chan means moon and the same word is used for a cherished or beloved one.

Land to the villagers is a much loved and valued possession, for they see land in terms of wealth, power, prestige, and honor. It is a source of

livelihood and they work on it applying the knowledge which came to them from their forefathers. Land is owned by zamindars, but every kammi tries his hand at tilling the soil whenever he has an opportunity and to own land is his most ardent desire.

To a villager of Mamola, animals are a source of livelihood and a sign of wealth and prestige. The death of a buffalo or a horse is greatly lamented and is a proper occasion for offering condolences. Man feels attachment and responsibility for the animals he owns, his buffaloes, horses, and cattle. Animals, like himself, have djan (life), and feel hunger, thirst, heat, cold, and fatigue the same way as he does. Yet animals cannot speak and express their needs and thus are wholly dependent on man. A good owner feeds his animals before he himself eats and works along with them. The villagers believe that if a man treats the animals properly, he will never be in need of anything on this earth, but if he does not treat them well, he will find neither iman (faith) nor rizk (livelihood).

The term rizk means that every human being is provided for and that during his lifetime care will be taken of his primary needs. God has apportioned to him a certain share in life from the very moment a man is born and that is his rizk. His rizk may be small or it may be large, but everyone has a rizk which ends when his life comes to an end. The fact that a man has a rizk does not mean that he will get his share in life by sitting idle. On the contrary, everybody should work to find his rizk. One man may work little and earn much, for he has a bountiful rizk. Another man may work very hard and yet get little, for his rizk is small. Whatever it may be, the individual should be content for that is his share in life, apportioned to him by God.

Kismat, or the concept of destiny, is ever present in the minds of the people. Death, sickness, unhappy marriage, loss of property—all of these are explained by referring to kismat. Yet, the idea of kismat or predestination does not render the people inactive. In case of sickness, they avail themselves of native cures, magic, or Western medicine, but when all prove ineffective and they find themselves powerless, they realize that there is something stronger than the human effort. That is kismat which one cannot escape and should accept.

In his relationship with God, man accepts the idea of kismat and of rizk. However, he does not consider them as binding forces which eliminate for him the possibilities of working for the goals he might have set for himself. Man is free to struggle and to choose his way in life. It is God alone who knows what the outcome will be.

God loves all his creations. The men of Mamola have a strong belief that God loves and protects them and this gives them great security in

life. In times of grief or distress, whether it is a matter of death or natural calamity which brings the loss of property, to him it is not God's punishment nor does he ever think that God is against him. He never reproaches God, nor feels guilty. He attributes those hardships to some hidden purpose known only to God. He says: "It is the will of God, it should be fulfilled. He knows best."

A man who does wrong never loses hope. He feels that it is still possible for him to reach God. Sometime, somewhere, he may do a good deed which will bring to him the realization of his place in the universe. Once he realizes himself, he is united with God. On the other hand, a pious man who has prayed all his life, once he feels that he deserves heavenly reward, may never reach God. In this case, by the very fact of assigning himself a special place, he has deviated from the real path, the path that leads one towards losing oneself in the Whole.

The twenty-four hours of the day and the night are divided into eight pehers. In each peher there are a varying number of divisions of time, some of which overlap and yet retain their separateness. The division of time is based on the movement of the sun and the stars. It integrates the time for work in the fields, for food, and for prayers. The time as defined within one single peher can be as exact as if by using a regular watch. If a villager wants to indicate some time before the sunset, he will say maari deeger which means fifteen or twenty minutes before the sunset. If he says maara namaz vela that is the time for the morning prayer which is about a quarter of an hour before daybreak.

For indicating time, people use also the shadow cast by the sun. The time for the afternoon prayer is when the shadow cast by a man is one and a half times his own height. Women, by watching the advancing and retreating shadows in their courtyards, can tell correctly the time of day.

As seen by a Westerner, people do not seem to be very exact as to the time of an appointment when calling on each other. But their flexibility as to the concept of time has to be appraised from their own standpoint. In some cases, they may expect a guest for the dinner yet they will not start to cook until he has actually arrived. Both the guest and the host seem to take the matter leisurely and show tolerance. Yet, for two occasions in their lives they are never late. One is the time of arrival of a barat, or the bridegroom's party at the village of the bride. The barat never fails to come at the appointed time regardless of the weather or the difficulties that might lie ahead. In times of flood they may cross swelling rivers and be carried away to death trying to reach the village on time. The second occasion when they are never late is at a death. Relatives and friends must be on their way as soon as a messenger sent by the bereaved family

has brought the news of death. They must reach the house the very day the death has occurred. Then they go again to offer their condolences on the tenth and fortieth days.

Distance is explained in terms of mileage as well as of time. If one asks how far a certain village is, the reply would be so many kos (a kos equals one and a half miles), and the villager would add, "You'll reach the place by noon", or depending on the distance, "in the afternoon or by evening". A villager has a sense of humor and observation as he gives the information. If the passer-by walked at a slow pace before inquiring, the other one remarks: "if you proceed at the pace you were walking just now, you may reach the place quite late, but if you speed up a little, you'll be there by noon." If the traveler is on horseback, the quality of the horse is taken into consideration and the information given in accordance.

People have great respect for the north and the west. They pray facing the west, for that is the direction of the holy Kaaba, the "house of God", where people go on pilgrimage. They never sleep with their feet towards the west nor toward the north, for in the north is the polar star in which resides the soul of the greatest pir of all—Hazrat-Gauz-ul-Azam.

The villagers of Mamola use three calendars with great ease, the Muslim or lunar calendar, the native calendar, and the Western one. The lunar calendar is used in connection with religious practices. The villager may not know the names of all the lunar months, but he knows the months of the important religious events. He knows the native calendar best, which he calls dessi. It is used in his everyday life and also in connection with cultivation of the soil and with the seasons of the year. He knows the names of the twelve months, but refers to any period of shortage of food as a thirteenth month. This thirteenth month is usually the time preceding the harvest when the grain at home is finished and the new crop has not come in yet. He calls the Western calendar, English, and uses it in connection with government, tax paying, law courts, elections, as well as opening and closing of schools. When fixing the date of an engagement or a marriage, the native and the lunar calendars are used together and sometimes the Western calendar as well, thus combining all three of them.

A Panjabi man has a well organized way of classifying all the things around him, as well as the people and their attitudes, into two clearly defined categories of kachcha and pukka. Kachcha means raw, unripe, unbaked, unsteady, breakable, changeable, inexperienced, and unreliable. Pukka means cooked, ripe, well baked, fixed, durable, experienced, and reliable. They speak of mud houses, of dirt roads, of an unripe crop, of uncooked food, of crockery and pottery, of the changing weather in the rainy

season, of a shallow or inexperienced and unreliable man, of a promise which may be broken, or of unconvincing talk as being kachcha. On the other hand, a brick or a concrete house, a metalled road, ripe crop, cooked food, metal wares, fast colors, a mature or experienced and reliable man, an unbreakable promise, convincing talk, or thorough knowledge are referred to as being pukka.

Whenever a new idea or a new product is introduced, a Panjabi immediately recognizes where it belongs and groups it accordingly. For him there is a hard and fast line between all things which are either kachcha or pukka. This classification has to do with things outside of himself. With regard to his own self and to his own feelings, there are times when he feels kachcha-pukka. This is a state of mind, a state of indecision, when he has conflicting emotions and desires.

A Panjabi man has still another classification of peoples, products, and ways of life into dessi or native and vilayeti or European. His countrymen and native products are dessi to him, and foreigners and their products are vilayeti.

He has a preference for certain vilayeti products, such as cotton and silk cloth, shoes, soap, sugar, medicine, machinery, and cigarettes, the last of which are a considerable luxury. However, he knows the value of his country products as well. The efficiency in administration and in business organization, as well as justice and impartiality in the courts as experienced through contacts with officials during the rule of the British, are foreign or vilayeti to him.

To a Panjabi villager, the whole of Europe has been Vilayet although Vilayet has been chiefly identified with Britain and its people. The villager knows the other foreign countries through their products and has graded them in accordance with the quality of their goods. Germany has been considered at the very top for the sound quality of her machines and Britain has been foremost for her cloth and consumers' goods. Japan made itself known through her products which are considered cheap and unreliable. The villager has come to know China through the saying of the Holy Prophet: "Seek knowledge, though you may go as far as China"; also through her silk cloth which he calls Shanghai. Of the neighboring countries, he knows Afghanistan, Persia, and Iraq. Of all the Muslim countries, he feels closest to Turkey because for a long time Turkey was the seat of the Khilafat. Next comes Saudi Arabia, for Mecca and the Kaaba, the holy place for all the Muslims, are there. As many villagers go on pilgrimage to Mecca, they come back with a wider interest and greater affection for the Muslims of the different countries in the world. The villager knows of Misir (Egypt) through the stories in the Qur'an about

Moses and the pharaoh and about Yusuf and Zuleikha. This last one is a subject for a long epic written in Panjabi. Besides, in the long symbolic poetry, Seyf-ul-Mulk, so well known to all the Panjabis, the hero is a prince who came from Egypt. Caucasus, to them, is the abode of fairies, as is told in their fairy tales. The villager calls Greece Unan, and there is a whole branch of native medicine and treatment known as unani derived from Greek medicine. He is acquainted with the names of the Greek philosophers, particularly Lokman,[1] Aristotle, and Plato, and may quote wise sayings attributed to them. He knows stories about Alexander the Great and Aesop's fables. France is known through Paris, the source of fashion in clothes, perfume, hair-do, and make-up.

It was only after World War II that the average Panjabi villager got his first notion of another big country in the West, America. His knowledge of America is very recent and, as he comes in contact with the people and the products of that country, no doubt, he will form his judgment.

CONCLUSION

The world view of a Mamola villager is firmly rooted in his cultural background. From his very start in life, he knows his place in his immediate family, in his kin group, and in his society. Duties and responsibilities are well chartered for him and the ways to fulfill them are defined. In his relationship to God he feels secure, and although he does not live on the level he believes God has destined for him, yet he struggles to reach the Source. To material things he may show attachment, for land, animals, and property are dear to him. Yet, there is one idea he never forgets and he often expresses it by a Panjabi saying: "All things made must perish, all creatures born must die."

Everything around him is placed into definite categories of perishable and unreliable as against lasting and reliable. Having integrated many cultures, as is seen by his use of various calendars, he has the flexibility of adopting new concepts and of adding them to his cultural wealth of experience. He is discriminatingly conscious of his native as well as of foreign and Western products. He is quick to recognize and appreciate the Western ways of life, their systematic regularity in work and efficiency in organization. Yet, he knows the value of his own way of life, which suits his environment and his own systematic regularity in work which follows nature and its seasons. He has his own organization at the big ceremonies, which are so important to him and which are carried through with great efficiency. He has an ever expanding view of the world and, as the new countries, people and ideas become known to him, he has a place for each one of them.

NOTE

1. Lokman, believed to be a Greek philosopher, is a legendary figure of pre-Islamic times to whom are attributed many Arabic sayings. He is mentioned in the Qur'an.

CHAPTER IV

PANJABI URBAN SOCIETY

MARY JEAN KENNEDY

Although Pakistan consists predominantly of an agricultural population, there is an urban tradition which is centuries old, with a consequent development of urban society. Urbanization has achieved its greatest development and importance in the area of West Pakistan formerly designated as West Punjab, where centers of trade, and manufacture have emerged as cities. This trade is made profitable by the very favorable economic condition of western Punjab, which includes some of the most productive land of South Asia, a condition which permits a relatively high standard of living.

The growth of cities, especially the large increase in urban population during the past fifty years, reflects the increasing prosperity of western Punjab, due in large measure to the construction of irrigation canals under British rule. New cities such as Lyallpur and Montgomery were created, while the Punjab as a whole doubled its population in the last fifty years.[1] The surplus of births over deaths through introduction of public health measures accounts for the spurt of population characteristic of the subcontinent of the same period.

At the present time, urbanism is more advanced in western Punjab than in other parts of West Pakistan; therefore the data on urban development are drawn primarily from this geographical area. The 1951 Census of Pakistan listed for West Punjab an urban population of 3.4 million, or 18 per cent of the total population of the former province, which is a higher proportion than the figure for Pakistan as a whole of 10 per cent urban population. The 1931 and 1941 Census figures showed 13 and 15 per cent proportions respectively, while the 1951 figure is exactly double the 9 per cent of the 1901 census.[2] This trend toward urbanization indicates the increasing development of trade and industry which draws upon the rural population. There are six cities of Class I population (over 100,000) and fourteen additional cities of Class II population (over 25,000) in western Punjab. Lahore stands

pre-eminent as the major city, offering employment in government offices, business, educational institutions, and many small factories. The 25 per cent increase in the population of Lahore city in the 1941-51 decade is credited primarily to resettlement in Lahore of refugees from urban centers of eastern Punjab in India such as Amritsar, Ludhiana, and Jullundur.[3] The increased population of Lahore is matched in other urban centers of western Punjab, where the non-Muslims who left for India have been replaced largely by an urban population from the other side of the border.

Some characteristics of an urban society are but manifestations of the culture pressed to their full development, while others may obviously be traced to foreign influence. This essay will seek to describe those characteristics, aspirations, and behavior patterns which typify Panjabi urban life. Urban development in western Punjab may be used as an indication of the effects of industrialization in the less developed parts of West Pakistan, assuming the same basic social structure and common values held by virtue of religion and custom.

To understand urban development in this area of West Pakistan, one cannot ignore the role played by Hindus in the pre-independence period. While there was a predominantly rural population of Muslims, and a preponderance of Muslim artisans and laborers in cities, control of manufacture, business, and banking lay primarily in the hands of non-Muslims.[4] Hindus engaged in trade as an occupation achieved a clear economic advantage, which, allied to greater use of educational facilities, led to an extension of that economic position. Non-Muslims held the majority of administrative posts in public services, education, finance, and especially in trade. This organization of urban society was drastically altered by the population exchange at the time of independence, when millions of Hindus and Sikhs departed, and their shops and habitations were occupied by incoming Muslim refugees. As the Punjab was the throughway for refugees, it was most strongly affected by the influx, and received an estimated six million Muslim refugees in exchange for four million departing non-Muslims. It has been stated that at least one-third of all incoming refugees settled in the urban areas of Pakistan because of greater chance of economic rehabilitation. The 1951 Census of Pakistan reveals that of the present population of Panjabi cities, refugees form the following percentages: Lyallpur, 69; Sargodha, 69; Jhang-Maghiana, 64; Multan, 49; Gujranwala, 50; Lahore, 43; Sialkot, 32; and Rawalpindi, 37.[5] Although there may have been some movement inland since 1951, these percentages give a clear indication of the effect of exchange of population in urban communities.

Considerable difficulties followed the exodus of the Hindu and Sikh

communities, for the economic and administrative life of West Punjab came almost to a standstill. Most banks, commercial houses, and factories closed, normal channels of trade were broken, and many of the administrative posts of public service, educational institutions and hospitals suddenly had to be filled. The reorganization of public services and businesses, especially of trade, has produced a new middle class and professional group in Pakistan society. To some extent, the characteristics of this middle class are different from those of its predecessor, which was British or Hindu in composition. The establishment of Pakistan upon a religious issue has made public observation of piety and orthodoxy of major importance. Agitation to make Pakistan an Islamic state has encouraged the growth of sectarian feeling, by emphasizing the orthodoxy of a large segment of the population, while another group has tended to react strongly against the bid for power by the religious extremists.

In present day Pakistan, the group in urban society which has the highest prestige consists of those who hold high government offices, railway officials, wealthy landowners, officers in the armed services, and those of the business community who have achieved wealth and power. There is a feeling among many urban Pakistanis that wealth and political power are the only significant criteria for placement at the top of the social structure. An official in power, whatever his merits, is catered to and given special privileges, while the same person out of office is disregarded. It is the office, or status, which confers dignity and privileges. High government posts, such as those in the central government ministry or the top ranks of the West Pakistan civil service, pay monthly salaries between Rs. 1,000 and Rs. 4,000,[6] with frequent addition of a bungalow, and an automobile. Government service is considered the best career by all young men who are inclined toward the professions, because it offers security and perquisites. The academic life is shunned because of a low pay scale and the low prestige which the teaching profession holds in the country. The highest paid branch in government is Civil Service, which continues administrative responsibility along the lines of the British Indian Civil Service.

Another avenue for entrance into the higher class of society by wealth has been through trade. The immediate effect of Partition was to remove the Hindus and Sikhs from their privileged economic position, and to leave the field open to the Muslim community. Commercial standing was achieved primarily through the device of allocation to Muslims of such factories, industries, and commercial houses as had been abandoned by non-Muslim refugees to India, or by Muslims entering into fields of enterprise

left vacant. To a certain extent, class status achieved in India was perpetuated, because official government policy was to allot to a refugee proportionally as he or she had possessed in India. New businesses grew from the exigencies of a nation, for with the difference between the devalued Indian rupee and the non-devalued Pakistani currency, and political tension, trade was oriented abroad. The middlemen in the importation of foreign manufactures or raw materials have been able to realize extraordinary profits under an import licensing system which has restricted competition and guaranteed a seller's market. Shortage of materials and manufactured articles undoubtedly has encouraged the growth of a free market in many products with prices which are above world commodity prices. It is difficult to estimate whether leadership in industry has been taken by local people or by refugees, but under the allocation system of abandoned property, existing factories and other enterprises were assigned to refugees, sometimes to people who were inexperienced in operation, or unable or unwilling to improve them.[7] This practice increased the confusion of re-establishing an industrial base in urban life.

The generality of the middle class, in town, consists of businessmen, shopkeepers, and entrepreneurs in various industries as well as professors, teachers, doctors, lawyers, and members of other professions. Besides the occupational label, middle class and lower middle class are grouped according to their monthly income. Upper middle class is defined as one with an income of between Rs. 500 and 1,000 monthly; lower middle class an income between Rs. 150 and Rs. 500, while the working class earns monthly wages below Rs. 150, but averaging nearer Rs. 70 monthly for unskilled labor.[8] As indicated, teaching is relatively poorly paid. A teacher with a year's training after the B. A. receives between Rs. 130 and 150 plus a cost of living allowance of 25 per cent, while teachers of lower qualifications receive between Rs. 60 and Rs. 120 per month. Under the salary scale, only professors in colleges, who receive between Rs. 400 and 800, could be called members of the upper class. Neither from the point of view of income nor prestige can teachers be said to be leaders in the urban community. Other than medicine, teaching is the only profession which custom permits to educated women.

Most of the men in the upper class wear Western dress, but none of the women even consider the possibility of such a change. Upper class women who do attend mixed functions have tended to adopt the sari, rather than the Panjabi dress which for several years was equated with being Pakistani. Children of upper class families, many of whom attend Christian mission schools, generally wear Western style children's clothes. Even in the lower middle class, the majority of urban men wear Western style suits.

Shopkeepers may wear salwar (trousers) or lungis (cloth tied about the waist which falls to mid-calf). Men of both upper and lower class affect the Jinnah cap of caracul or plush, or other headgear, but rarely the brimmed hat of Western dress. Women of lower middle class or working class wear Panjabi dress. Fewer of the children wear Western style clothing.

Among educated and Westernized Pakistanis, marriage outside the social group is increasing. Parents now tend to select a possible mate on the basis of personal qualifications and family. There is a tendency among upper class Panjabis to marry persons who are of the same economic, educational, and social bracket as themselves, rather than solely within the family. Class ranking is not hard and fixed, but depends upon such factors as wealth, status role, and family connections. These vary according to the fluctuating political fortunes of the members. Therefore class can be said to be fluid in urban West Pakistan. While there is no caste system among Muslims, there are readily identifiable caste-like groups which carry the connotation of a particular occupation, location, or descent, such as goldsmith, Kashmiri, or Mughal. Orthodox Muslims denounce the concept of caste as being of Hindu origin and, therefore, un-Islamic and instead stress Islamic egalitarianism. Muslims, unlike Hindus, may marry first cousins from either side of the family, or relatives of more distant relationship, but the preferred marriage is within the kin group. The caste-like groups seem to be significant in arranging society into a hierarchy of relationships with a few groups at the top, hundreds or thousands of "good" groups in the middle, and a few inferior groups. Popular prejudice, in ranking these groups condemns certain of them as a whole because of presumed dishonesty, cowardice, or other traits. A Pathan said of the Mughal group: "They are considered to be brave persons, but I think they are very cowardly. If they see red blood, they fall senseless to the ground." Hatred is expressed by less educated Muslims for people who claim a higher group affiliation than that into which they were born. The Shaikh group is one of the most numerous in Pakistan, because it is a title often taken by converts from Hinduism. The word "shaikh" is a title of respect which means "leader", and is supposed to designate descent from the early Arab invaders. The popular suspicion that persons of converted ancestry are not of good standing is shown in the saying, "Waste yarn becomes a khes;[9] a man of no caste becomes a shaikh." Claims of group ranking made by refugees are carefully verified before a family will allow a daughter to marry such a person, because of the fear of a daughter marrying outside the family group affiliation.

Most Muslims in western Punjab, whether refugee or native, name

the inferior caste-like groups as those doing personal service such as sweepers, shoemakers, washermen, tailors, leatherworkers, or vegetable growers and gypsies. Of these the bhangi (sweeper) and camar (leatherworker) groups are considered lowest. People of good affiliation will not accept food from persons of those two groups, nor permit them to handle utensils, do shopping, stand near them, or do any personal service. There is prejudice among Muslims also, though not as widespread, against accepting food from people not of the book (i.e., Hindus, Sikhs) or from Christians. Some people would not eat with members of lower groups such as cobblers, kanjars (sons of prostitutes) or Arains (vegetable growers). The connection between the defiling work of sweepers and leatherworkers and their status is obvious, and this makes them ineligible as household servants. An individual who moves to another area where he is not known, and changes to a less defiling occupation, can change his status.

It is interesting to find that the sweepers, the abhorred of all good castes, have their own ranking system. Sweepers of a higher subgroup will not permit other lower ranks to sit on the same bed nor mingle at marriage parties. The lowest group of sweepers are the scavengers.

Where population has been as deeply affected by migration as that of urban West Pakistan, it is difficult to make generalizations about group occupations or practices. There is some evidence to indicate that newcomers, who were perhaps closer to Hinduism, are more likely to hold to hereditary group and family occupation, especially the uneducated lower classes. However, this tendency is offset by the necessity of earning a living by whatever means was at hand, so that many hereditary occupations have been sacrificed to new economic conditions. The refugee Muslim handloom workers have been so handicapped by lack of yarn, credit, and marketing problems that thousands have drifted into other pursuits.[10] Yet a number of workers were found who appeared to be able to continue the family or caste tradition of employment, such as embroidery, blacksmithing, unani medicine, or shopkeeping, and who preferred to do so.

Housing accommodations depend on the income level of the family and the allotment of rooms made possible for refugees. In the old city of Lahore, as in older parts of other Panjabi cities, most families are limited to several rooms, with an occupancy of four to six persons per room. The possession of a compound or rooftop is rare, so that purdah means virtual confinement in rooms for many women, since they leave the house only for necessary visits, clad in a burqa.[11] The necessity for going out is reduced because most upper middle class families have two or more servants, whose main job is to do the shopping, prepare food, and assist in other household tasks. The women of such families are relatively free of household obliga-

tions, unless they participate in the care of children or cooking. In a lower middle class family, where observation of purdah is strongest, if a household servant is lacking, the men customarily undertake the burden of shopping, not only for the daily food supplies, but also for cloth and household goods.

The standard of living in the city is more ambitious than in the village, because more amenities are desired. It is also more expensive, since commodities must be purchased for cash. The joint or extended family with a common fund is one bulwark against economic want, since unemployed members, children, and the aged are cared for by those who have work. The common prejudice against women working outside the home makes the role of women as wage earners negligible in Panjabi cities. Very few women use their time for any home industry, such as spinning or sewing, even if the family is in need. Among artisan and working castes, and even among those higher in the educational and social scale, parents, married and unmarried sons, and unmarried daughters live in a common household. Particularly among the lower social groups, where the men of the family share in a joint occupation, working members contribute to a common fund and the father dispenses this account according to his judgment of need. Married sons who have established separate households, or educated sons who have gone to new localities have their funds separate. Housing available for lower middle class and working class families is of very low standard. The average occupancy is five persons per room, and often no provision is made for electricity, water, bathroom, kitchen, or latrine. Housing for refugees has been extremely substandard, because of the dearth of housing and the lack of developments to take care of the vastly increased population. Refugees have built their own shelters in an improvised fashion, often upon land to which they have no title. That this housing is poorly constructed is indicated by the fact that 54 per cent of such buildings in the flooded areas of Lahore collapsed during the 1955 floods.[12]

In urban as well as rural Punjab, the family is a dominant influence in the life of the individual. Descent and most property pass through the patrilineal line with supreme authority being assumed by the eldest male. The father holds complete economic control of property and family income, and constitutes himself as censor of such behavior of family members as affects prestige in the community. Those who receive the father's disapproval are likely to be chastised physically if children or, if adults, threatened with disinheritance and complete severance from the family relationship. In a country where social standing and livelihood are so closely connected to family status, this is no idle threat. The very considerable economic and social control held by the father or eldest male has resulted in a family

structure which is very authoritarian and typified by male dominance. Within the family, women are occupied with child care and preparation of food, since motherhood and competence in household tasks are deemed the highest feminine virtues. Women are to be protected and sheltered by men, and it is expected that in consequence women will be more tender and loving. There is usually a warm relationship between a mother and her daughters, through the mother's training of her daughters before marriage. In addition to natural affection for a son, the mother finds him essential for validation of motherhood and as a support for her old age. Greater intimacy between mother and children during the child's early years usually leads to stronger emotional ties between mother and children than develops between father and children, for the father's role as disciplinarian and his demand for respect make him a more awesome figure.

In traditional Islamic society, only men participate in public activities or community work, while woman's nature requires that she confine her interests to family and household. In this smaller world, women have different status roles in the family revolving around birth and marriage. As daughters and sisters they are cherished, and the reputation of a family depends in great part on the behavior of daughters as well as the generosity of wedding festivities given by a family in their behalf. Parents and brothers maintain a vigilant and protective attitude toward daughters of the family both before and after marriage, and a woman turns to them for assistance if she is abused or divorced. After marriage, the bride enters a new family —although with the prevalent custom of cousin marriage she is not among strangers—where she must be on good behavior and is subject to discipline by mother-in-law and husband alike. The pivotal relationship in the patriarchal family is that between father and son, rather than that between husband and wife as in the Western conjugal family. This appears to be due to the emphasis laid upon descent of property, which is primarily in the male line. The possibly disruptive effect of the son's marriage is minimized by traditionally restricting the husband-wife relationship primarily to a sexual union, especially in the early years of marriage.

The mutually exclusive activities of men and women support stability of this type of family, for a man spends his working hours and leisure time with other men, not with a wife, while a woman performs household tasks or visits relatives, a mela (fair), or a saint's tomb in the company of other female members of the family Until a wife has borne a child, above all a son, she has no security in marriage and little prestige. She is viewed as the "outsider" and often receives blame for any misfortune which befalls the family. There is evidently a split attitude toward women, for while the daughter and sister are indulged, the daughter-in-law and wife are criticized.

It would appear that the tensions produced in an authoritarian patriarchal family are released by action directed against daughter-in-law or wife.

Women dramatize the feminine role by elaborate clothing, jewelry, perfume, and beauty aids such as eye makeup and the use of henna on hands and feet. These enhancements reach their culmination at the time of marriage, the biggest event in a girl's life.

Men are expected to be stronger, more disciplined, and less self-indulgent than women. Muslim men are enjoined not to wear clothing of silk or gold jewelry, and are encouraged to cultivate a martial spirit. The Qur'an contains a number of directives which distinguish sharply the role of men from that of women.

Men who do renounce the male role and assume women's clothing are not held to Quranic prescriptions on attire. These hijiras, or transvestites, wear silken clothing, gold jewelry, and other women's accoutrement while engaged in the institutionalized begging which is their occupation. Hijiras are ascribed popularly with being timid and cowardly like women. The change in dress indicates a change in personality. Although transvestism is institutionalized for men, no example is known of a woman dressing as a man or taking the masculine role.

Marriage, except among the more wealthy and Westernized families, is with a mate of distant or close family relationship. Marriage to first cousins is very common and even preferred, the explanation being given that it is customary, and that parents prefer to arrange marriage into a family whose customs are the same and whose character is known. Another explanation given is that parents who marry their daughter to a child of a brother or sister are in a better position to protect her from ill treatment or to oppose the addition of a second wife to the household in the future. The economic benefits of marrying closely within the family are also kept in mind, because of the question of inheritance. As in villages, the expenditures in connection with a wedding are heavy for the bride's family particularly, since the tradition is to furnish as much in the way of jewelry, clothing, and household equipment as the family finances allow.

Among Panjabi Muslims, a settlement for a daughter is generally made upon her marriage, in lieu of later inheritance of property upon the death of parents. This is regarded as compliance with Sharia law which stipulates that a daughter's share of property is half that of a son. Many families which formerly disregarded this aspect of Islamic tradition are now giving a daughter her inheritance under Pakistani laws, transfer being made either at the time of her marriage or after the death of a parent. Among both upper and lower class Panjabis, a bride receives a settlement from the bridegroom at the time of marriage called haq mehr. The amount depends upon

the wealth of the bridegroom's family and must be paid to the wife in the event of divorce. It serves as a restraint upon a husband's hasty dissolution of a marriage, which is otherwise a simple affair of pronouncing divorce three times. Divorce is legal even if the marriage settlement has not been paid, and many ex-wives must bring suit through the courts to enforce payment.

Although wedding festivities in urban centers do not continue for three days, as in Panjabi villages, they still constitute a financial burden to town families. Even refugees go into debt to marry a daughter in style, including dowry, gifts, and a wedding feast for several hundred guests, at the least. This expense is necessary for izzat rakna—to keep respect—otherwise the family would be talked about among relatives or acquaintances. Although not as strongly as in villages, much of behavior in town is based on the desire to avoid giving rise to gossip by others, which is part of keeping respect.[13]

The continuance of the purdah system makes it incumbent upon parents to select the marriage partners for their children. This selection is usually made within the family relationship, for reasons given above. In the event, however, that relatives are not available because of age differences or hostilities within the kin group, a marriage partner is sought from the same zat or caste-like group. A son may and frequently does marry outside his social group, but a daughter almost never is permitted to do so by higher social groups such as Rajputs or Pathans The prejudice seems to be based on a fear of "mixing the blood" which emphasizes the greater power of the male to absorb foreign admixture than of the female, who would not only be lost, but would take family prestige away with her. A family "lowers their head" or loses prestige if they are unable to marry a daughter to a relative, or at most within the group, yet the number of girls who marry into higher groups indicates that the rule of hypergamy is the basis for selection, rather than family pride alone. For a son of a good family to marry a girl of lower status entails a delayed handicap upon his children, since the issue of such mixed marriage would not be considered as pure blooded members of the father's group. Daughters of mixed marriages, in particular, find it difficult to marry into the father's zat, and are downgraded. Mixed marriages usually are those with second or third wives chosen by the man on a basis of attraction. The family difficulties obviously are increased by difference in social ranking of the wives.

One Shaikh community made it a custom that a Shaikh man might have only one Shaikh wife. At least one polygamously inclined merchant evaded this limit by selecting additional wives from other groups. Statistics on plural marriage are not available, but it is not common in urban Punjab.

Many men realize that domestic harmony is difficult when two or more wives share a household; while others state quite frankly that they can afford to keep but one wife. A second marriage for the purpose of having children meets with approval, and polygyny is defended as being morally superior to the prostitution which is considered rampant in the West.

Divorce is permitted by Islam, but as no legal record is kept in Pakistan of talak divorce—that pronounced by the husband—the number of divorces cannot be ascertained. Divorce is almost out of the question among those under the strong influence of Islam and with little education, but among the professional classes and the wealthy, divorce is resorted to as a solution to an unhappy marriage rather than the addition of another wife, though one does not exclude the other. The institution of polygyny means that a husband need not divorce to secure a younger and more attractive wife. It is often cheaper to add a new wife than to pay the haq mehr, or marriage settlement money, to the first wife at divorce. Women must have recourse to a law court if they wish a divorce on grounds other than mutual consent. Panjabi women are reluctant to divorce unless in great misery, because there is a prejudice against divorcees as such and of remarriage, which makes another marriage difficult to achieve. By Sharia law, a male child over the age of seven and a female child over fourteen return to the father's family, in the event of the mother's remarrying. Children under that age are taken by the mother's family. Such restrictions give pause to any woman considering divorce, if she loves her children. Also there is a problem of maintenance in a society where women as wage earners are neither customary nor welcomed. All of these factors combine to insure stability of marriage unless there is unusual provocation on one side or the other.

Since marriage is enjoined upon all Muslims except for valid reasons, it is practically universal in Pakistan. Both the Qur'an and maintenance of family respect require that sons and daughters shall be married at a suitable age, and parents who fail to make the necessary arrangements would be subject to grave criticism by relatives and neighbors. The importance in the family of procreation and rearing of children is a central part of Pakistani culture.

To insure the chastity of women and the moral behavior of men, a number of restrictions have been placed upon the actions of men and women, both married and unmarried. This is done under the assumption that these restrictions are required not only by Islamic law, but for the preservation of the stability of family and society. A recent study on women's status in Islam explains: "Sexual purity and chastity are among the fundamental social values upheld by Islam. . . They are, therefore, regarded by Islam as

occupying a position of primary importance in its total scheme of things."[14] To achieve this sexual purity, women are enjoined to dress modestly, with only face and hands showing, and forbear wearing ornaments or attractive dress where they may be seen by men outside the immediate family relationship. Both men and women are restricted in their meeting outside the family, and in the family circle as well, this behavior being codified under the concept of segregation of sexes, which affects all aspects of life. From the age of puberty, members of the opposite sex who are not related do not meet, talk, or carry on any activities together, lest intimacy lead to sexual temptation. This behavior pattern is crystallized in Pakistan in the observation of purdah, which implies a confinement of women within the walls of their homes, and women's wearing a veil or burqa when on the streets in order not to be seen by men. "When a man can't see a woman, he doesn't think evil about her", is the orthodox explanation.

So strongly has this injunction of the segregation of sexes been followed, that it is common belief that women who do not observe purdah must necessarily become immoral. The free mingling of the sexes, as practiced in the West, is held to be the root of evil which will produce a morally corrupt and licentious society.

Sex and religion are two aspects of culture which are viewed subjectively and non-rationally by most urban Panjabis. The combination of these elements into the purdah system makes the question of women's deportment and the relative roles of men and women a matter difficult for rational solution. The emergence of Pakistan as a new nation has made people self-conscious about the excesses of the purdah system, and indeed there has been relaxation of strict purdah in the past decade, for observably more women are on the streets of Karachi, Lahore, and other towns both with and without burqa, more girls are attending school and colleges, and more Muslim women are attending official social functions. On the question of segregation of the sexes, and the privilege of women to participate in society, traditional views prevail. Young people who suggest that segregation is not necessary today are assured by their elders that free mixing of the sexes would produce a debauchery of morals and ruined marriages such as are presumed to be typical in Europe and America. The argument that men cannot resist temptation and hence purdah is necessary suggests the weakness of internal moral control, which has yet to replace external mechanical control in urban areas. The practice of polygyny is defended as a man's natural privilege because of his biological nature, and as an alternative to the prostitution of the West--an argument which overlooks the flourishing areas of prostitution in urban Punjab. In practice, plural marriage is not common, and judging from recent newspaper contributions on the subject,

there is increasing public prejudice against it. More emphasis is put upon "equal treatment" of wives.

Companionship between the sexes, whether within or outside of marriage, is not conceived as a possible relationship. Men do not share their worldly or intellectual interests with a wife, since such interests are considered unfeminine. The joint or extended family, which separates the activity and social life of men and women on the basis of Sharia law, emphasizes the sexual relationship between men and women even within the family. It is possible that marriages of mutual love exist, but customarily marital stability is independent of this factor. Popular belief is that marriage of choice, based on attraction, are bound to fail, and that arranged marriage produces a more stable relationship. The cooperation or non-cooperation of family members no doubt plays a decisive role in making the marriage a success, and independent choice by man or woman is interpreted usually as a challenge to authority, an act which is unacceptable.

Women are limited by custom and traditional Islamic injunction to activities within the family home. In the villages, economic necessity has forced women to work in the fields with their men at certain times. In cities, women of the lowest paid working class must move about to earn their living. To observe purdah has become a matter of prestige and is interpreted as a religious obligation by those who can afford it. The lower middle class holds to this tradition most rigidly, and the men go to extraordinary lengths to keep their women from the need to go to the bazaar. The emphasis upon woman's role as wife and mother has led to the conclusion that any other task is unsuitable for her, and activities outside the home should be carried on, if they must be done, by women past the childbearing age, whose mixing in society would have no damaging effect upon sexual morality and family stability. Any activity which is construed as inimical to the primary role of woman as wife and mother is censured by the elders of the family, an attitude which is a major source of resistance to the education of girls, in addition to the economic burden of education for any of the children. Men are expected to maintain the women of their family, both wives and unmarried sisters, and it is considered a slur on the family if women must earn a living. Even upper middle class families who encourage their daughters to secure an education, prefer that they not use the skills unless divorce or acute emergency necessitates employment.

The disinclination to have women work outside the home has discouraged employment of women, even though there is industrialization in Lahore or other cities of the Punjab. In 1955, approximately three hundred women registered at the Lahore Employment Exchange for jobs as teachers or domestic servants, while thirty-six thousand men registered, of whom

only five thousand were placed.[15] The oversupply of employable adult male labor makes the possibility of women's employment more remote.

The education of children in general and of girls in particular has increased during the past few years in urban areas of Punjab, and there are in many areas more applicants than space in the schools. Parents believe now, quite often, that educated girls are more marriageable, and this is an incentive towards women's education. Young men with a B. A. or M. A. degree and the prospects of rising to high positions in contemporary Pakistani social life request their parents to select an educated wife. The amount and scope of the education given girls is limited by the parents' view of what would make her a suitable wife. Many orthodox parents would limit a girl's education to memorizing the Qur'an, or up to the fifth grade and the reading of Urdu religious books. Education beyond a certain level is held to be harmful to girls, but that level is variable. Some parents accept the goal of matriculation and even try to educate their daughters to the B. A. or B. T. (Bachelor of Teaching) standard, but a son's education is always a matter of first concern.

If the purdah system is to be challenged, what forces will operate to do so? Higher education is considered to be a force of emancipation and enlightenment in most societies. However, students tend to accept the mores of their community for the most part, and these mores include the observance of purdah. A study currently in progress based on the analysis of questionnaires submitted to post-graduate men and women students in Pakistan indicates that the attitudes of men students show a preference for the women of their family to observe purdah. A persistent but not increasing minority in the past five years urges active reforms for women's status and states that the burqa should be discarded. It is noteworthy that this minority for the most part comes from professional but non-governmental families. Graduate women students wear the burqa because of their understanding of Islamic injunctions, and to a certain extent to please relatives.[16] A separate study made in 1950 on the attitude of college women toward purdah was made on the assumption that the educated woman is the "crucial part of society, the part which can and will initiate any social change".[17] One hundred college women were queried as to their attitude toward a range of behavior, from veiling and seclusion to meeting men freely and wearing fashionable dress. A 75 per cent majority chose no purdah, simple dress, and meeting men when necessary. In a choice between the two extremes, 3 per cent preferred full freedom of action to 13 per cent for full purdah. It should be remembered that these choices were made by unmarried girls, who are subject to particular criticism in their social behavior.

It may be that the college women realized that economic dependence

plays a significant part in maintaining the purdah system, for 88 per cent of those questioned replied that women should be able to earn their own livelihood. The teaching profession and medicine were favored overwhelmingly by these college women, most of whom ignored the concept of social service.[18] Medicine does not include the service of nursing, which is regarded by most Muslim middle class families as a career which is degrading and leads to immorality. The not surprising result of this cultural prejudice against nursing is that the shortage of nurses in Pakistan endangers future health programs in the nation.[19]

The problem of education in Pakistan, of its type and scope, is an extremely complicated one. Formalism in the curriculum, the policy of downward filtration of ideas, poorly paid and unqualified teachers, inadequate buildings and staff, absenteeism due to sickness or domestic needs, public apathy to education, the seclusion of women, and a low standard of living combine to challenge any easy solution.[20] The Punjab pioneered in compulsory education in eight urban and eighty-six rural areas as early as 1923, and new areas have been added to the list since then.[21] Compulsory education is also free education, but parents must bear the costs of extra clothes and other items, which with the present high cost of living and low wages makes schooling a luxury for many families. The expenses of primary school education have devolved upon local administrative bodies. Economy has been effected by such devices as open air schoolrooms, and by furnishing almost no equipment. Children in primary grades usually sit on the floor, as at home, and normally learn to write on a small wooden slate rather than on paper. Classes average sixty to seventy pupils, which is a large group for any teacher to handle. The conditions of school and economic pressure for children's labor combine to limit schooling for vast numbers of children below the level of literacy, even in urban communities. An enlarged school enrollment may represent only an increase in the first two standards or grades. School dropouts before the fifth standard represent a wastage in effort, for such persons never become truly literate.

It seems obvious that a basic problem in education is the extremely low pay and therefore low status of teachers. The UNESCO report on education in Pakistan states: "The low pay and poor qualification of an average primary teacher have most unfavourably affected his social status."[22] The salary of trained and untrained teachers, as mentioned earlier, places them in the working class or lowest level of the lower middle class by income. A teacher who is despised is not likely to be the channel through which social change is introduced to the community. The assumption that education of any type represents a liberalizing influence fails to take into account those cultural factors which negate that assumption.

Observance of religious duties is of first importance in Pakistani life. Most lower class men and the orthodox of the upper classes offer prayers five times daily as required of a good Muslim, and generally two of those prayer periods are in the mosque. All Muslims are expected to learn the Holy Qur'an in Arabic, but ability to recite passages does not insure understanding of the contents. Women are supposed to pray at home, for it is not customary for them to attend the mosque for prayers. Many women are devoted to one or more Muslim pirs, whose tombs they visit for prayer. Both men and women of the lower economic classes have great faith in the power of pirs or saints. This homage is a development of Sufism, the Islamic school of mysticism, which is strong in Punjab and which emphasizes achievement of a state of grace through guidance by a spiritiual leader. Pirs, both living and dead, are venerated because they are believed to have achieved great spiritual powers through holy lives; descendants of pirs inherit respect and receive material benefits from popular offerings.

Living pirs are consulted primarily for spiritual guidance, and are maintained by offerings of the faithful. Deceased pirs have tombs of varying quality and expense erected in their honor, and these shrines are visited by seekers after spiritual or material assistance. Offerings of flowers, oil lamps, or money are made and prayers said at the tomb; when prayers are answered additional donations are given in the name of the saint. Before Partition, Hindus as well as Muslims visited the tombs of Muslim pirs to offer homage. The eleventh day after a new moon and the ceremonies at the death anniversary of the saint, the urs, are considered unusually favorable for making requests. In popular Islam, the intercession of a holy man is deemed to be effective with God just as the recommendation of a powerful political figure would be desirable in the affairs of this world. The worship of pirs is condemned by the orthodox as being contrary to Islam, but the practice has a large following among the people, who regard the urs as the occasion for a festive mela or fair. Women come in great number to the tombs of pirs, and have regular recourse to them as a place of prayer. It appears that women more than men are dependent upon this place of worship, for custom denies to them attendance in the mosques for regular prayers.

In daily life, Islam is expressed by conscientious fulfillment of family obligations and observation of dietary restrictions. Abstinence from drinking intoxicants, eating pork, gambling, and taking interest constitute religious observance. The same holds for not mixing with the opposite sex, observing modesty in dress and behavior, and eschewing music and other light entertainment. For recreation, a serious man may take a daily

walk, visit with friends and family, or offer prayers. There is a puritan prejudice against amusement for its own sake. It is considered obligatory to give some form of zakat, or tithe, toward the less fortunate, and among many of the lower socio-economic group, this tithe is spread within the kin group through contributions of clothing, food and expenditures for weddings of poorer relatives. Charity in other forms is also commended, a religious prescription which is made use of by members of the beggars group and those in need who travel through the bazaars on Thursdays and on Friday mornings before the noon prayer at the mosques. Orphanages are maintained by funds from the religious community in the form of zakat. The obligation to maintain women of the family, provide marriage funds and dowry for sons and daughters are all regarded as religious duties.

Religion as a political movement is a logical consequence of the foundation of Pakistan as a predominantly Muslim nation. There are a number of religious leaders who preach a return to the idealized purity and simplicity of early Islam, and who advocate the foundation of the state on Islamic principles.[23] The most influential of these movements is the Jama'at-i-Islami, whose leader is Maulana Abul Ala Maududi. His program extols the virtues of an Islamic state based upon the orthodox tradition and preaches acceptance of fate as given by God, strict purdah for women, observance of the rituals of Islam, and intolerance of modernist or sectarian differences.[24] The program of the Jama'at-i-Islami no doubt has an appeal to the very conservative, who believe a return to "basic principles" will provide an adequate foundation for social action.

Those who experienced the 1953 riots in the Punjab are of a divided opinion as to the origin of the disturbances. Some claim that all trouble was due to goondas[25] while others who participated claim it was but a peaceful demonstration to indicate to the government popular dislike of any of the Ahmadi sect holding public office. Although popular prejudice against Christians exists, it is not expressed as intensely as that against Ahmadis, who have claimed that their leader is the new messiah, a gospel which is anathema to the Sunni majority of Pakistan.[26]

Although the activities of the Jama'at-i-Islami have been under surveillance by the central government, the views expressed by their leader are supported by a substantial number of the urban population, whose beliefs and prejudices coincide with those of the Jama'at-i-Islami. The call of Islam in danger arouses an emotional response from people which makes logical consideration of results difficult.[27]

Islam is considered to have a code of behavior regulating all activities of life. In popular thinking, morality has come to be defined largely as sexual morality, and a man's reputation is judged upon this criterion. Queried as to what are the worst crimes, without exception men of the less

educated urban class replied: sexual corruption. Many justified murder if a wife were unfaithful; a number said that a sister who was unchaste should also be killed, as well as the man involved in either case. Those more pacific by nature said that an erring wife should be divorced as set forth in the Qur'an. Women stated that a woman's worst crime was to run away from the house, and agreed with men that a husband was justified in killing an unfaithful wife. The extent to which women have espoused the masculine viewpoint is not known, but it seems to be widespread. The other major crimes are considered to be murder, telling lies, and gossiping, the last named said to be a particular weakness of women which causes such bad feeling within family relationships that it not infrequently leads to murder.

Receiving gifts, using influence for relatives or acquisition of public funds were not named as crimes; it appears that these are not construed as part of personal morality. The explanation is given that receiving gifts from subordinates or persons in need of favors could be regarded as supplemental income. The report of the Economic Appraisal Committee (1952) stated:

> Corruption and nepotism are rampant. . . . The evils of corruption cannot be dealt with on a curative basis only . . . The leaders should focus attention on it and create an atmosphere where corruption would be considered so wicked and so unsocial as to be voluntarily shunned . . . The standards of conduct, both public and private, need to be raised.[28]

Corruption can be ascribed to human desire for wealth and power without scrupulous regard for method, but the numerous instances indicate that the still dominant code of primary loyalty to tribe and relationship justifies favoritism or related practices. Groups which in more industrialized countries provide leadership to challenge nepotism are undeveloped in urban Punjab—the civic improvement associations of the citizenry, or labor and craft unions. Initiative for community projects is left to government, a reaction ascribed to earlier years of foreign rule, and to divisionist feeling of the different mohallas, or sections of the city. Labor unions are only partially organized in urban areas of Punjab; they are in no position to undertake political action. The presence of thousands of underemployed in a society where hand labor is cheaper than machines adds to the difficulty of formulating a labor movement as in Western countries.

What is the effect of Euro-American influence, of modern ideas, on urban society in contemporary Pakistan? It is difficult to evaluate an historical process which has been going on for several hundred years, and which presents a constantly changing picture. Pakistan is definitely receptive to material benefits of modern technology if these can be afforded, as the thousands of American cars on the roads attest. Bicycles, radios, modern style furniture such as tables and living room sets, as well as imported crockery are in evidence even in lower middle class homes. Women are constantly knitting sweaters for family members of imported or home produced yarn. Foreign goods of all kinds, such as cosmetics and clothing, have high prestige, and if the price differential is not too great, preference is usually given to a foreign product on the assumption that it is better made. Machinery and machine tools are used in thousands of simple factories and shops, but a knowledge of motors and maintenance is still not widespread even among the urban population. As was noted above, Western style clothing, which is not unlike native dress, has been adopted by the majority of men in trade in the urban areas, but women have rejected Western style women's dress as conflicting with traditional mores and their concept of femininity. Those adoptions and adaptations of Western practices as here noted indicate that those foreign elements which appear technologically advantageous or practical are accepted without serious reservation.

The role of films, whether of foreign importation or indigenous origin, merits attention for its influence as popularizer or carrier of culture. Statistics on cinema attendance do not reveal adequately the importance of screen drama in urban life, where a sample survey indicates that men, even of the low paid lower middle class, attend on an average of once a week. Urdu and Panjabi language pictures made in Pakistan or imported from India feature singing and complicated plots. English language movies, to be well attended, must have either fighting or sex as their distinguishing feature, but their background of luxurious living by local standards arouses in the viewers both contempt and envy. For people of the upper class, foreign movies serve not only as entertainment, but also as a link with European and American culture. Furthermore, in a culture where dining is the major form of social entertainment the cinema provides a welcome alternative.

Western contributions in the realm of ideas are viewed more critically and more emotionally than technological borrowing. A certain number of the educated upper class have identified themselves with Euro-American culture, have been educated from childhood in schools where English is the medium of instruction, and read English publications, especially in the professional field, by preference. Colleges and universities

maintain the connection with the British system of education by continuing with English for instruction, and textbooks and references favor English. A certain amount of Western ideology pertaining to comparative behavior patterns and the scientific approach has been accepted during the educational process. The British system of administration and the judicial system have been maintained, and English continues as the official language in government and courts. At present, English is regarded as indispensable to material progress by facilitating contact with Europe and America.

Many young men, especially those who have had training abroad, realize that the West has a philosophy which embraces more than technology and a democratic form of government. These men complain that a return to Pakistan brings personal frustration and a feeling of suffocation. Socially, they are absorbed by the family as if they had never been away: the arranged marriage within family or group, observance of purdah or in any event the segregation of the sexes, deference to parental authority, and observation of the many obligations of family relationship. Professionally, this educated elite finds itself unable to reconcile the acquired values of the scientific approach, freedom to criticize authority, and individual initiative with traditional culture, which requires nonrational responses, obedience to authority, and subordination of the individual.

In contrast to those who find Westernization useful or congenial are those persons who oppose European culture on several grounds: as a relic of colonial superiority, and as inimical to traditional Islam. Secularism, the continuance of British institutions, and use of the English language are held to be undesirable survivals of the earlier political period. This group gives its most bitter opposition to the efforts of modernists to reinterpret Quranic teaching so as to permit behavior patterns approximating Western practices. The ideological struggle between modern and traditional culture appears in sharpest relief in the educated classes, but in time the problem will affect all of the urban population of Pakistan. The upper middle class is becoming increasingly separated from its historical traditions, but has yet to synthesize the values as well as the technical exports of Euro-American society. The urban lower middle class is not yet politically conscious, and gives loyalty to particular personalities. Educational facilities which would enable members of the lower middle class to gain economic power and prestige are lacking, and the resources of the country are a limiting factor for such mobility.

Urban residents, by virtue of greater contact with foreign influences, are the ones who first adopt and cause the spread of certain modern ideas and techniques, but a change in the system of values comes more slowly. The hypothesis is made that insofar as the family and social structure retain

their hierarchical, patriarchal, and authoritarian forms, progress or change in the realm of ethical values and attitudes will be arrested, for it is in the family that behavior patterns are learned. If family structure changes, subject to the new economic developments and broader education, the culture pattern will come to resemble more the individualistic modern Euro-American social structure with its concomitant values.

NOTES

1. Census of Pakistan, 1951, Vol. 5, Punjab & Bahawalpur State.
2. Ibid., pp. 39, 53.
3. Ibid., p. 43.
4. Ibid., p. 34.
5. Ibid., p. 75.
6. One Pakistani rupee equals twenty cents U.S.; this salary range would be U.S. $200 to $800.
7. Abdul Aziz Anwar, Effects of Partition on Industries in the Border Districts of Lahore and Sialkot. Board of Economic Inquiry, Publication No. 105, Punjab, Pakistan, 1953, p. 108.
8. Figures obtained from Board of Economic Inquiry, Lahore.
9. A cotton coverlet.
10. Board of Economic Inquiry, op. cit., p. 86.
11. The long covering garment with face cover worn by orthodox Muslim women.
12. From a housing survey made by the Department of Social Work, Pan ab University, Lahore, October, 1955. (Mimeographed.)
13. D.N. Majumdar, "About Women in Patrilocal Societies in South Asia," The Status of Women in South Asia, (Bombay, Calcutta, Madras: Orient Longmans, Ltd., 1954), pp. 47-64; see especially p. 63.
14. Muhammad Mazheruddin Siddiqi, Women in Islam, Lahore, The Institute of Islamic Culture, 1952, p. 128.
15. Figures from the Lahore Employment Exchange.
16. Maya Vanti Rallia Ram, The Social and Economic Position of Women in Pakistan, Master's Thesis, Panjab University, 1953. She is continuing her research as Research Fellow, Department of Political Science, Panjab University, Lahore.
17. Safdar-Un-Nisa, The Attitude of the Educated Girl towards Pardah, Master's Thesis, Panjab University, 1950, p. 35.
18. Ibid., p. 47.
19. Pakistan Times, Lahore, December 12, 1955.
20. Muhammad Shamsul Huq, Compulsory Education in Pakistan, UNESCO Studies on Compulsory Education, No. XII, Paris, 1954.
21. Ibid., p. 72.
22. Huq, op. cit., p. 49.
23. Stanley Brush, "Ahmadiyyat in Pakistan," The Muslim World, Hartford, Connecticut, Hartford Seminary Foundation, April, 1955.
24. For an analysis of Maulana Maududi and the development of Jama'at-i-Islami, see Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Modern Islam in India, London, Gollancz, 1946, pp. 149-52.

25. A term used in Pakistan to describe anti-social persons.

26. Stanley Brush, op. cit.

27. The political role of the Jama'at-i-Islami is partially described in Report of the Court of Inquiry, Lahore, Superintendent, Government Printing, Punjab, 1954.

28. Report of the Economic Appraisal Committee November, 1952. Karachi Ministry of Economic Affairs, 1953, p. 179.

CHAPTER V

PATHANS OF THE PESHAWAR VALLEY

HERBERT H. VREELAND, III

THE PESHAWAR VALLEY

The Peshawar Valley lies between the Khyber Pass and the Indus River, in what was until recently Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province. Girdled on all except its eastern perimeter by a rim of rugged and barren hills, the valley has the appearance of a large bowl with an open side against the Indus River. At the western end of the valley, in the shadow of the highest visible peaks and thirty miles from the Afghan border, sits the ancient town of Peshawar from which the valley derives its name. Once the western terminus of India's Grand Trunk Road, it is now better known to the world as the eastern terminus of the Afghanistan-Pakistan trade route through the Khyber Pass.

This large basin drains into the Kabul River, which rises in Afghanistan, cuts through the intervening mountain range several miles north of the Khyber Pass, and flows straight eastward through the center of the valley, collecting the waters of a fan-shaped system of perpetual and intermittent streams before it empties into the Indus near Attock. From the mountains to the Indus is a distance of about fifty miles.

The center of the valley is a broad plain, generally level but with occasional rises and rocky protuberances. Swampy areas still occur along the Kabul, but there are no true lakes and springs are rare, occurring mainly in the foothills. Most of the scanty rain supply falls in the autumn and in sporadic bursts through the winter months. Autumn, winter, and spring are relatively mild and humid. The summer is extremely hot and dry and rain is rare. The ground and the air are scorched and some of the perpetual rivers dry up to a trickle. Temperatures sometimes reach 120 degrees Fahrenheit for long periods. Regular afternoon windstorms burst across the plain in May and June. The worst onset of heat is the "loo"—a mass of hot air which moves through the valley, day and night, without ceasing for

as long as a week. As a result, the valley has a pronounced alternation of winter and summer climate.

While the valley supports a wide range of flora and fauna, of both temperate and tropical kinds, it does not do so with any abundance. Orchards, date groves, and green fields are found growing where men water and tend them, but otherwise there is little natural cover except along the banks of the streams.

The present indigenous occupants of the valley are of diverse ethnic origin, but two major blocks stand out, those of Afghan and of non-Afghan origin.

The first block consists of the Afghan-derived Pathans, who are numerically preponderant. Considerable confusion has been introduced into discussions of the frontier by the term "Pathan", owing to its varied connotations. The popular language of the Peshawar valley is Pushtu, the eastern branch of the Iranian language group. Any native speaker of this language refers to himself, when speaking Pushtu, as a "Pushtun" or "Pukhtun". A person whose native language is not Pushtu, but some other language, such as Urdu or one of the regional dialects, normally refers to native Pushtu-speakers as "Pathans".

Among the various shades of Pukhtun, or Pathans, inhabiting the Peshawar valley there are those who consider themselves to be the "true" or Asli Pukhtun. The Asli Pukhtun is essentially one who can successfully establish his connection with one of the Pukhtun tribes, which are of Afghan origin. Among the hill tribes, which are all Asli Pukhtun, this is a minimal problem since one's pedigree is generally a matter of common knowledge. In the settled areas, recourse to written genealogical materials is frequently necessary, owing to the mixture of peoples and the breakdown of the tribal system. Great quantities of such documents were collected by the British to establish land claims and are preserved in government records. These can be tied in to lists of the old Afghan-derived tribes which originally settled in the valley.

Furthermore, on direct questioning, anyone claiming to be a true Pukhtun, will identify himself as "Afghan" when asked to state his "caste" (the official term for registering ethnic identity) while other native speakers of Pushtu will give another identity. This is quite apparent in the local police records. In the ensuing discussion the term "Pathan" shall be used to designate only the true or Asli Pukhtun, who claims the ability to prove his origin from an Afghan-derived tribe, but who lives in the settled valley area.

The other major ethnic block of Pushtu-speakers consists of several ethnic and caste groups which are collectively considered as "Pathan" by

their Panjabi neighbors, but which are not of Afghan origin and do not identify themselves as true Pathans. While many of these groups are of known or probably Indian origin, such as the Awans and Gujjars, others are of uncertain origin and most have only vague traditions of their ancestry. Some of them claim descent from ancient conquerors or holy men.

At least one of these groups has however, a written genealogical base for its origin—these are the Syeds (Sayyids), who claim descent from the Prophet Muhammad. Families belonging to this group are in theory of Arab origin, claiming to have entered the country with the Arab immigrants to Sind, and can produce genealogical materials purporting to trace their ancestry from living members back through Muhammad to Adam and Eve.

A wide range of physical types can be seen in the valley, from striking Iranian types with angular features, light skin, and piercing blue or grey eyes, to the softer featured, dark skinned types more characteristic of India. One has the general impression of a preponderance of the former type among the Pathans and of the latter type among the other ethnic groups, but both types can be seen in almost any group.

In the settled valley, there are no marked differences in dress or behavior as between the Pushtu-speaking ethnic groups, the differences which do occur being correlated rather with wealth and social status. In the hills, however, there are certain differences in headgear which serve as an index of the part of the tribal belt from which a man comes.

In addition to the native Pushtu-speaking inhabitants, there are many representatives of other regions who live in the towns, for example Panjabis, Sindhis, and refugees from Uttar Pradesh in India. These people are considered "outsiders" by the natives as long as they do not adopt Pushtu as a second language.

While Pushtu is the language of both the rural areas and the towns, Urdu, as a language of daily conversation, is largely restricted to the towns. Two variants are spoken there, the "official" form which is current in government and among the upper classes, the "bazaar" Urdu, a regional form, which is spoken by shopkeepers, servants, and villagers who do business in the bazaar. Some of the educated men, both in the towns and villages, speak and read Persian. Hindko, a local form of Hindi, is spoken in a few villages near the towns.

The great majority of the people are Sunni Muslims. Groups of Shi'a Muslims, Parsis, and Christians are found, however, in the towns. The Parsis are generally prominent business men, while the Christians are found scattered through most of the occupational categories. Some members of the Ahmadi or Qadiani sect of Muslims are also present. Practically all

of the Hindus left at Partition, but individuals are found in various places and stations. In spite of the communal riots which occurred in the bazaars of Peshawar and Nowshera, most villagers and townsmen had no ill feeling towards their own resident Hindu families and view their departure as a loss.

Human adaptation to the Peshawar Valley follows the same general patterns found in northern India. Subsistence agriculture forms the base, with wheat, barley, millet, corn, cotton, peppers, and sugarcane being the primary crops. The annual cycle is divided into two planting and harvesting periods, one for wheat and barley (winter) and one for corn (summer). Planting and harvesting of sugarcane overlaps both periods. These crops are supplemented with a variety of vegetables, and with clover which is used in conjunction with millet as a fodder. In many villages there are extensive pear, peach, and apricot orchards, and grape vineyards. Tobacco is also an important crop near the town of Nowshera. Wheat, cotton, pepper, and especially tobacco and sugarcane are grown for the market as well as for local consumption.

Most cultivation is performed by means of crude animal-drawn plows and hand tools made of wood and iron. Some modern tractor-drawn equipment is in use on the estates of the largest landowners. Animal manure is important as a fertilizer, and recently considerable interest has been shown in the use of chemical fertilizers.

Domestic animals are an important part of the agricultural picture. Small humped cattle and buffaloes are of primary importance, since they pull plows and carts, turn small cane-crushing mills and provide much-needed manure for fertilizer and fuel. Buffaloes and donkeys serve as beasts of burden. Goats, fat-tailed sheep, and fowl are raised for food. Horses are used only for pulling carriages and are therefore associated primarily with transportation rather than agriculture. All animals are bred in the villages, except the draft horses which are imported from Afghanistan. The larger animals are either stall-fed or fed with cut fodder in vacant fields of the village. Goats and sheep are grazed on stubble or in marginal areas between the cultivated areas.

Hunting, fishing, and the collecting of wild honey are popular pastimes, but are otherwise not seriously pursued for a living.

The pronounced winter-summer alternation in the climate of this region has a visible effect on the agricultural life of the valley. The mild, humid winter is a period of maximum activity, both in the irrigation and cultivation of fields, and in the supplementary tasks of repair of canals and processing of cane and grain. The summer is a period of relative inactivity, cultivators doing a minimum of work in the fields and on the irrigation system. Many of the wealthier people use this time to escape to cooler places

in the surrounding hills.

The alternation of activity within the valley itself has associated with it a seasonal migration of certain Afghan groups between their Afghan homeland and the Peshawar Valley, via the Khyber Pass. In winter, when the valley is mild and agriculturally in full swing, the Afghan highlands are bitterly cold and unproductive. Consequently, the poorer Afghan villagers who have put in their winter crop in autumn, find it advantageous to descend to the Peshawar Valley to wait out the winter and at the same time find some gainful occupation. In the spring, when the great summer heat is about to settle on the valley and work slackens, these groups return to their Afghan villages in time to harvest the winter crop.

Because of the fact that they carry their belongings on donkeys or camels, they are known by the valley men as khana-ba-dosh, or "house-on-the-back". For the same reason many Western journalists have persistently confused them with the nomadic pastoral tribes of Central Asia and depicted them as "pouring through the Khyber Pass". The fact is that these people are neither pastoral nor do they pour. Any true pastoral nomad, of either the wandering or transhumant variety, would find the valley decidedly unattractive, since at the level of its present technology it is an overworked agricultural area in which any marginal grazing sites are already fully utilized by the indigenous villagers.

In the month of October, a long thin stream of these people, mostly of the Ghaljai (Ghilzaï) tribe, can be seen plodding down the Khyber Pass road into the valley where they disperse to villages in small family groups. Most of them return to the same villages year after year, where they are put up in empty houses and are employed through the winter months as day laborers. They are considered to be especially skilled in mud masonry. Some sell various products, hire themselves as caravaners, or find employment in the towns, but the majority put up in the rural areas, and are not highly visible except when on the march or camping along the road in tents. Their primary concern is to integrate themselves as rapidly and remuneratively as possible into village life. Although their dress is distinctive, they all speak a variant of Pushtu, are accustomed to farm life, and merge easily with the Peshawar villagers.

Many Pathan or Pukhtun tribesmen also follow the same pattern, descending from their mountain valleys with their animals and families to spend the winter in settled villages. Wealthy Pathans frequently have two homes, a summer home in the hills and a winter home in the valley.

The most general technological problem in the valley is the water supply. In the absence of sufficient rain, dry farming has been supplemented by irrigation. An ancient system of channels, fanning out from the few

perpetual streams, has been overlaid during the British regime by a public system of concrete barrages and arterial canals, from which both publicly and privately constructed channels lead off. Since these government canals are located in the northern half of the valley, sugar cane cultivation is restricted almost entirely to this area. The southern half of the valley has, until recently, received little attention and remains dependent on the old channels and on sporadic rains, as a result of which it is extremely barren over wide areas. After Partition, the Government of North-West Frontier Province attempted to develop the water system in the southern half by construction of a barrage on the Kabul River at Warsak.

The extent of the water problem can be seen not only in the elaboration of the irrigation system, but also in the supplementary techniques for controlling and utilizing water. The Peshawar Valley is a living museum of water-controlling devices. The Persian wheel, or arhat, is used extensively in the northeastern quarter of the valley. The jalar, a paddle wheel which is powered by water and simultaneously lifts water in containers attached to the blades, is popular where the land is higher than the canal. In some of the piedmont villages, in the southwestern quarter, one can see the local version of the Iranian qanat, or underground water channel. Those who can afford it are also experimenting with modern pumping devices.

Human settlement in the valley is oriented primarily to the agricultural patterns of life and to the water supply. Hundreds of villages and hamlets are scattered throughout the valley. In the well-irrigated northern half of the valley, these are dispersed along the vast network of primary and subsidiary channels. In the southern half of the valley, which is poorly irrigated, the settlements tend to cluster along the few perpetual rivers and streams.

The typical village is a compact, irregular cluster of buildings and walls, with narrow winding streets and no central square or meeting place. Most buildings are one-storied and made of mud, sun-dried brick, and timber. The village is divided into wards, which are not always physically discrete, but which are nevertheless socially distinct. In most cases the wards are actually separated by alleys or short stretches of open land. The average village includes about eight hundred people. A few large villages have between four and six thousand people.

Around the village site proper lie the village fields, a patchwork of small, irregular plots separated by ridges and interspersed with water channels, cart roads and foot paths. The lands of one village are generally continuous with those of several others, and in many cases the boundary is formed by a jointly-used water channel.

The situation in the surrounding hill areas is somewhat different,

owing to both geographical and social factors. Settlement is restricted largely to narrow mountain valleys where small patches of arable land and the water from mountain streams can be combined. As a result, the tribal village appears as a series of small walled compounds strung out along the stream.

Interwoven with the agricultural life of the valley is an ancient pattern of industry and trade, in which the village is relatively self-sufficient but still intimately connected with the town, and the town is in turn both dependent on the village and on far-flung trade relations with the external regions of Afghanistan, central Asia, and the subcontinent. In the villages are found carpenters, blacksmiths, weavers, potters, barbers, priests, school teachers, midwives and various other specialists who provide most of the basic goods and services required in a village subsistence economy. One of the most acutely felt lacks is adequate medical service. There is some specialization by village, and not all villages have all the necessary skills present, so that peddling between villages helps to even out differences. The average village also processes its own products for local consumption.

At the same time, it is characteristic of most villages that they operate at an extremely low level of skill and complexity, and with the most minimal facilities. In these terms, the transition from village to town is abrupt and striking.

There are four main towns in the Peshawar Valley—Peshawar, Mardan, Nowshera, and Charsadda. All except the last actually consist of two distinct parts—the "City" which is the old native bazaar town, and the "Cantonment" which is a recent adjunct consisting of a European-style military post with government offices. Each of these serves its separate functions.

Peshawar is probably the most colorful and romantic of these frontier towns. The City, with its compact mass of buildings and labyrinth of winding streets and alleys, in a way resembles the villages around it, but here the buildings are many-storied, better built, and there is a central square. The streets are lined with rows of stalls and shops, and filled with a hubbub of pedestrians, cyclists, camel trains, and automobiles. Here highly skilled artisans work in groups, retail shops sell trade goods from all over the world, and doctors and lawyers of every sort offer their services. Here also are the lower offices of the provincial administration, government and mission hospitals, a woman's college, mosques and seminaries, hotels, inns, garages, and apartments built in the general modern style. Where the relative simplicity of village life is combined with a blending of its varying cultural traditions, the complexity of the town is combined with

a bewildering juxtaposition of the old and the new, the traditional and the modern. Into this maelstrom the villager comes to dispose of his surplus goods, pay his taxes, innoculate his family, attend the mosque or the cinema, and to buy his kerosene, his tea, and his milled cloth.

These older patterns of agriculture, bazaar, industry, and trade are gradually being supplemented by industrialization based on factories and hydroelectric power. Fruit canneries and textile mills near Peshawar are well established. There are two large sugar mills near Mardan which absorb a large part of the valley's crop. Chemical plants are beginning to appear. Two large hydroelectric plants, in the northern rim of mountains, provide light and power for the towns and for a few satellite villages. In the main, industry is in its infancy and is either government owned or heavily subsidized and protected by government. So far, it is providing employment for a few people from the towns who have already acquired some mechanical skill in the bazaar or in government service. To the average villager the factory is a curiosity.

The interaction of village and town, and of town with exterior areas, is aided by a well-developed communication system. The four large towns are connected with each other, and with towns outside the valley, by a system of excellent hard-surfaced roads. Most of the larger villages are located near these roads, while the smaller villages utilize a secondary system of dirt roads and tracks. The government maintains an efficient bus service on the main roads of the valley. A railroad line runs up into the valley from Lahore, passing between Peshawar City and Cantonment, and continuing up into the Khyber Pass almost to the Afghan border. The Pakistan International Airways has regular semiweekly passenger and mail service into an airfield just outside the Cantonment. Telephone and telegraph service are relatively well developed in the main towns and between these and the rest of Pakistan.

Until the recent amalgamation of the provinces of West Pakistan, the government of the North-West Frontier Province consisted of a governor, a cabinet of five or six ministers, a legislative assembly, and a civil secretariat with numerous administrative departments under their respective secretaries.

For administrative purposes the settled areas of the province were divided into six districts, two of which, Peshawar and Mardan, were located in the Peshawar Valley. The districts were administered by district magistrates (deputy commissioners) and district boards, and were further subdivided into units called a tehsil, or county, under a tehsildar. The rural areas of the tehsil were again subdivided into two separate but roughly coterminous administrative units: the zail, or revenue circle, for land

revenue purposes, and the thana, or police ward, for policing purposes. Each ward had a police station with both reserve and roving patrols. Urban centers within the tehsil, for example Peshawar City, were set up as separate municipalities, and administered by municipal committees.

The lowest administrative level was the village. Most villages were provided with a government primary school and teacher, and were visited periodically by government agents: the patwari, or land registrar, called to record land transfers and to distribute the tax assessment slips, while the roving police patrols passed through on routine inspections. As long as the villagers paid their taxes and kept out of trouble, the government had little concern with the interior political structure of the village. The only wholly elective body was the provincial legislative assembly, members of which were seated on the basis of rural and urban constituencies, from the settled districts only.

Although many of the lower echelon offices of the provincial administration were located in Peshawar City, as well as in other towns of the province, the central offices were located in the Peshawar Cantonment which served as the provincial capital. Designed as a self-contained European-style settlement, the Cantonment is laid out in a rectangular grid of streets, with spacious lawns, and contains the governor's mansion, the assembly building, the higher courts, the secretariat buildings, army and air force installations, and the residences of higher level civil and military officials. These are supplemented with a separate bazaar, several hotels, a mission college, Christian churches, a well-run museum with collections of the famous Gandhara sculpture, a residential club, cricket fields, an athletic stadium, and other symbols of European culture. The whole is encompassed in a barbed wire perimeter with sentry boxes at the several gates.

The barbed wire and the sentry boxes are indicative of one of the provincial government's persistent problems—relations between the administration in the valley, and the independent tribal groups in the hills. Whatever its basic causes, this relationship has ranged from open warfare between the tribesmen and the army, to at best a state of uneasy suspense.

During the British regime, a system of agency was devised with the purpose of maintaining contact with, and minimum indirect control over, the adjoining tribal belt. Sections of the tribal belt were assigned to special officers, called political agents, who were responsible through the chief secretary, to the governor of the province in Peshawar. Within the chief secretary's office there was also a special officer to handle affairs relative to the seasonal migrations from Afghanistan to the Peshawar Valley. The governor thus had a dual role, Governor of the Settled District and Agent

of the Central Government in respect to tribal affairs. Tribal affairs for the whole of Pakistan were coordinated and controlled through the Ministry of States and Frontier Regions, in Karachi. Responsibility for administration of the tribal area has been taken over by the West Pakistan provincial government.

The two types of government, direct administration in the settled areas, and indirect agency in the tribal area, were kept discrete, and the tribes continued to operate under their own systems of law and order, subject to the help, advice and threats of the political agents. In the event of a tribal uprising, the government stood ready to meet the emergency with its string of border forts, and its ground and air force stationed in Peshawar and other border towns.

This apposition of the militarized "state" and the autonomous "tribe" is one of the more visible and traditional aspects of life on the North-West Frontier. Beneath the surface, however, run other currents, for although the tribal and settled areas appear separated and opposed on a political level, they are intimately interconnected on both an economic and a social level, and in a way which places a premium on the government's ability to keep both areas in a state of quiescent equilibrium.

Economically, the two areas are highly interdependent. Since farming in the hills is marginal affording only a meager subsistence, the tribesmen are forced to find other souces of income, either through looting, or by more ethical means. Service in the armed forces or the civil offices, and professional education and practice, have in the past attracted large numbers of tribal Pathans into the valley. Until Partition, it was common for tribesmen to go as far as Bombay and Calcutta seeking employment and many became stokers on ships. Many tribesmen have made a living out of selling hill products, such as wood and narcotic weeds, in the valley. Several wealthy tribesmen are in business in the border towns, such as the trucking business. One enterprising Pathan family, with both tribal and settled branches, has for years been supplying the Peshawar valley with its millstones, quarried in a special area in Afghanistan and floated down the Kabul River to a small village just north of Peshawar.

The valley is in turn dependent on the hills, not only for timber, but more critically, for water, since the main water resources of the valley either rise in or pass through the tribal hills. Both Peshawar City and Cantonment, for example, are supplied with water which is piped off the Bara River inside the tribal territory.

Socially the problem is more complex. Pathans in both the tribal and the settled villages consider themselves as parts of the same social continuum, with no perceptible break at the border. Although the border

is marked on government maps by a definite boundary line, and although the government maintains armed check points at places where the main roads traverse the border, these formalities have little import for the Pathan who is bent on some friendly or hostile social mission among his "cousins" across the border. Tribal and settled villagers attend each others' weddings and funerals. The sons of tribal leaders attend college in the valley, a luxury which is made especially convenient by the fact that the large and important University of Peshawar is located five miles west of town, toward the tribal border. On vacations, these students bring their classmates back to their tribal homes. Personal blood feuds are also carried across the border, though the risk is great in the settled areas.

This picture is further complicated by the fact that while both tribal and settled Pathans largely ignore the border for social and economic activities, they will utilize its political significance for various kinds of expediency. Tribal families, worsted in feuds, find it convenient to remove into the settled areas where feuding is outlawed. Families in the settled areas which wish to carry on some illegal occupation openly, such as gunsmithing or trade in narcotics, find it convenient to move over the border into tribal territory. Criminals of all sorts skip across the border to avoid arrest by the police.

For these reasons, the government is little concerned about the protection of the settled villages immediately adjacent to the border, and is rather more concerned about their potential for abetting the illegal and the criminal. What this means, in large, is that the government faces a much more complex problem than defense of the administered areas against tribal incursion. While attempting to keep the tribal belt peaceful, through a combination of diplomacy and sword rattling, the administration must simultaneously look to the maintenance of its own authority within its own jurisdiction.

Here the principal enigma is the settled Pathan who is not completely committed either to the administered society in the valley or to the tribal society in the hills. In a formal political sense he is a citizen of the state, but in a broader social sense he is also an extension of the tribal society from which the state has chosen to set itself apart. Only in this context can one understand the seemingly ambivalent attitude of many settled Pathans toward the departed British raj. These Pathans will, in one breath, praise the British for their impartial administration of justice in the settled areas, and in the next, accuse the British of deliberately segregating the hill tribes in order to provide a "live" training ground for army officers.

Hence, the government is actually dealing with two different and overlapping kinds of society, which exist within its own jurisdiction—one

a complex administered society included in the "state", and the other an ethnic society, which is represented in the former, but which also straddles the border and is oriented towards its own set of traditional institutions and values.

PATHAN SOCIETY

Pathan society has a tribal origin. Today the tribal structure is still largely intact beyond the border, and here the traditional forms of Pathan social life continue to operate within their own context of custom. In the settled areas, where the tribal structure has broken down and its functions have been absorbed by the state, custom has been undermined by an administered and alien law, and many of the traditional forms have been altered. Contact with a more highly differentiated and stratified society has also had its effect. Consequently, one can find many differences between the social forms of the tribal and the settled areas.

At the same time, the tribal and settled Pathans still share a set of explicit values and "ideal" forms, which serve as common reference points for both groups. The settled Pathan is aware that his own "real" social forms diverge in many ways from the "ideal" which he associates with tribal life. Deferring to tribal tradition, he frequently feels obliged to explain what these divergences are and how they came about.

Before proceeding further, it may be well to point out that Pathan tribal society is not peculiar in this part of the world. It has many parallels throughout the Iranian plateau, and many of its features can be found in less extreme form, throughout northern Pakistan and India. Even its most dramatic stereotypes appear relatively commonplace when subjected to wider comparisons.

The structure of Pathan society is based on a kinship system in which the central principle is that of unilinear descent through males. All Pathans are, in theory, descended from a common male ancestor, called Kais, who lived in Afghanistan many generations ago. Hence, all Pathans consider themselves "cousin" to each other, and each one sees himself as the center of an ever-widening circle of kinsmen, from the first cousins in his own family, to the most distant cousins at the limits of the society. Any two Pathans can theoretically establish their exact relationship with each other by tracing up their respective male lines until they reach a common male ancestor. This large society of kinsmen is divided into three kinds of groupings, the tribe, the lineage, and the extended family.

The tribe, or qaum, is the largest of these three groupings and is also the maximal political unit. Tribes sometimes form confederacies, but

these are not permanent units like the tribe. Each tribe has a name and occupies a clearly defined territory of its own. Its members also tend to have certain peculiarities of dress, speech,and manner which set them apart from neighboring tribes. As a distinct political unit, the tribe maintains law and order among its members according to its own codes, and unites for defense of its territory.

The tribe is divided into several large lineages, called khel, which are composed of all those people descended from a particular male ancestor, somewhere below the level of the common tribal ancestor. In most cases the various male ancestors at the heads of all these large lineages are considered to have been "brothers". The large lineages are further subdivided into smaller lineages, called kahol or kor.

Although there is no rule that a man should marry a woman from his own lineage, lineages tend to be endogamous, particularly where relationships with adjacent lineages are bad. The feud, which is the most frequent cause of lineage segmentation, is often perpetuated by bitter wranglings over land, so that closely related lineages frequently are the most antagonistic. This makes it difficult to marry out of the immediate lineage, since it would involve either taking a wife from real or potential enemies, or traversing hostile territory. In consonance with this situation, one finds that the Pathans have a strong preference for marriages between closely related cousins. Since exchanges of dowry and bride wealth are also involved, this kind of marriage has the advantage of keeping economic and social ties within a narrow range of currently compatible kinsmen.

At the base of the tribal structure is the source of most of the tribe's internal dissension, the extended family or khandan. The smallest lineage is composed of several closely related families, each of which holds land of its own, and lives in a separate fortified residence called a qala. In the piedmont region, and through the Khyber and Kohat passes one can see these small forts perched on knolls, or spaced out through a mountain valley.

The interior of the qala is divided into at least two compounds separated by a high wall. The large main gate enters the more public of these compounds—the farmyard, or gholai, which is primarily for men and men's activities, although it also is the province of small children of both sexes who play games, perform small chores, and listen to the deliberations of their elders. In one corner there is a stall or shed for the larger animals and a tool house. Along one wall is a veranda, constructed with carved beams and thatch, and provided with several light frame cots. In wealthier families there is a room of some kind built behind the veranda,

or at one end, which is used as a dining room or a bedroom on cold nights. This section of the farmyard, including the veranda, the special guest room, and the open ground immediately in front is known as the hujra and it is here that the owner entertains his male guests and friends.

The other compound is the family living quarters. Here are several rooms, built around one or more sides of the hollow square, where the various married couples live with their children. Men of the family normally sleep here, unless they have an overnight guest in which case they sleep in the hujra with the guest, as required by custom. Men will also sleep in the hujra if the women of the family are putting up women visitors overnight in the family quarters.

Within the walls of the qala lives a group of males related by blood, together with their wives, who may or may not be their close blood kin, and their unmarried sisters, daughters, and small children. It is expected that fathers, sons, and brothers will continue to reside under the same roof as long as the size of the qala and the compatibility of its members permit. Wives move into their husbands' qala, while sisters and daughters, when they marry will leave the qala. This family group cultivates the family fields around the qala and lives as a self-sufficient unit except for its dependence on the nearest bazaar, and on the supplementary occupations of the men away from home.

The traditional system of inheritance is to divide equally among all sons, daughters being excluded in spite of Qur'anic prescriptions to the contrary. What is actually distributed to the heirs is not specific plots of land, but equal shares or bakhra in whatever aggregate lands were held by the deceased, so that initially there is no basis for contention among the heirs. Ultimately, however, specific plots must be assigned, and it is here that the trouble begins, since plots vary considerably in their size, quality, and accessibility. An equitable distribution of plots is attempted, and may be initially satisfactory, but in time real or assumed differences appear, and one heir feels cheated. To reduce such cumulative inequalities, and bring concrete holdings into line with the abstract shares, there was at one time a custom of periodic redistribution, or vesh, by which all plots of the community were pooled and reassigned by lot. It is no longer practiced.

Another element in family relationships contributes to the land conflict, that is, the social inequality of brothers. Younger brothers are expected to defer to their father and older brothers. When an older brother enters, a younger brother is expected to rise and relinquish the best seat; he is also expected to refrain from smoking or being shaved in the presence of his older brother. When the father dies, it is normally the older brother

who takes over the managerial and authority role in the family. Although the family residence is supposed to be equally shared, the older brother has the strongest claim to the best part of the residential quarters, and prior use of the guest house. The older brother is usually the first to be married and married persons have considerably more status than unmarried. If the younger brother is still unmarried when the father dies, the older brother will handle the family funds, arrange for the wedding, and make the necessary payments to the bride's family. This prior access to wealth, status, and authority is frequently misused, and adds further fuel to the potentially explosive land situation already existing between brothers.

The highest potential for conflict occurs in polygynous families. Pathan men may, and frequently do, marry more than one wife at the same time. Whatever their real motives, this is usually rationalized either by the first wife's failure to produce a son, or by an appeal to the romantic ideal. Since first marriages are arranged by the family, the second marriage is one of personal choice—the "love match".

Polygyny raises a serious problem because the inheritance customs not only call for equal division to all sons, but to all sons whether by the first or by any other legal wife. Each co-wife, already jealous of the other, is further angered by the knowledge that the sons of the other woman will be sharing in the inheritance, thus reducing the shares to her own sons. Each will incite her own sons against the other wife and her sons, and the first wife, jealous also of the father, will frequently set her sons against him.

This complex of inheritance, unequal status of brothers, and polygyny, produces tension and conflict in an effort to gain control of the critical item, land, which is in short supply. This conflict has two aspects, one, the overt battle between real and half brothers, and second, if there are two wives, the covert battle between wives using black magic against each other and white magic to gain the affections of the common husband.

When this conflict results in physical violence, the Pathan code of honor requires retaliation, or badal, in the form of blood revenge—an eye for an eye, a life for a life. Since there is both an inherited obligation for counter-retaliation, and an obligation to support close kin, there may develop in one generation a bitter feud between two families where only one family existed before. Cousin becomes pitted against cousin, a situation so prevalent in Pathan life that the term for paternal cousin, tarbur, has almost become synonymous with "enemy". From this point of division the two families in time become separate lineages, nursing the old hate, and jealously guarding the boundaries of their respective

land holdings. Out of this competitive situation emerge real and visible social inequalities. While Pathan society is not stratified into classes, it has a scale of social status based on differences in wealth and power.

Through default of heirs, through various kinds of deceit, or through misuse of authority and privilege, some families acquire more land than their neighboring kinsmen. While wealth carries a power of its own, the competitive nature of the society forces the wealthy family to protect itself by acquiring a special power in the form of a group of loyal supporters, owing personal allegiance to no one but the head of the family. Thus the wealthy man surrounds himself with paid retainers, whom he feeds, clothes, lodges, and arms, and who accompany him on important missions away from his native valley.

Accordingly wealth and power run together, and those who own most land, and who have the greatest number of retainers, occupy the highest social status in the society. The lineage headman, or malik, is the wealthiest, the most powerful man in the lineage, and has the highest status.

The lowest status is held by the poorest and least powerful families, although here sterling qualities of personal integrity, piety, and courage will bring considerable recognition and prestige in the eyes of the wealthy and powerful. Such people will be selected as personal servants and retainers and allowed direct participation in the daily life of their masters.

Among the Pathans, the most evident and traditional earmarks of social status are (1) the relative inactivity and invisibility of their women, and (2) the relative lavishness of the hospitality which is offered by the family through the medium of its men.

As a general rule, men perform the hardier tasks and engage in those occupations external to the home, among which are farming, herding, trading, blacksmithing, carpentry, masonry, and politics. Women perform tasks centered within the family quarters, which include care of the home and the children, preparing and cooking food, spinning and sewing, and milking and feeding of the animals quartered inside the compound. Only two tasks, fetching water and gathering fuel and fodder, normally take them out of the home.

In families with more wealth and higher status, the women relegate as many of these tasks as possible, particularly the dirtier ones and those requiring leaving the home, to female servants drawn from the poorer families. As a result they tend to be less visible to the public eye, and it is their relative leisure and ability to remain in their own quarters, which signals their higher status.

The men's status symbol is hospitality. It centers around the offering

of food, drink, tobacco, conversation, lodging, and protection to other males, particularly those of equal or higher status, but also on a lesser scale to personal retainers, messengers, and people of this nature on whom the family relies either for personal loyalty or a good report. Hospitality is normally offered in the hujra, or guest section of the farmyard compound. Since the hujra is also the place where the men relax during the day, it serves as a kind of public meeting place and the extent to which a man's hujra is patronized by the public is an index of the man's status in the community.

In the Pathan code of honor, this is known as melmastia (from melma, guest) and has been interpreted as something that the honorable Pathan must do or lose his family's social standing. While there is certainly this compunction among Pathans, there is more to it than that. Pathans use the hospitality game as much to achieve prestige as they do to save their existing status. Wealth and power are the bases for high status, but it is only a correspondingly lavish show of hospitality which gives full recognition to this status in terms of wide prestige.

The prestige aspect of hospitality thus becomes a competitive game between Pathans of equal status, each trying to outdo the other's last display. This is often jokingly recognized as a sort of "social feud", and after being well entertained, a guest will smilingly say to his host: "When you come to see me, I shall make badal (revenge)."

Viewed as a whole, Pathan society is thus highly divisive and competitive. Under the surface appearance of equality and congeniality, lie persistent elements of inequality and strife. Fear of advantage, and of those who have it, hovers continually over the Pathan's mind. Aggression is either hidden beneath a disarming smile, or flares suddenly and violently into the open. Brothers are wary of each other, and cousins often avoid each other. Friends are few, and friendships highly selective and intense. True friendship exists only between equals and seldom between immediate kinsmen. Competition for loyalties which will support the land issue runs high, and the situation is fluid, revolving around wealthy and influential men whose positions vary according to their fortunes in the manipulative game.

In the midst of this struggle appears one of the most curious characters of the frontier, the clever and successful rogue. He will execute almost any kind of mission for the right price, or for the friendship of a wealthy and powerful man, confident that in success he will also achieve a certain legendary notoriety. He is known generally as a badmash or "bad character". Though he may be shot at by some and avoided by others, he is assured the

open company of many who admire his devil-may-care attitude, his conviviality, and wit. With unshaven face, permanent smile, direct gaze, and hat at a rakish angle, he moves from hujra to hujra, accumulating his special kind of prestige. Since this type of individual is generally tolerated in both the tribal and the settled areas, he migrates freely between the two, carrying information, or helping to settle a trans-border social obligation. For this reason he is one of the administration's minor headaches in its attempt to keep peace on both sides of the border.

SETTLED VILLAGE SOCIETY

When Pathan tribes moved down from the hills and occupied the settled farming villages of the Peshawar Valley, they came into close association with other ethnic groups already occupying these villages. They also came under the control of a series of centralized governments based at Peshawar. Many of the leading Pathan families of the time were drawn into the orbit of a society where class and caste distinctions were important. As a result, the tribal structure of Pathan society broke down and greater distinctions in social status appeared.

The remnants of the old settled tribes can still be found in the Peshawar Valley today. The more well-known of these are the Yusufzai, Khalil, Mohmand, Muhammadzai, Daudzai, and Khattak Although no longer organized as political units, they still have their traditional tribal areas, called tappas, associated with them, and Pathans coming from villages in these tappas will identify themselves as Yusufzai, Khalil, etc. if asked for their tribal origin. It is also apparent that these tribal areas once formed the basis for the original administrative subdivision of the valley, and in spite of subsequent alterations, tribal and administrative units are roughly coterminous today. In other respects, however, the tribal areas have no functional significance.

Similarly, the lineage structure has largely broken down to the extent that most Pathans are not conscious of it beyond their immediate small lineage consisting of several closely related families. The patrilineal principle of descent still prevails, but the pyramidal superstructure of lineage groupings is gone. It is possible to reconstruct large lineages, in an historical sense, by reference to government documents, but the average Pathan does not refer to such documents except to establish land claims. Hence relationship beyond the small lineage is traced through more immediate ties of blood and marriage. The Pathan will know his blood kin within the depth of a few generations. He may also have a tradition of some kind of blood relationship to all the other Pathan families

in his own village, and may even believe that all the Pathan families in the village are descended from a common ancestor. But he is seldom able to establish the exact connection in any systematic way. Hence closeness of relationship beyond the immediately known blood kin is reckoned by marital rather than by patrilineal ties.

Small lineage groups tend to be localized within villages, but again the average Pathan is only vaguely aware of any principle of localization. Most settled villages are divided into wards, the Pathan is conscious that his own lineage tends to cluster in one of these, but the pattern has many discrepancies of which he is also aware. It is possible by historical means to discern a certain localization of larger lineage groupings within the old tribal areas, so that separate villages tend to be occupied only by members of a single lineage, while adjacent villages are occupied predominantly by members of a still larger lineage. But this kind of perspective is somewhat removed from the Pathan's field of vision, and has meaning to him only when the historical revelation is made.

What one finds, therefore, in the average village of the Peshawar Valley is a collection of small Pathan lineages, composed of several closely related families, which can be shown by record to descend from a common male ancestor, but which have little awareness that they constitute collectively a still large lineage group. Similarly, families in adjacent villages, which can be shown by record to descend from a common male ancestor, several generations removed, normally think of each other as related only through whatever immediate blood and marital ties exist between them at the moment.

A group of closely related families in the village is headed nominally by a malik who is the most prominent man in the most prominent family of the group. As in the tribal areas, this is a title fixed after the fact and there is no formal office involved. Hence, the village may contain several persons with the rank of malik, of approximately equal status and of varying degrees of mutual congeniality, respect, and intercommunication.

The family of the settled Pathan is organized on the same principles as among the tribes, and follows the same rules of marriage, including both polygyny and a preference for marriage within the lineage. Deference of sons to fathers, and younger to older brothers is also present. The household is organized in the same way, with a division into two separate parts, the family quarters, where the women stay, and the courtyard or gholai where the men keep their farm equipment and animals and also have their guest house. The primary difference is that here these

two parts may be physically separated by a street or alley, and the walls of the gholai are lower and less fortified, the fortifications being reserved for the family quarters.

The families of the village are susceptible to the same kind of tension and conflict that exists among the tribal groups. Typically the families of one lineage either deliberately avoid or have little to do with families of the other lineages. Any one of these lineages may be rent by internal squabbles, so that families separated by only one or two generations refuse to speak to each other, feud in the courts, or destroy each other's property surreptitiously. The village Pathan accordingly distinguishes those families with whom his own family is on speaking terms from those with whom they are not. The distinction is made with the concept of khebadā, "the good with the bad", meaning a mutual sharing of the crises of life. The Pathan says: "We have khebadā with these people" or "We have broken khebadā with those people." Two families which have broken khebadā will not attend each other's weddings and funerals, and will assume no obligation to assist in or settle the other's feuds. With the disappearance of the strong lineage principle, kinship obligations extend out only to the limits of mutual compatibility. Since the concept of khebadā applies to whole families rather than individuals, it is possible for personal friendships to cut across the invisible curtain between two mutually estranged families. It is through these, and through the medium of neutral servants, that communication between such families takes place.

Under the complex web of inter-family relationships lies a strong element of factionalism which is usually associated with the division of the village into wards and which frequently splits the village into two opposing halves. In daily life, certain families in opposite factions may have khebadā with each other, and personal loyalties between individuals may again cut across the line, but for any issue which involves the village as a whole, the factional split emerges clearly.

As in the tribal areas, much of the internal strife of the Pathan families and lineages in the settled villages centers over the control and inheritance of family property, particularly land.

Although the system of land registration employed by the provincial government recognizes the Qur'anic prescription for inheritance, and requires that such land transfers show daughters of the family receiving their due share, the traditional inheritance pattern still prevails. Shares are inherited patrilineally, passing from father to all his sons equally. Women have no claim on the land except in cases of default, and are then frequently unable to hold their land without the support of some strong male. Where the distribution of water from irrigation channels is a crucial problem,

shares also include water rights.

The arable land of the village is divided into two major categories. These are mulkiet, which is partitioned into private holdings, and shamilat, which is communally held land, except that here private interests are also recognized in terms of the shares held in the mulkiet. Where the mulkiet is fractionated into hundreds of small plots, the shamilat is traditionally undivided, though in many villages it has been parcelled out like the mulkiet. The shamilat is a potential source of trouble, being subject to expropriation by powerful men of the village.

Although based on the tribal tradition, the settled Pathan's attitude toward social status has been considerably affected by the fact that the settled villages have a mixed ethnic composition, and that in most cases the Pathans are the landowners while the other ethnic components are landless. The principal exceptions to this occur on the eastern side of Peshawar City, where many villages are owned by Awans.

The majority of the landowning Pathan families are also landlords who do not cultivate the land themselves but let it to the landless group on a sharecropping tenantry basis. Some Pathan landowners are, however, so poor that they cannot afford to divide the crop, and must cultivate their own lands. Although not immediately visible on the surface, these distinctions have associated with them certain status distinctions which become apparent on closer analysis of social attitudes.

The Pathan landowners are set apart from the landless tenants by a class barrier, which is discernible mainly in the general reluctance of landowners to marry members of the landless families, and by the fact that the tenants address the landowners as khan, or master, while the landowners address the tenants by their given names. Other than these, there are few overt signs of class difference, either in appearance, manner,or interaction, except in cases where the landlord wears clothes of better quality.

One can see elements of the caste system at work in the village. The lower tenant class families perform a wide range of special services and crafts in addition to tilling the soil, and among these certain occupations such as barbering, corn-parching, and blacksmithing appear to be restricted to particular sets of related families. Though familiar caste names appear among some of these families, no really typical Indian caste groups can be found in the villages. However, the element of an inheritable occupation is certainly there.

At the same time, while members of the wealthier Pathan families will occasionally turn a hand to farming or tending the plough animals, they will not engage in any other occupation within the village. The poorest members of the Pathan landowning class, who do all their own cultivation,

and Pathans who have lost their land, will occasionally engage in certain kinds of other activity such as shopkeeping and carriage driving, but they will not perform those menial or craft occupations which have a strong caste tone about them. These attitudes are strongest near a city such as Peshawar, where the caste element is most pronounced. Pathan servants rebel against performing any of the household chores normally assigned to servants from other ethnic groups.

Conscious of themselves as a distinct landowning class, the Pathans are inclined to look down upon their own Pathan village-mates who lose their land and are forced into the role of common laborers. This loss of status is also recognized by the tenant class who omit the title of khan when addressing such a person.

Class consciousness among Pathans reaches its peak in the case of certain Pathan lineages which were drawn into the more elaborate class system associated with the rulers of Peshawar. Before the arrival of the British, several prominent Pathan families had already made themselves useful to their governors by serving as intermediaries between government and the hill tribes. They were the forerunners of the present political agents. Both before and during the British period, these families were rewarded with heritable titles, such as Arbab and Nawab, along with sizeable jagirs, or tax farms. While these families have been replaced in this function by the political agents, and their jagirs were later withdrawn by the Pakistan government, their titles and other social prerogatives remain, as well as considerable prestige and influence accumulated over a period of time and now reinforced by local traditions. Two of these families, the Arbabs of the Mohmand tappa, and the Arbabs of the Khalil tappa, have now grown to large lineages. They are socially and politically prominent in Peshawar, still retain landlordship over many villages, and command considerable deference from the average Pathan landowner or tenant in their own and neighboring tappas. Because of their position as the local "nobility", they have kept up their lineage records and are much interested in their pedigree. Through marriage with other Pathan families, their kin ties have ramified out into other settled Pathan tribes, and the title of Arbab appears elsewhere than in the original Arbab lineages.

Settled Pathans are as much concerned with the traditional symbols of family status as are their hill cousins, and in certain respects they are more extreme, especially in the matter of the invisibility of the women. In the Peshawar Valley, strict purdah is a more critical issue than the activity of the women. The Peshawar Valley has a reputation throughout West Pakistan as the center of conservatism in this respect.

Women observing strict purdah normally operate under the following

rules. They remain unveiled as long as they are inside the walled off quarters where the family sleeps and eats. Here they may be visited by women of other families who observe a comparable purdah, or by close male relatives belonging to such families. Exceptions would be female servants and midwives who come normally from families of much lower status, or women from societies where purdah is not observed. Women leave their homes for several reasons. They may visit their kinswomen in their own or other villages, attend funeral and wedding ceremonies, visit shrines or cemeteries, or make shopping trips to the bazaar. In such cases, they remain veiled from head to foot from the time they leave their own compound until they return or are received in the women's quarters in another home. Modern doctors complain that women often insist on being innoculated through their heavy burqas or veils. At weddings and funerals, women and men have separate functions, in separate parts of the home. In the settled villages, the women of the landlord families maintain this kind of purdah, even in cases where the men of the family have experienced considerable contact with the life of the larger towns and cities, and may have assumed many of the outward attributes of the modern cosmopolitan male.

In general, extreme forms of purdah are used only by families which can afford to do so and which are aspiring to a social status higher than the one they actually occupy. The purdah symbol, however, affects the lower classes as well, and their women will endeavor to observe some kind of seclusion and veiling within the limits of their meager quarters and their daily chores. The tenant farmer's wife will drop behind her low compound wall to escape the view of the passing stranger. She will stop and turn her back to him in the village street, or drape her face with her chuddar as she goes to fetch water.

That invisibility rather than inactivity is the critical issue is seen in the fact that Pathan women of the wealthiest and most respected families are getting higher education and entering professional life while still keeping purdah. They attend correct women's colleges, or sit together in a curtained off half of a mixed graduate class, where they are seen by, and can see only the socially neutral lecturer. If they attend general lectures in an auditorium they are completely veiled and sit in the front row.

Hospitality is important everywhere among the men. It is as much a symbol of status and prestige as it is in the hills. In regard to hospitality, the settled Pathan is most explicit about his divergences from tribal tradition. To him the tribal form of hospitality is an ideal which he is continually hoping to equal. It is the proudest symbol both of his being a true

Pathan, and a man worthy of esteem among Pathans. Not only will the settled Pathan apologize for the hospitality which he offers, but in the next breath he explains that such inadequacy is a general failing of his breed who have fallen from their tribal homeland into the lap of callous urban society. The construction and maintenance of a guest house, or hujra, is something that every Pathan of any means holds as especially dear. Such pride is taken in this that a man will frequently build a guest house of fired-brick and cement while the family quarters are made of mud.

A PATHAN VILLAGE

The integration of these elements of settled Pathan society into the total life of the village can be seen best by an analysis of one typical village. This will enable the political structure of the village, which involves all of its ethnic components, to be brought out more clearly.

About seven miles northeast of Peshawar, in the old Daudzai tribal tappa, there is a village of about eight hundred people. Its lands are shaped somewhat like a three-bladed propellor and the northern wing receives enough canal water to support an important sugar cane crop. This village has no particular specialization, but a neighboring village is the sole distributor for millstones in the district. Communication with the outside is mainly by word of mouth or by hand messages. Several landlords own crystal radio sets which pick up the local station of Radio Pakistan. Papers are brought in occasionally by men returning from town. There is no telephone in the village and postal service is irregular.

The ethnic components of the village consist of three major groups, the Pathans, Awans, and Syeds, along with a scattering of other non-Pathan elements. During the winter months, the local population is augmented by several families of Pathans from the tribal areas, and of Ghaljai (Ghilzai) from Afghanistan. At present, all villagers are nominally Sunni Muslims. A family of Hindus lived in the village formerly, but left at Partition in 1947.

Besides the residences of the inhabitants, the village also contains nine small shops, much of their business being done by barter within the village. Surplus farm products are either exchanged here or sold in town through commission agents. There are also five mosques, four of which are generally accessible to the public, while the fifth is in a private home and is supervised by a family of Shaikhs. A large open space near the entrance to the village is used by the village children as a play area, but otherwise there is no common meeting place within the village itself. Several different guest houses, or hujras, of the wealthier families serve as gathering

places for various groups of landlords and their friends and retainers.

There are three main social classes in the village: (1) the landowning Pathans, (2) the landless Awans and other related ethnic fragments, and (3) the Syeds. Hence social classes are correlated both with landownership and ethnic group.

The first and second classes are stratified vertically, and there is a strong barrier between them, operating primarily through matters of land acquisition and marriage. Due to a pre-emption law which gives a preferential option to buy land to those already owning, the landless are in fact prevented from acquiring land in the village even where wealthy enough to meet the sale price. In theory the landowning Pathans and the landless Awans can intermarry, but this has not worked out in practice since the conditions required by the landowners cannot be met by the landless, namely, landownership and strict purdah, both symbols of status.

The Pathan families, controlling virtually all the land and water in the village, are thus the center of wealth, power, and prestige. There is a considerable gradient of status among these families according to the amount of land owned per capita. At the lower fringe of this class there are one or two families which have lost all their land and are practically members of the lower class. The families with the highest status are those which are not simply landowners, but landlords who do not need to cultivate but let their lands to lower class tenants. These families have members who are occupied outside the village, mostly in Peshawar, as college students, army officers, civil servants, and businessmen.

The lower class families own neither land nor houses. A large part of this class is directly involved in cultivation, either as occupancy tenants, tenants-at-will, or day laborers. Others perform services and crafts of various kinds, either as a full time occupation, or in addition to cultivation. The village barbers may plough in the morning and shave customers in the afternoon. Some of these people also have jobs which take them into town, such as shopkeeping, carriage driving, and menial services in the civil offices. The seasonal migrants from the tribal areas and from Afghanistan fit into this class and are employed as day laborers in cultivation or masonry.

There are two kinds of economic relationship between landlords and tenant, one involving goods and the other involving services. Produce is divided equally between them, with the landlord providing land and water and paying the taxes on both, and the tenant providing the seed, labor, plough animals, and tools. This allocation is clear-cut and accepted as traditional. Since the landless do not own house sites, they occupy small houses constructed by the landowners, and house-tenancy involves

the rendering of personal services to the landlord. These are, however, only vaguely defined and tend to create tension between landlord and tenant.

Landlord-tenant relationships are unstable in the sense that there is considerable reshuffling of tenants among landlords each year. This may be initiated from either direction. Accordingly, tenants do not as a rule form strong attachments to their landlords. The situation is somewhat different with personal servants and retainers who are drawn from the lower class. Such people are usually paid a monthly salary, and the males may be put up in common sleeping quarters in a corner of the men's compound. Since they are trusted with personal matters and enter more intimately into the life of their master than do the tenants, this master-servant relationship is the strongest tie across the class boundary.

The third major class, consisting of the Syeds, is composed of several families which form one lineage. These families stand between the stratified Pathan and Awan classes, but somewhat to the side, more or less the third corner of a triangle. Although they seem to prefer lineage endogamy, marriages between Syeds and Awans do occur. There is no evidence, however, of any marriages between Syeds and Pathans. This class is somewhat better off than the Awans, since they normally own their own houses and have free use of certain lands loaned to them by the Pathans. These lands are usually let to tenants. While religious leadership is the traditional occupation of the Syeds, several members of these families do engage in such occupations as farming, shopkeeping, and carriage driving. One Syed man from this village is employed as Pushtu editor on a newspaper in Peshawar.

The Syeds occupy a rather peculiar position in the village. They are addressed with a special honorific, regardless of age, by all members of the village. Their inherited religious status gives them more prestige than the achieved status of mullah. or religious leader. That is, while the prestige of the mullah is an individual matter, varying with his intelligence, background, training, and integrity, the prestige of the Syed derives from his family pedigree and tends to remain relatively constant no matter what he does. This is particularly true from the viewpoint of the lower class villagers, but the Syeds also carry weight among the landlords, the head of their lineage being frequently consulted by the landlords as well as by the tenants. In spite of their prestige, however, they do not have the same status as the landlords because they are dependent on the latter for access to the land. That they aspire to this status seems indicated by the more extreme form of purdah which their women observe.

There are several mullahs in the village, some of whom are tran-

sient talib'ilm, or students, while others are ordained mullahs who serve as prayer leaders, or imam, in three of the public village mosques. The fourth is served by a young Syed man who has completed his studies at a theological seminary in Peshawar. Since the mosques, and hence the mullahs, are largely supported by the wealthier landlords, the social position of the mullah depends partly on his own personal qualities and partly on the kind of support and acceptance which his patrons accord him. Many mullahs, among the Pathans, derive from poor tribal families and tend to associate with the lower classes in the settled villages. Of these, many are so obviously incompetent and uninspired that they draw only minimal courtesy or ridicule from the more educated upper class. At the same time, some of the more distinguished mullahs, particularly those who serve as imam, are almost adopted by their patron landlord families, and form a permanent part of their special patron's entourage.

The village has a primary school with a government teacher, but his status in the community is difficult to assess since in this case the man was a member of the Ahmadi, or Qadiani, sect and had little association with anyone except the children during the school hours. After school hours, he left for his home in a neighboring village.

One of the striking features of the village is the absence of village-wide solidarity and cooperation, although certain limited kinds of co-operation do appear at various points. The Pathan families are descended from a common ancestor, but this large kin group is today split up into several small lineage groups, each consisting of a few families. These lineages have little feeling of common interest. Some of them are mutually estranged, while others are hostile, and at least two warring families have been carrying guns for years in a stalemated blood feud. The village is bisected into an "upper" and a "lower" ward, with part of the lineages located in one and part in the other. The strongly factional nature of this division appeared when a government-sponsored cooperative was introduced into the village, but at other times there seemed to be no sign of a more positive kind of concerted action between lineages located in the same ward.

Only the few families within one of the small lineages have any real feeling of group solidarity and cooperation, and even this has its limitations. Cooperation between landlords in several different lineages does occur in the face of a common external threat, such as a water dispute with a neighboring village. However, this kind of cooperation is not normally transferable to village-wide improvements suggested by one or two individuals. There is considerably more solidarity among the lower class families of Awans and other ethnic groups. Here cooperative

work gangs and labor exchanges form an important part of their effectiveness as tenants. Among this class, there are fairly well-to-do tenants who are influential and who emerge as spokesmen when the whole class faces a common threat. The lower class is also championed by the Syeds, who tend to take the part of individual tenants against their landlords, or to support the tenants' spokesmen in wider issues. When the distribution of American wheat failed to meet the expectations of the tenants and laborers in this village, their spokesmen and one of the educated Syeds submitted a petition to the responsible government officials.

Looking at the village as a whole, it is thus apparent that when any extensive cooperative activity is initiated within the village, in either an economic or a political direction, the cooperating group involves either landlords or tenants, but not both, and if landlords are involved only those families which are closely related and compatible will normally respond. Any suggestion for joint action thus tends to hit eventually some barrier of disinterest, distrust, or hostility. Attention to this state of affairs is drawn quite explicitly by the village religious leaders, particularly at burial services which are the only occasions when a representative sample of the whole village is on hand. Village-wide cooperation and solidarity is the religious leader's theme song, but there is little response. The result is that in time of disaster, or when there are other needs affecting the village at large, the villagers turn to the outside, to a paternalistic government, for help. This dependency complex appears well-developed and strongly entrenched throughout the Peshawar Valley and applies to both the landlord and the tenant classes.

The political organization of the village reflects this lack of village unity. It also reflects a conflict between two different principles of government which meet in the villages and which tend to neutralize each other to the extent that neither one is fully effective. The first principle is that of government by centralized authority and law, as symbolized by the government in Lahore. The other is that of government by arbitration and council, as found among the tribes.

There are only two visible political roles found in the village, the lambardar and the chowkidar. Both of these are little more than agents of the provincial government and have no immediate relation to the internal political structure of the village. The lambardar is a resident landowner who has accepted the job of collecting the land and water taxes from other landowners on a commission basis. He is also expected to accompany the police in cases of house search. This village has four lambardars each of whom collects only from the families most closely related to him. The chowkidar is a resident member of the tenant class whose main job

is to record births and deaths, and to make periodic reports to the local police station. He also delivers summons and acts as a general assistant for visiting officials. Both of these roles are normally inherited and are frequently occupied by persons of minimal prestige and influence. There is thus a lack of permanent central authority in the village, either elected from within or appointed from above.

Such social control as exists within the village is channeled through various informal mechanisms. Religious sanctions, public ridicule reinforced by the Syeds, and fear of punishment by the dominant landlords are the main controls on the tenant class. Among the landlords, religious sanctions are weak, but fear of ostracism by the extended family, and fear of retaliation through force or fraud are strong. Fear of black magic is also a factor but appears to operate more between women or between men and women. The threat of police action is not to be entirely discounted, but in the main, the villagers prefer to keep the police out of village affairs.

Protracted interpersonal conflicts are generally handled by arbitration through the medium of individuals of prestige and influence, who arbitrate on request and in addition to their primary roles such as landlords and priests. It is probably important to note that a particularly strong vested interest in this kind of political role is held by influential Syeds. Where arbitration by individuals is not successful, either a neutral party or one of the contending parties may call a jirga, or council, to handle the matter. This may consist of several people, but it is seldom a large group. Frequently, arbitrators and council members are requested from outside the village in order to assure impartiality.

Major conflicts between landlords, such as blood feuds, cannot normally be resolved by either of these means. Council members do not represent the village community as a whole, and there is in fact no real community to which the case can be referred as in the tribal areas. Due to the internal fracture of the Pathan kin group, it is almost impossible to involve a kin group containing the contending parties as well as a large residual element which is both interested in a resolution and impartial enough to give weight to their opinion. Responsibility for this kind of involvement is extremely limited. For the same reason, however, the obligation to support a feuding kinsman is limited, so that feuds seldom involve enough people to make settlement a requisite for community security and stability. Hence, they tend to remain as encysted cancers in the village society.

The ultimate sanction behind village social control is, in theory, the provincial government, operating through the courts and a body of law which, though partly religious in origin, is nevertheless entirely secular

in its administration. It may be resorted to in extreme cases, but seldom produces a solution satisfactory to the villagers. Litigation is interminable and costly, sentences are light, decisions are not always enforced, and even capital punishment does not, in the eyes of the true Afghan, remove the obligation for the traditional blood vengeance. Hence, it is not a completely effective supplement to the traditional village institutions of control. At the same time, the presence of this external and superior "authority" serves as a further deterrent to the proper functioning of the arbitration and council system.

This state of affairs at the village level appears to be general throughout the Peshawar Valley, and it is probably not surprising to find an absence of elective bodies either in the village or between the village and the provincial legislative assembly. Various attempts have been made in the past to develop permanent political structures at the village level, notably the panchayat, or five-man council, but these served to focus rather than override the competing interests within the village. In 1954, there was no such system in operation, although some talk of developing a system was current in official circles.

It is probably to be expected also that this structural vacuum between the village and the provincial government has been filled by various forms of administrative "bossism". Villagers are forced to deal with several echelons of appointive agents and officials, particularly those of the revenue department, who, being underpaid, are prone to accept bribes and falsify records and evidence, thus encouraging mistrust and tension between villagers, and ultimately reinforcing the existing fractures in the village society.



FIG. 4 — PAKISTAN'S NORTHWEST FRONTIER

CHAPTER VI

PATHANS OF THE TRIBAL AREA

JAMES W. SPAIN

The 1951 Census of Pakistan frankly admits that its 2,647,158 population figure for the tribal area adjoining the Peshawar Valley is an estimate based on a small sampling of tribesmen. The figure itself is the best available and can be accepted without major reservation. The census also shows only 17,875 literates out of the total population of more than two-and-a-half million. Of these, all but 4,892 literates are in the Malakand agency which includes the progressive Swat state. Despite the fact that Pakistan is still staggering under the load of displaced persons resulting from the chaos of Partition, the tribal agencies hold only twenty refugees. (The Punjab, in contrast, has nearly five million refugees out of its nineteen million population.) The Frontier figures are representative of a small and isolated area which has traditionally scorned the refinements of the outer world and contact with the rest of South Asia.

ORGANIZATION OF TRIBAL TERRITORY

Recent publicity on the merger of all the subunits of West Pakistan into a single province has tended to obscure the separate identity of the tribal area. However, except for the fact that it is now the responsibility of the West Pakistan provincial government, rather than as in the past, the central government, no major change has taken place.

The internal divisions of tribal territorial administration remain unaffected by the institution of one unit government in West Pakistan. It is through these tribal agencies——five geographic and one ethnic——that the tribal area is tied to Pakistan. They are the Malakand Agency in the far north, which includes the states of Dir, Swat, and Chitral; the Mohmand Agency, which is concerned with the affairs of the hundred thousand Mohmands who live in Pakistan north of the Kabul River; Khyber Agency, which straddles the famous pass and includes mostly Afridis and Shinwaris;

Kurram Agency covering the relatively prosperous and well-developed valley of the Kurram River, inhabited chiefly by Turis; North Waziristan, home of the fierce and powerful Wazirs and many lesser clans; and South Waziristan, in whose rocky confines Wazirs and Mahsuds carry on their endless feud.

The tribal area stretches more than four hundred miles from north to south, hard against the Durand Line, controversy-breeding boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan. All of the agencies, with the exception of the Mohmand which was created in 1952, were inherited from the British administration. Each is headed by a political agent, who has at his disposal a few political officers, and again with the exception of the Mohmand, a corps of Scouts, a paramilitary force under the command of regular officers of the Pakistan Army. The political agent can also call on the khassadars, non-uniformed tribal levies, for picket and patrol duties.

In addition to the agencies, small sections of tribal territory are attached to each of the six settled districts of the old North-West Frontier Province. Thus, there are pieces of tribal territory adjoining Hazara, Mardan, Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, and Dera Ismail Khan districts. Responsibility for these is vested in the deputy commissioners of the respective districts.

The officers responsible for all the subdivisions of tribal territory report to the Secretary for Tribal Affairs of the West Pakistan Government, who, with the Minister for Tribal Affairs, is resident in Peshawar. All other department heads are located in the provincial capital at Lahore.

With the exception of a small Pakistan Air Force station at Miranshah in North Waziristan, there are no regular Pakistan military units in the area. All of the old British-established garrisons have been withdrawn shortly after Partition as a gesture of the new Muslim nation's confidence in the tribesmen. The tribal area is still "unadministered", that is, the regular laws and administration of Pakistan do not apply in it. Order is maintained by means of indigenous tribal assemblies, called jirgas, Pukhtunwali, the traditional Pathan code of honor, and the Frontier Crimes Regulations, a unique set of laws dating back to 1901 under which trials may take place before jirgas selected by the political agents, with the ordinary rules of evidence suspended.

Geographically, the area in which the tribes live varies from twenty-five thousand foot peaks of northern Chitral to the desert sands of Baluchistan. With minor exceptions such as the Swat and Kurram valleys, all of it is barren and hostile. Tribal territory centers geographically as well as culturally on the eastern slopes of the hills whose watershed marks the international boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan. In most cases the

eastern boundaries of the tribal agencies adjoin the settled districts at the very point where the land sloping down to the Indus River becomes cultivable. The people living on the western side of the watershed in Afghanistan are the same as those on the east. Traditionally, the hill tribes have lived by raiding the relatively fertile lowlands to east and west, and by making the most of their only asset, control of the passes which provide easy access to the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent—the Khyber, Kurram, Tochi, Gomal, and a score of lesser ones.

The great powers of Central Asia and the Gangetic Plain have in turn tried to use the area as a barrier between them. The tribal agencies were deliberately created as an inner marchland in 1901 by the geo-politically-minded Lord Curzon, then viceroy of India.

It is frequently said that the tribal problem is an economic one, and that with the coming of a certain moderate prosperity to the area, it will disappear. This is an over-simplification. The problem is conditioned by economic and geographic necessity, but it also is the result of a peculiar political history, and is based on the chosen way of life of a free and independent people, who show few signs of being eager to trade their vigorous and still vital society for one more in tune with the rest of the twentieth century.

THE PEOPLE

Pathan is a Hindi term adopted by the British. It originally simply designated Pushtu-speakers without racial implications. Local pronunciation tends to drop the aspirate, leaving Pattan or P'tan. British usage limited it to the dominant tribal group and to those living on the eastern side of the Durand Line, that is, in what is now Pakistan. A more accurate word, though one which has come to have partisan overtones because of Afghanistan's sponsoring a campaign for an independent state of Pushtoonistan, is Pukhtun or Pushtoon. (The hard and soft sounds are variants used in the north and south respectively.) This designates a tribesman who speaks Pushtu regardless of country of residence. The tribesmen themselves sometimes use Afghan without differentiation as to Pakistan or Afghan nationality. In a political sense, of course, Afghan also means a national of Afghanistan and can be applied to a non-Pukhtun, such as a non-Afghan inhabitant of Afghanistan.

Some recent writers have adopted the practice of designating the tribesmen of the settled districts of Pakistan as Pathans, those of the tribal territory as Pukhtuns, and those resident in Afghanistan as Afghans. This system is convenient if not altogether accurate and shall be used here.

In all, there are probably a little more than ten million Pushtu-speakers having the same tribal origin, though estimates vary widely.[1] They are divided into three major groups. Historically, the most prominent have been the Durranis, who have supplied the ruling house of Afghanistan. Their home is entirely within Afghanistan and lies north and west of Kandahar. They have been susceptible to Persian influence to a considerable degree. The Ghilzai live to the east of the Durrani, across the border from Pakistan's Baluchistan. They, too, reside almost exclusively in Afghanistan, though large numbers of them, the powindahs, are nomads who migrate annually into Pakistan. The third group, the "true" Pukhtuns, live astride the Pakistani-Afghan border, to the north and east of the Durrani and Ghilzai. Many of the latter carry on a localized seasonal migration but are not nomads.

Although descended from the same common ancestor as the Durrani and Ghilzai in theory, the "true" Pukhtuns have little connection with the other two great groups. Some, such as the Jajis, Mangals, and Zadruns live mainly in Afghanistan; others, the Yusufzai and Khattaks, for example, cultivate land in the settled districts of Pakistan. All of these, however, center on the great independent tribes who dwell in the border hills, the Mahsuds, Wazirs, Afridis, Mohmands, and smaller clans. The latter have been least affected by outside influences. Locally, their homeland is called Yaghistan, "the land of the unruled", sometimes appropriately translated as "the land of the unruly".

Tribal organization is based on an involved and at least partly fictional but remarkably consistent genealogy, with some of the leading families possessing a family tree headed by Adam.[2] The basic unit within each major tribe is the khel. Probably once no more than an expanded family group, the khel has now grown to the point where individual members are bound by common allegiance to certain leaders and policies rather than by conscious ties of blood. The Afridis, for example, are divided into Kuki Khel, Malikdin Khel, Zakka Khel, Adam Khel, Kamar Khel, Aka Khel, Kumbar Khel, and Sipah.[3] Since other tribes have khels with the same names, and since some individual khels are independent of ties with a larger tribal grouping, a certain amount of confusion arises when the name of an individual khel is used without indication as to its position in the whole.

Within the khels, the basic division is the kahol (sometimes called kor), or family group. The importance of family ties is indicated by the existence in Pushtu of more than seventy kinship terms, running to such detailed specifications as "daughter's husband's father's brother". The leader of each group is called malik, and the most important of a group of maliks

may be designated the "leading malik" of the khel or tribe.

There are no significant religious divisions among the tribes since with a few exceptions, such as the Turis, who are Shi'a, all are orthodox Sunni or traditionalist Muslims. Other tribal divisions are crossed by a peculiar and difficult to define party factionalism, which seems to have originally centered in the Bangash of Kohat district and spread to the Afridis and Mohmands. These factions known sometimes as Gar and Samil, as among the Jajis and Turis, and elsewhere as Spin and Tor, have no relation to other tribal groupings, and no unified policy or objectives. Vaguely akin to political parties, they seem designed primarily to enable a man to belong to a group hostile to his neighbor with whom he may be joined by ties of religion and blood. Though allegiance to either faction is frequently inherited, tribes, khels, and even kahols may be split. Thus, the Kambar Khel, Kuki Khel, and Adam Khel Afridis are Gar, while the Malikdin Khel, Zakka Khel, Aka Khel, and Sipah are Samil. The factions seem to have lost much of their importance in recent years but still appear in tribal feuds. Various smaller localized factions known as goondis play an important role in village life. They are usually based on an ancient quarrel over one of the three great Pukhtun bones of contention: zar, zan, and zamin (gold, women, and land).

SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

Tribal society begins and ends with the individual, who in most tribes holds his status by virtue of being a daftari, that is, one who in fact or theory possesses a share in tribal lands and a voice in tribal councils. The importance of each group, including the kahol, depends directly on the number of individual tribesmen whose allegiance it commands. Allegiances only occasionally cross tribal or khel divisions and are usually based on blood ties. They do, however, sometimes depart from the family group—i. e., a young tribesman does not inevitably look to his father or grandfather as his community leader, perhaps preferring a collateral relative, or even a member of the khel to whom he is not related, more renowned for courage or ability. The usual object of allegiance is a malik (or in the settled districts a khan) who gains his title by his ability to lead his voluntary followers in public affairs—whether peaceful or warlike. Allegiance is given and withdrawn almost exclusively on the basis of the malik's personality and performance, although wealth, family influence, and official approbation have some attraction.

The lot of the non-Pukhtun dependent, the ghulam or hamsaya, is less noble. Almost literally slaves until recent years, these people, Gujars,

Awans, and various non-Muslim menial castes, depend for their life and work on their attachment to some Pukhtun as servant or craftsman. As such, they are as inviolate as the rest of his property—which is determined by his power.

The hujra, or community center, represents a gentler and more social side of Pukhtun character. It exists in practically every village, and is accepted as a mark of development, many of the other tribes looking askance at certain sections of the Mohmands in whose villages hujras are rarely found. Traditionally used as a male club and social center, where the unmarried young men of the tribe sleep, the hujra houses visitors and serves as a focus of community opinion and action. Civil affairs are conducted there and gossip and information exchanged. Many hujras now possess a radio, and as a result such alien subjects as the United Nations and the "cold war" have entered the conversation of the tribesmen.

THE MULLAH

Although devoted to the ritual of Islam and fanatic in defense of their religion, many tribesmen are theologically very ill-informed. Consequently, their thinking is susceptible to influence by mullahs, pirs, and Syeds, a liberal supply of which exists in the tribal area. However, the mullah does not hold a very high position in tribal society merely by virtue of his calling. His status is a result of the highly individualistic outlook of both Islam and Pukhtun society. It is only when a remarkable man is able to join personal courage and success in battle to religious sincerity that he becomes formidable, and is able to weld religion and war into a jihad[4] such as those which sent the tribes streaming against the British under such notables as the Powindah Mullah, the Haji of Turangzai, and the Faqir of Ipi.

With the advent of the Muslim state of Pakistan, however, the impetus afforded to jihad by the "infidel challenge" of the British has disappeared. Though the Faqir of Ipi remains defiant in his cliffside stronghold on the Waziristan border, his influence is rapidly waning and rests largely on his not inconsiderable ability as an outlaw rather than on religious sanctity.

THE JIRGA

The jirga, or assembly, by which most community business, both public and private, is settled in the tribal area, is probably the closest approach to Athenian democracy that has existed since the original. It is

typical of tribal society, and prevents, just barely, an insistent democracy which has never become representative from degenerating into anarchy. Though capable of the greatest solemnity when the occasion requires, it is informal in the extreme. Membership may vary from the three or four "reputable" men selected by the political agent to try a case involving a tribesman and a resident of the settled districts to thousands of armed men demanding acceptance by Pakistan, Afghanistan, or the United Nations of a resolution of international significance. In between it may take the form of a handful of elders warning a reluctant father that he must pay the agreed price for his son's bride or a dozen or two tribesmen attempting to convince the political agent that he must find special scholarships for their sons in the Pakistan universities if the high-spirited lads are to be kept from cutting local telephone lines.

In some tribes, only the maliks and spinziriu, or "grey-beards", take part; in others every adult male participates. In either case, there are no elections and no credentials committees. A man's right to be heard depends on the force of what he has to say, his reputation with his hearers, and the rifle on his shoulder.[5] A jirga may meet under the shade of a solitary tree by the dusty road in Waziristan or on the spacious green lawn of Government House in Peshawar.

The jirga has three main functions. In legalized form, it tries cases considered too unusual for the ordinary law under the Frontier Crimes Regulations. In its broader and more indigenous form, it regulates life at all levels requiring community attention within tribal society, for example, the choice of a site for a new mosque or a decision whether to undertake or settle a blood feud with a neighboring tribe. Thirdly, it provides a mechanism by which the decisions or opinions of the tribe are communicated to government and government's decisions are passed on to the tribes. There is seldom any voting. The "sense of the meeting" is usually quite apparent, and since its members each carry at least one firearm at the time of decision, its authority is usually respected. The sanctity which is universally accorded the jirga is indicated by the fact that very rarely does it break up in a fight. Considering the volatile nature and heavy armament of the Pukhtun, this is truly a triumph of tradition over inclination. Anyone defying the decision of a jirga may have his house burned and his property destroyed.[6]

THE LASHKAR

The best English equivalent of the Pushtu lashkar is probably "war party" as were found among the American Indians. A lashkar is simply a

number of men who have joined together for the purpose of fighting. The Pukhtun outlook on life being what it is, the word is one of the most common in the language. As in the case of the jirga, size is irrelevant. The term is applied to a dozen men going to a nearby village to steal a sheep and to the fifty thousand who poured into Kashmir in 1947-48.

Though exceptional in size and direction, the Kashmir lashkar, or jihad as it is sometimes more formally called, presents a convincing demonstration of tribal power. In it can be found all of the good and many of the bad elements of the Pukhtun character. Tribesmen from deep within Afghanistan and ordinarily peaceful cultivators from the settled districts participated in the attack, but the bulk of the invaders were from tribal territory. There is little doubt that, despite some outside encouragement and support, the real impetus for it came from the tribesmen themselves. They covered great distances. Srinagar, capital of Kashmir, is 250 miles from Fort Jamrud at the entrance to the Khyber. It is almost double that from Razmak in the heart of Waziristan. Ladakh and Skardu are another 150 miles beyond Srinagar over some of the highest mountains on earth. In the winter and spring of 1947-48, Pukhtun war cries were heard in all of these places. The Kashmir lashkar still holds a place of prime importance in tribal thinking. One malik described it simply in 1954: "It was the best time of my life. We went along singing and holding our rifles and nothing could stand before us."

PUKHTUNWALI AND RAWAJ

The broad philosophic concepts on which most systems of law are based are largely beyond the Pukhtun's horizons. Ordinary regulatory law with its myriad "dos" and don'ts" is beneath his contempt. His conduct is governed by his own tradition and fanatic devotion to honor. These are embodied in Pukhtunwali, sometimes called Nang-i-Pukhtana, "the Way of the Pukhtun". The code rests on a mixture of tradition, precedent, and custom. Its cardinal principles are: (1) badal, vengeance regardless of consequence; (2) melmastia, hospitality and protection to every guest; and (3) nanawati, asylum for all fugitives and acceptance of a bona fide offer of truce, with its corollary, badragga, safe-conduct for a stranger or enemy. As in law, where the latest statute is the decisive one, in cases of conflict between principles of Pukhtunwali, the obligation most recently assumed is the binding one, although badal is usually pursued relentlessly after a temporary interruption for melmastia or nanawati.[7]

Although Pukhtunwali provides for a certain amount of order and cohesiveness in tribal society, it has also unfortunately helped to perpetuate

the blood feud, as a result of which whole families are still being wiped out in the tribal area. The obligation of the blood feud descends through all male members of a family from generation to generation. In 1918, a British source listed as main causes of blood feuds: (1) intrigues with women, (2) murder of a member of a family or one of its dependents, (3) violations of badragga, (4) disputes about debt or inheritance, and (5) squabbles about water or land. A survey of contemporary records indicates that the list is still accurate.

Pukhtunwali is interpreted by jirgas frequently on the advice of particular families called serishta who are hereditary preservers of local custom. It is also applied directly by individuals and is upheld by the overwhelming weight of public opinion. Throughout the tribal area, death is the penalty for murder, except in the case of a blood feud when the relations between the families involved and the kind of provocation is taken into account. In either case, if the deceased's relatives agree before a jirga, blood money may be paid in lieu of execution of the murderer, and the obligations of badal are deemed settled. If the victim was a relative of the murderer, death by the sword is prescribed. Refusal to go to battle at the call of the tribe is punished by nagah, a fine, confiscation of property, and the burning of the laggard's house. Adultery is punished by the death of both parties, the woman first. If the woman is allowed to live, it is an indication that the man is not guilty.

Pukhtunwali and the simple democratic forms through which it is implemented is still the strongest force in the tribal area. Unlike their brothers in Afghanistan and the settled districts of Pakistan, the hill Pukhtuns accept no law but their own. By virtue of their remoteness and power, their tribal society remains intact and they are free of the cultural and psychological tensions which plague more "civilized" Pathans who find that the requirements of badal are frequently frustrated by civilized law. Economic, social, and political pressures will undoubtedly have an effect in time, but for the present at least, the Pukhtun lives by the code of his ancestors with very little compromise with the rest of the world.

The rawaj or rawaj-i-am is an intricate system of customary law based on a combination of Pukhtunwali, Islamic, and British personal law. It varies from tribe to tribe. Several British attempts at codification failed to produce a representative picture—in part because the Muslim Pukhtuns early became aware of their identity with other Muslims of the subcontinent and insisted to their British interrogators that there was no rawaj, only Sharia, the universal Islamic code of personal law. Certain principles based on rawaj are still applied and marriage and inheritance provisions are tempered by it. For example, a presumption of marriage exists only if there is

presumption of the required contract, that is, no common law marriage is recognized. The Islamic doctrine of equality of inheritance of all sons is modified by recognition of the right of the eldest, who inherits—at least tentatively—his father's community responsibility, to a bit more, and the strict inability of a daughter to alienate in any way her smaller share of the inheritance.[8]

WOMEN

Pukhtun women take no part in social or public affairs outside the home, except for occasional visits to friendly households or for religious purposes. In the tribal area, with the exception of the ghulams and powindahs, almost all observe purdah or seclusion, but that does not mean they lack influence. Intelligent and aggressive within the limits prescribed by custom, Pukhtun women direct the substantial domestic affairs of their men and play a large part in arranging marriages and family alliances. They also provide the practical means of implementing melmastia which is so important a part of Pukhtunwali. They are as fanatically devoted to the code itself as are their men, and are reportedly an important factor in urging the obligation of badal on lazy or reluctant males.

There is to date no sign of an incipient female revolt against the purdah system, and in an area where there is a surplus of labor, there is little economic motive for it. Social outlets are found in Friday visits to the mosques and graveyards, and in marriage festivities.

Although the traditional tribal custom of "buying" brides has been tempered somewhat by the Pakistani and Islamic custom of a marriage settlement including both dowry and pledge of funds by the husband, most tribal brides of the poorer classes are still "bought" by cash or commodity payments to the girl's father. Intense pride of family among the khans of the settled district and some of the more powerful hill maliks has resulted in a peculiar twist on the conventional custom of the husband's pledging to the bride an extravagant sum of money which in fact is to be paid only if a divorce is subsequently obtained. In the newer version, only a token sum, easily paid by anyone, is pledged, as a symbol of the fact that divorce (or legitimate grounds for it) is unthinkable and no monetary safeguard is required between families of honor. Underlying the gesture is the fact, as all parties are well aware, that divorce is apt to result in the death of the offending husband at the hands of his ex-wife's relatives rather than in mere pecuniary penalization.

VESH

A peculiar aspect of traditional Pukhtun land tenure is provision for periodic exchanges of land between individual members of the tribe. Called vesh, the idea originally was to allow every member of the group to enjoy the best land for some time and prevent the development of leadership based on economic power. Surprisingly, the exchange was usually carried out without violence or bloodshed. However, it proved impractical even in an early stage of community development, and the custom has now almost entirely died out, except perhaps in certain remote sections of Bunair.

RELIGION

The vast majority of the Pukhtuns are Sunni Muslims of the Hanafi school. Notable exceptions are the Mongol-looking Turis of Kurram who in the past at least owed much of their sufferings at the hands of their neighbors to their Shi'a sectarianism. Many of the Bangash and Orakzai are also Shi'a. A deeply cherished secular tradition in public matters and centuries of isolation from the main currents of Islam have made most tribesmen's understanding of their religion narrow and personal and have sometimes resulted in laxity.[9]

The tribes swelled the forces of Mahmud of Ghazni, "the Idol Breaker", on his seventeen invasions of Hindu India in the eleventh century, and have remained sturdy in orthodoxy ever since except for two occasions. The first centered around Bazid, Pir Roshan, a mystic who gathered a large following and was the cause of several intertribal wars in the sixteenth century. The second involved the giving of temporary allegiance by many Pukhtuns to Syed Ahmad, leader of a puritanical sect of Muslims who settled at Sittana in the Black Mountain area early in the nineteenth century and preached jihad against the Sikhs and the British. Although at first attracted by Syed Ahmad's joint campaigns against the "infidel rule" of the Sikhs and British as well as the Sufism which permeated Indian Islam, the tribes turned on the religious reformer when his Wahhabi-like puritanism interfered with their social customs and sought to regiment them into a disciplined religious community. They, rather than the British or Sikhs, were largely responsible for the eventual failure of the movement.

ART

Most of the skill of Pukhtun hands is expended on the construction and ornamentation of weapons. In accordance with Islamic tradition, graphic art among the tribesmen is rare. Many of the remains of the great

Buddhist Gandhara culture which abounded in Swat and parts of the Khyber Agency, have been ruthlessly destroyed by the iconoclastic tribesmen.

Music is not highly developed, the most common instrument being the drum, with simple fifes and something akin to bagpipes accompanying it. A few popular traditional songs exist, most famous of which is "Zakhmi Dil", a Kabuli love song, frequently used in an altered form as a cadence for Pathan troops.

Most popular of all is the Khattak dance, which, despite its name, is common to most of the tribes. There are several forms of it, all martial in the extreme, all involving large numbers of participants, all exclusively male. Though the Khattak dance is most frequently seen as a display or recreational performance of Pathan troops, it is occasionally performed in tribal villages.[10]

LITERATURE

Despite its fairly advanced state of development and force of expression, Pushtu has had only limited use as a literary language—probably as a result of the low rate of literacy among those whose mother tongue it is and the preference of some Pukhtun intellectuals for the more fashionable Persian or Urdu. There is very little written in Pushtu today but the works of a dozen gifted poets of earlier ages are still remembered and admired. The two most favored poets are the warrior chief Khushal Khan Khattak and the moralist and philosopher Abdur Rahman. Both wrote in the seventeenth century.

All of the early writers reached levels of sophistication rarely attained by their descendants. Their works are deeply tinged with the Sufi mysticism which flourished in India under the Mughals. A favorite subject is the search after an unreachable beloved, and they can be taken, as they generally are today, simply as love poems. In most, however, the beloved who is given the form of a beautiful woman——or even a comely lad——is a symbol of divine love, philosophic truth, or abstract good. Alone among them, Khushal Khan also deals with the hunt, war, and the pleasures of the fireside. He sings of an ideal Pukhtun nationalism and glorifies defiance of the Mughal conquerors.[11]

INTERTRIBAL RELATIONS

Although sharing a common language and culture, not to mention a common descent, the Pukhtun tribes find an outlet for their individuality of

outlook in continuous feuding. A long-standing enmity is carefully nurtured between Mahsuds and Wazirs. Escorts are usually required for foreigners traveling in Waziristan, and even the normally serene Pakistani political officers rarely go about without a dozen riflemen. The reason for the precaution lies not in any special hostility of the southern tribes, but is a defense against the favorite tribal trick of firing at an outsider by a Mahsud when he is in Wazir territory or a Wazir in Mahsud territory with the aim of bringing down the wrath of the government on the other tribe. Ironically, the Mahsuds are not a separate tribe at all, but merely a khel of the Wazirs. This ethnological fact is simply not believed by the mass of either group, and the visiting scholar who tries to prove it by the charts in his books is apt to return a disillusioned man—if he returns at all.

Other vendettas exist between khel and khel and kor and kor. They are frequently the direct results of blood feuds begun sometimes in innocence when a member of one group acted against a member of the other in army or police work. The feud, with its eternal demand of badal which descends through the family hierarchy until a boy may inherit the duty of killing the family enemy in his twelfth or thirteenth year has been the cause of apparently senseless violence in army and scout barracks, and the bazaars of distant cities.

Fortunately for their neighbors in the rich plains of northern India, the tribes have never pursued friendship with each other with the same intensity as their feuds. However, some traditional alliances exist. The friendship of the Adam Khel Afridis and the Khattaks has persisted since the Adam Khel alone of all the tribes rallied to Khushal Khan Khattak's side in his battle against the Mughals. The Mohmands, Afridis, and Shinwaris united for a kind of joint action against the British in 1908. The Mahsuds and Wazirs simultaneously, if independently, fought the British in 1919-20 and 1937-38. In 1930, Congress Party political agitation in the settled districts resulted for the first time in history in a tribal uprising inspired from the east rather than the west. In that year, Wazirs, Mahsuds, Daurs, Utman Khel, and Afridis all took the field. Later, elements of all tribes participated in the Kashmir lashkar of 1947. Never has the total power—or any considerable part of it—of the half million rifles now conservatively estimated to be in the tribal area been brought to bear in a coordinated fashion.

The Pushtunistan movement for an independent state has succeeded in bringing individual members of all of the important tribes together in a common cause, but this harmony seems to exist primarily in Kabul where the movement is centered. Despite the emotional appeal which racial and linguistic autonomy could be expected to have, Pushtunistan has had relatively little attraction in the tribal area.

Tribal economy is considerably underdeveloped. An occasional rice paddy or patch of wheat is carefully cultivated and jealously guarded on a tiny terrace. A few sheep and goats nibble a meager sustenance from the stony hillsides. Arms, including modern rifles, pistols, and simple automatic weapons are manufactured, mainly by the Afridis. However, some Mahsuds and Wazirs have come down to replace Hindu businessmen in the bazaars of Dera Ismail Khan, Tank, and Bannu. There are Mohmands in the Peshawar markets. The Khyber Pass Afridis have developed a profitable carrying trade and some operate small fleets of trucks. The Afridis also serve the rest of the Pukhtuns—rather in the manner of the Sikhs in India —as drivers and mechanics and experts in everything having to do with motors. With the exception of a dwarf palm whose leaves are useful for basket-weaving and the herb artemisia which are cultivated in Kurram, practically no exportable crops have been developed.

Most food and all manufactured products are obtained from the settled districts. The means to pay for them come chiefly through the traditional government subsidies supplied either in direct cash payments for keeping the peace or through employment in the scouts or khassadars, which are tribal levies.

The subsidies are not paid to individual tribesmen but to leading maliks of the tribes or khels, each of whom is responsible for a particular number of his people and specific geographic area. The malik distributes the money as he sees fit, and his position as receiver of the government funds is vital to his prestige. The system would seem to invite corruption and injustice, but in fact works very well. The malik is chosen to receive the subsidy because of his power and influence, which depend on the satisfaction and allegiance of his group of followers. Unless all are convinced that the use to which the money is put is just and equitable, satisfaction and allegiance rapidly disappear. So does the malik's power and influence.

The most conspicuous failures of both British and Pakistan frontier policy have been the few occasions on which a rash political agent tried to "make a somebody out of a nobody" by giving distribution of the subsidies to a friendly but uninfluential malik. The tribesmen won't have it. While accepting government subsidies as their right, they insist that the malik who receives them have earned his position by the standards of the community. Large groups may remain loyal to a malik from whom the subsidy has been withdrawn, even following him into exile if he is declared a "hostile". The tribe may refuse to accept the subsidy at all if it is conferred on a leader whom they do not respect. Traditionally, refusal to

accept the subsidy, for whatever reason, has meant an outbreak was soon to follow. Thus, though the system of subsidies has been useful in controlling the tribes as a whole and absolutely essential in maintaining order, it has not significantly affected the organization or outlook of tribal society.[12]

As soon as specific tribes and villages have indicated that they are ready to receive them, the Pakistan Government has extended educational and medical services to central locations in the tribal area. Since the tribesmen pay no taxes, and their territory produces no revenue, the subsidies and social welfare services are a heavy drain on Pakistan. Efforts are being made to reduce it by urging development of cottage industries, and construction of irrigation projects opening up new land at the edge of the tribal area, but it is impossible at the present to foresee a time when the barren border hills can be self-supporting.

THE PUKHTUNS AND THE WORLD

The Pukhtuns know a good deal about the rest of the world. Their own experience in Kashmir has left them with a continuing interest in all that concerns it. Their strategic location ensures the interest of neighboring countries in them and has even attracted the attention of the great powers. The radio brings news of all this into the hujras and forts of the maliks. The visitor finds that names of Dag Hammerskjold, Henry Cabot Lodge, Molotov, Nixon, Krishna Menon, and Khrushchev and the things they do and say are familiar; and he meets tribesmen fluently able to point out the faults and virtues of all of them. Though not nearly so numerous as in the settled districts, veterans of British Indian Army campaigns in most parts of the world may be found in the tribal territory. They also contribute their word on world affairs.

The unique accomplishment of the Pukhtuns has been that they have managed to accept certain developments of civilization which they wish to utilize for their own purposes without destroying the fabric of their tribal society. Aware of the very different world from which these things come, they have thus far been very selective, realizing that the way of life they cherish cannot help but be changed by close contact with the world beyond their borders. As a result, Pakistan's moderate and careful program of offering only what is asked, has left the tribesmen with a school here, a hospital there, the privileges of progress without the responsibilities. There is little doubt, however, that as social welfare and economic development prove their worth, the Pukhtuns in turn will meet their obligations, and gradually assume a full place in the national life of Pakistan.

NOTES

1. The most recently published figure is in Herbert Penzl, A Grammar of Pashto, Washington, American Council of Learned Societies, 1955. Since the thirteen million figure given is based on the official but dubious Afghan Government claim of 7.5 million Pushtu-speakers in Afghanistan, it is probably much too high.

2. According to local legend, the founder of the race was Afghana, son of Jeremiah, son of Saul, builder of Solomon's temple.

3. The question has been raised as to whether the Afridis are really Pukhtuns at all, with most British writers insisting that they are descendants of the original Buddhist inhabitants of the Peshawar Valley who were overrun by and mixed with the Afghan tribes as the latter moved eastward. See R.T.I. Ridgway, Pathans, Calcutta, Government Press, 1918, p. 50; and C.C. Davies, The Problem of the North-West Frontier, Cambridge, 1932, p. 62. At present, however, they are thoroughly steeped in Pukhtun culture.

4. Jihad here does not have the same sense as in formal Islamic law. Its common local usage as covering almost any act of violence against any non-Muslim or unorthodox believer is indicative of the freedom with which Islamic dogma is applied in the tribal area.

5. Almost a hundred years ago, one of the first British studies of the subject stated: "The chiefs or mulliks are indeed the representatives of the tribes, divisions, or families, to which they respectively belong, but they possess no independent power of action, and before they can be privileged to speak in jirga, or council, they must have collected the wishes on the subject under consideration, of the bodies they represent." Hugh R. James, Report on the Settlement of the Peshawar District, in Selections from the Records of the Government of India, 1865, India Office Library, London.

6. A Pukhtun's house is very literally his castle, being fortified with watchtowers, thick walls, and iron-studded gates. His honor and power are intimately associated with his ability to defend it. In British times, large punitive expeditions sometimes were sent out with the sole object of destroying a rebellious malik's house and thereby discrediting him.

7. For a graphic fictional account of Pukhtunwali carried to its ultimate, see Gobineau, "The Lovers of Kandahar," in Tales of Asia, London, 1947.

8. Fragments of rawaj appear in J.G. Lorimer, Customary Law of the Main Tribes of the Peshawar District, Peshawar, NWFP Government Press, 1934, and H.N. Bolton, Summary of the Tribal Custom of the Dera Ismail Khan District, Peshawar, NWFP Government Press, 1907.

9. As long ago as the seventeenth century, the great Pukhtun poet, Khushal Khan Khattak, wrote: "The call of the muezzin cannot be heard

in all the Tirah [heart of the Afridi country] unless it is the crowing of the cock at the dawning of the day." Selections from the Poetry of the Afghans, translated by H.G. Raverty, London, 1861, p. 212.

10. For a stirring description of the Khattak dance, see Ian Stephens, Horned Moon, London, 1953, pp. 235-36.

11. The best available English translations of Pushtu poetry are C.E. Biddulph, Afghan Poetry, London, 1890, and Raverty, op. cit.

12. The subsidy intended for a group which is referred to here is known as muajib. It is the base of the system of control. Another form of subsidy called lungi, is an annuity or pension given to an individual for past services to the government or as a mark of honor. Lungi may run from a few rupees to a few hundred rupees per month. Still another form of payment, called kharcha, is merely expense money, paid by the political agent to an individual to cover the cost of the tribesman's coming to agency headquarters or for performing some specific service.

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CHAPTER VII

WOMAN IN WEST PAKISTAN

JOHN J. HONIGMANN

An understanding of a woman's position in any social setting can come through seeing how she is regarded within her culture and what she does, as well as from perceiving how her status and role relate to other phenomena in the social milieu. In accomplishing these twin tasks it does not appear necessary to evaluate a woman's relative rank as higher or lower than that of women in a different social setting.

Three further assumptions of importance which enter the present essay must be stated. First, the continuity of culture between India and Pakistan is assumed, despite both internal variations in each country and certain obvious differences between them. In both nations individuals still encounter many common or highly similar experiences. They hold many values in common. Second, the assumption of relative uniformity of culture makes it possible, within limits that must be judged carefully, to use sources of data like interviews with Hindu women or Indian films and fiction, to illuminate certain areas of Pakistan's culture. Third, the usefulness of literary and similar materials as sources of information about culture is assumed. Such sources are not utilized by the anthropologist in preference to interviews or observation but for additional data with which to fill out or support conclusions derived through other means. A short story cannot be regarded as an objective report of some recurrent situation. It must be used far more cautiously and selectively. Where other data reveal definable attitudes, the subjective expression of similar ideas in literature or films adds depth and meaning to the pattern of behavior which is being described. Such an assumption does no more than recognize the integration of cultural elements. The expressive products of a community reflect the hopes, ideas, or emotional tone in other areas of a way of life as well.

To speak of the Pakistan woman is to refer to a very general social

status, one comprising many more specific referents, like the mother, wife, paternal aunt, daughter, wife of the village barber or mullah, and others. In each of these capacities a woman enjoys distinctive responsibilities and privileges. Furthermore, West Pakistan does not correspond to a culturally unified community. The behavior of the twelve million women in this province varies regionally. Within any region, differences are again related to class, caste, or ethnic group membership. Such extensive variation imposes a difficulty for reliable generalization.

The description of a woman helping to harvest maize may be verified by visiting a Punjab village but it will rarely be seen in a Pathan village of Mardan district near Peshawar. On the other hand, even in the Punjab a prosperous landlord's wife and daughter will not appear in public unless they are veiled, nor will they work in the fields. The role ascribed to Brahui nomad women, who come to the Indus plain in Sind with their family and flocks, will not correspond to that of Pathan transhumants. However romantic the image of unveiled Muslim women singing at the village well, it is apt to be seen only in certain Punjab villages and scarcely ever in Sind or the Pathan areas. Probably no generalizations can be made about any subject as comprehensive as the Pakistan woman to which exceptions could not be found somewhere between Chitral and Tharparkar.[1]

THE CONCEPTION OF WOMAN

Woman in Pakistan is conceived within her culture as the feminine complement of masculinity, vulnerable to danger on account of her sex, and the very essential link that transmits culture from one generation to another through developing the personality of her children. Although they are interrelated, each of these largely implicit conceptions may be examined independently.

It is quite possible, as Margaret Mead has shown, for a culture to ignore the physiological difference between the sexes and to expect from each approximately the same qualities or achievements. Biological differences may in the end interfere with the equal realization of the asserted equal capacities of men and women. At other times the endorsement of symmetry may only be half-sincere, so that women find men pre-empting power while the ideal asserts fundamental equality. Neither of these is the traditional South Asian picture. Rather, complementary differences between men and women are accepted and emphasized and one sex does not compete with another. Outside of urban circles, in which a new conception of the relationship of men to women is being carved, this pattern

clearly holds for Pakistan. In rural areas the traditional conception often takes the form of asserting inequality between the sexes with masculine superiority and dominance taken for granted. Such attitudes are based on the belief, stated in this case by a female writer, that: "Women's physique as well as . . . liabilities. . . compel them to claim different rights than those of men."[2] The recognition of the feminine role as qualitatively distinct from its opposite is basic in all such assertions as well as in statements that go on to describe woman as the warmer person; more expressive with sentiments; more easily hurt and vulnerable, therefore to be cherished and protected.

Woman is to be idealized by man.
Reverently I touched her
Feet and asked: "Of which
Wondrous world of beauty
Art thou the Queen?"[3]

She is entitled to respect. A man takes pride in her behavior so that she, like her ornaments, is symbolic of the respect which the family may expect. "A man is known from the qualities of his wife", runs a Pathan proverb.

The notion we are bringing out should not be interpreted as one supporting discrimination in the face of demands for equality. Except in urban areas few firm voices urge equality. The clearest signs of sexual emulation come not from women but from men. It is apparently easier for a man, through transvestism and in dancing female parts, to express his attraction to a woman's role than it is for women to play roles symmetrical to the male's. Career women are regarded as deviants and with deep suspicion. For assertive public appearances they may even be reviled by self-constituted guardians of tradition. Apologists of the traditional conception argue that such a woman cannot be happy, for in pursuing equality she turns against her true nature. A Pakistan woman's power and respect remain most secure when she does not extend her roles to where they overlap with the man's but retains her complementary status.

An integral part of the conception of feminity is the notion of woman being vulnerable to an unspecified, sexually-tinged danger. The threat is not always clearly rape, illegitimate pregnancy, or even loss of virginity, though these are certainly dreaded. It is a danger that a woman can bring upon herself as much as one that can be forced upon her for in neither case can she, according to the conception, protect herself. As one Hindu woman put it: "Society must protect women and girls, as they don't know how to protect themselves."[4]

A letter writer to the Pakistan Times (October 10, 1954) commented

on illegitimacy: "When two young persons of opposite sexes get an opportunity to come together where there are no peeping eyes, the things which make them behave decently are natural shyness or a highly developed conscience strong enough to overcome the pulse of curiosity, adventure and biological instinct." But, he continued, one cannot be consistently "strong-willed all 24 hours in a day . . . . There are, inevitably, weak moments". Therefore he recommended forestalling opportunities for boys and girls to be alone by carefully selecting chaperones.

Unlike in America, a girl is not considered to be able to fend for herself. Hence it is regarded as easy to seduce a woman. This attitude is illustrated in an Urdu short story by Sadiqa Naseem.[5] A homeless refugee woman is invited by a man to visit him so that she might earn some money easily. "Do you think we can trust him?" she asks her mother uncertainly, betraying to an American reader unrealistically naive vulnerability. Such naiveté would be laughable in an American girl who has been trained to fend for herself.

A clue to the forces from which girls must be protected is found in studying the common conception of sexual love as blind and devastating in the way it ignores values of family or caste. These are common themes. Following our previously stated assumption, these themes may be looked for in the subcontinent's verse and motion pictures.[6] Less often chosen for literary expression is the Pakistani's own conception of the man's sexual role as grossly physical and selfish. This theme is powerfully revealed in a poem by the Urdu poet, Abdul Majeed Bhatti,[7] who speaks of the ineradicable blemish to family honor coming from a woman's illicit sexuality:

. . . . Tonight you are
No more than a mere beautiful
Doll to satisfy our lust—
. . . . . .
. . . We'll
Kill you afterwards, if
That is your wish, so that
Those despicable cowards
Your kin who ran away to
Save their skins, should have
No chance to put you to
Shame by saying they had no
Daughter, or daughter-in-law. . . . . .

That the conception of woman's passivity is at least partly grounded in real facts is suggested in reports that many women were abducted from Pakistan and India during the communal riots which accompanied Partition and still

remain unrecovered.

Coming now to the third theme, woman is conceived of with a deep appreciation of her role in motherhood through which she realizes her most rewarding achievement. Publicists frequently reiterate the picture of the woman as mother molding the national character. Iqbal, one of the foremost of modern Muslim poets, gave expression to this sentiment in his Mysteries of Selflessness:

> Our children's lips, being suckled at thy breast,
> From thee first learn to lisp No god but God.
> Thy love it is, that shapes our little ways,
> Thy love that moulds our thoughts, our words, our deeds.[8]

PURDAH

The custom of purdah is contingent upon the conception of woman as complementary to man and vulnerable on account of her sex. Purdah not only protects women from immodest, dangerous contacts with men (the chief rationalizations of the custom) but also emphasizes femininity. According to this conception, to discard purdah, except in castes which do not observe it and which express complementarity in different ways, would make woman's participation in the world equivalent to man's—hardly a desirable prospect in view of the prevailing value system.

A word of Persian derivation, purdah specifically designates a curtain or screen and more generally refers to secrecy, seclusion, or modesty. Purdah commonly refers to the state in which the woman is secluded from public view and protected from potentially dangerous contacts with men as well as from situations that she is thought to be unable to manage by herself. The custom may be classified as a relatively elaborate avoidance, or taboo, which is basically similar to the thousands of avoidances found throughout the world. The devices for maintaining purdah are numerous with the most common being separate quarters for women (the zenana) and the burqa, a garment that envelops its wearer from head to heel but possesses an embroidered screen or holes for vision. Occasionally, anxiety is expressed lest brightly colored or overly attractive burqas defeat the intended purpose of the garment.

Purdah is also maintained while traveling. Railroads provide reserved compartments for ladies traveling first and second class. Female servants traveling as they often do on cheaper third class tickets, are entitled to the seclusion of a reserved compartment only between the hours of 8 P.M. and 6 A.M. when they may join their mistresses. In automobiles and horse-drawn carriages, seclusion is obtained by drawing a cotton sheet around the

seating space of female passengers who will already be garbed in burqas. Days reserved for women at saints' shrines and public fairs illustrate another type of purdah arrangement. In the classes of Peshawar University, girls throw back the burqa as they face a male instructor but are secluded by a screen from boys in the class. In legal situations, like a Muslim marriage, a purdah observing woman may be represented by a male proxy.

There exist degrees of purdah with a few titled families observing seclusion so rigidly that a woman never leaves her home from birth to marriage and no unrelated male, including a possible male unborn child, may appear in her presence. The respect reserved for a family maintaining so austere a degree of seclusion for its women resembles the esteem reserved for a Brahmin family that observes stringent avoidances with respect to food and social contacts. More usually purdah is limited to a woman spending her time in the walled courtyard, ready to flee into the apartments on the approach of a male stranger. On rare occasions she leaves the house wearing her burqa. Often a servant tends to day-to-day marketing. In the North-West Frontier a case was observed where an esteemed landlord allowed an accidentally emasculated servant to sleep in the women's courtyard when the men were absent. Peasant women observe less seclusion. In Sind they emerge from houses to carry food to husbands working in the fields without any face covering but in Mardan District of the Frontier they adeptly keep the lower part of the face and entire body shrouded in a large cloak or chel. If a Pathan woman while abroad meets a man, she resolutely turns her back until the stranger has passed. On the other hand such women are sometimes careless about veiling in the presence of the village "gentry".

The opposite extreme of purdah is more difficult to describe. A Brahui woman who appears outside her home with face (but not hair) uncovered would scarcely seem to be in purdah. Yet modesty entails that she not speak freely to unrelated men. Panjabi women, who enjoy a stereotyped reputation in other parts of Pakistan for boldness and frankness, may speak to strange men but manifest modesty and decorum through unmistakable reserve. Although the women who head the All Pakistan Women's Association make public appearances, they often wear dark glasses that may possibly parallel the burqa in providing a sense of privacy. In common usage women who go about with face unveiled are spoken of as not observing purdah. The burqa, therefore, and a house closed to unrelated men, are characteristics of relatively extreme (or what is often called "full") purdah. Even women in this category, however, sometimes temporarily abandon seclusion when they accompany husbands to Karachi or a hill station.

Concerning the antecedents and history of purdah there is considerable

uncertainty, particularly as regards the influence of the Islamic penetration of the subcontinent and whether the custom existed in pre-Muslim India. Uncertainty also revolves around whether purdah has declined in the past few decades. Government propaganda rarely mentions the custom and by implication suggests it scarcely exists. That some women have left the veil is clear. On the other hand, Darling reports Panjabi Muslim peasant women who entered purdah following the enhanced prosperity of their families. Within the country debate occurs over the propriety of seclusion and whether the morality of purdah is clearly indicated in Qur'an or Hadith. Publicists who reject the propriety of seclusion, like A. de Zayas Abbasi, deny that the Qur'an sanctions the custom or that it is implied in the Quranic concept of hijab or modesty. To them, purdah seriously jeopardizes the rights of women guaranteed in the Qur'an. More conservative proponents of the contrary position see in Quranic injunctions for women to lower their gaze, hide their bodies, and stay quietly in their homes, clear validation for full purdah.

Purdah correlates with economic status. Of the Punjab, an area traditionally weak in seclusion, Darling[9] reports: ". . . in the village strict purdah is normally confined to the tribes at the top of the social tree, Rajput, Seyyed, etc., and to families who form, or would like to form, the country gentry. . . ." On the other hand, the correlation holds best when degrees of purdah are kept in mind. Strict seclusion, clearly, does not integrate well with a standard of living so low that a farmer cannot hire help in order that his women may remain behind the household's walls. Full purdah represents the ability to remove women from field work and to replace them by hired hands. To maintain purdah absorbs wealth and energy. Houses must have separate apartments; sweepers are needed to clean latrines; curtains may have to be provided leading from courtyard to taxi; servants are required; and the burqa, costing about eight dollars in 1952, is both an extra garment that needs care and an extra expense. A young Pathan expressed to us the relationship between wealth and seclusion clearly when he described his women as not going out but as being visited by neighboring women who even unveiled before the household men (although not speaking to the latter). The difference between the two customs, he said, was based on wealth. "They are poorer than we." On the other hand in some of the wealthiest urban strata, purdah, in competition with Western values, is losing its value.

A primary function of purdah is that it contributes to the esteem enjoyed by a family and thereby facilitates the adjustment of that group with other groups sharing complementary values. Hence, fear of public opinion constitutes a powerful motive reinforcing purdah. A family of

purdah-observing women occupies a favorable position for concluding marriage arrangements with other families to which it need not be ashamed to give daughters. Second, purdah helps to protect the woman. In this function, seclusion integrates with the conception of woman as vulnerable or helpless in fending for herself. Sharing such an attitude, many girls are scarcely likely to rebel against seclusion. Meanwhile, their guardians also remain watchful. As one Pathan landlord straight-forwardly said: "We do not let women out of the house, to protect their character. If she goes out, there is a chance she will be seduced."

The functions of purdah also engross Pakistanis who try to meet opposition for or against the custom. People concerned with attacking or defending the pattern select functions that buttress their arguments. Thus, A. de Zayas Abbasi[10] sees the wholesale abduction of women during the the Partition riots as related to their psychological unpreparedness, ignorance, and incompetence—qualities enforced by purdah. She also connects the custom to an allegedly widespread incidence of sodomy and prostitution. The secluded woman, it is claimed, faces a handicap for motherhood. She is incapacitated to rear fit children. The reader will not fail to note how the argument draws support by suggesting seclusion to be incompatible with the ideal of woman molding the national character.

Seclusion doubtless limits the sophistication of a woman and her ability to cope with experiences outside the home. Those who object to the custom lean backward to stress its unadaptive consequences when the woman must sometimes be on her own. A woman, however, is not expected to have to face unfamiliar situations without help from her father or husband, or at least a servant. Burqa-clad ladies may be seen traveling passively in the company of unveiled maid servants who strenuously bargained with carriage drivers and made necessary arrangements.

Purdah would seem to be neither more nor less suited to survival than certain other culture patterns, like circumcision or the use of drugs. It remains highly compatible with a relatively narrowly defined, domestic status for women. Of course, signs indicate that this status is altering. A proportion of the population insists on woman's increasing participation in education, elections, public office, and the labor market. Perhaps rigid provision may be made under those circumstances for full purdah, but this is not suggested in the report of the Punjab Labor Employment Exchanges: "Efforts to accommodate 'purdah' observing women seeking clerical jobs have shown very discouraging results. The Exchange authorities usually express their inability to find any job for them."[11] On the other hand, there appears to be relatively little evidence indicating that women are unanimously eager to change. It is naive to suppose that many men could

enforce seclusion without the cooperation of their mothers, wives, and daughters. The custom still remains congruent with many elements in Pakistan culture, including one interpretation of the Qur'an, arranged marriage, and the largely implicit conception of woman presented above.

Purdah in men's minds is associated with strong resentment for any real or suspected approach toward one's women. As a Pathan landlord explained "This is the main reason why we Pathans kill each other—because of women." In another Pathan village, the inhabitants customarily excluded men from a path used by women in carrying water. Somebody shot a policeman who, for an unstated reason, insisted on using the path. The significant point of the story is that in subsequent legal proceedings a man of the village exclaimed: "If the policemen were to commit the same wrong in my village I would be the first person. . . to fire at them."[12] As long ago as 1896, Crooke reports for the Baluch, who do not generally seclude women, that violence is highly likely to follow suspicion of adultery.[13]

ROLE BEHAVIOR

Different roles for boys and girls, reflecting divergent expectations and treatment of each sex, have an early inception. With the profound significance attached to offspring in the life goals of parents, especially the woman, for whom failure to conceive may be extremely traumatic, it is understandable that the birth of a child should be received very warmly. Boys are greeted with greater ritual, and probably also real, enthusiasm than girls but the sympathy felt for a baby does not allow neglect of a girl baby. A girl will ideally be nursed for two and a half years in contrast to her brother's maximum of two. A Panjabi woman queried by Darling[14] rationalized this difference by saying that "'A girl is the lowlier, and God pities her.'" While earlier weaning (except in case of an intervening pregnancy) is felt to violate Islamic law, the Qur'an (sura II, 233) explicitly allows considerable variability in weaning. Where an avoidance of sexual intercourse exists during the term of nursing, it is possible for extended nursing to function as an indirect means of controlling conception.

It is likely that the notion of a girl warranting more sympathetic treatment than a boy is widespread in Pakistan and that it conditions many elements of the woman's general role. It also is congruent with the attitude that woman is weaker, more vulnerable, and, in general, different from men. Discipline is probably more severe for boys, a Sindhi young man explaining that it was inauspicious and morally reprehensible to punish a girl. He hypothesized that therefore girls grow up to be more sensitive than boys, who possess thicker skins.

In early childhood, boys and girls play together with little restriction. In courtyards or on village lanes each is equally concerned with mixing mud or playing with dust, roles continuous with the man's later adobe making and the woman's occupation with dung cakes. Boys and girls from the age of five occasionally assume the care of a younger sibling, carrying the younger astride the hip. Additional economic responsibilities are also soon acquired. A few children may act as servants in a landlord's household, perhaps serving as playmates for the latter's children.

Girls aid in household tasks like cleaning utensils, ginning cotton, grinding flour on the hand mill, and sweeping. If her family owns little land she may be sent to scavenge for grass needed to feed a cow or burro. Girls also scour roads and lanes for cow dung and scraps of wood. These activities, of course, do not fit a landlord's daughter for whom considerably more time remains to play. The girl of this class also dresses with greater care so that she reflects the economic and social rank of her parents. On the other hand, she lacks opportunities for displaying herself outside the walls of her own or adjoining courtyard unless attending school.

The relationship of an elder brother to his sister continues the complementary emphasis that dominates in the status of women. He exercises responsibility for the girl comparable to his father's. As she matures, a Pathan girl becomes very shy of her brother, but in the Punjab avoidance does not obtain between siblings of opposite sex who may in winter even sleep in the same room until separated through marriage. Always the ideal is for the girl to remain modestly retiring; not to join into the conversation of married women; to hide her face when others speak about her; to avoid crowds, especially when they contain members of the opposite sex, and not to speak loudly. With her mother, she uses a corner of the courtyard or a bricked-off latrine for toilet purposes while peasant men generally relieve themselves in the nearby fields. Girls remain largely ignorant about sex, apart from what is learned by observing barnyard animals. Boys learn more from each other, with the usual distortion, or from older unrelated men, like servants. Later they may have contacts with prostitutes in town while the girls come to marriage virginal.

In villages, a few girls may attend mosque schools and so learn to read the Qur'an or they may attend primary grades in private or tax-supported institutions. To a large extent, however, schooling is limited by a number of elements in the girl's role and by the elders' conception of her status. Like her brother, she has responsibilities incompatible with attending school. When wealth permits the family to employ farm laborers and servants, schooling is still limited by the consideration that girls have little

need for knowledge outside of that which is bound up with traditional feminine roles.

Furthermore, once she is past childhood a modest girl does not mix freely with boys and this norm is explicitly recognized in the reluctance to extend compulsory education to include girls. Segregated schools however still leave unresolved the problem of the young lady leaving her home every day. In the Punjab most villages lack primary schools for girls. Without a girl's school near the village, parents' resistance to education increases. Finally, there is the distinctly unpleasant belief that school after about the fourth standard (about age nine) gives girls "modern ideas", exorbitant wants, and a readiness to abandon purdah. It may be significant that the teaching of English begins after the fourth standard. Probably less than 10 per cent of eligible girls are enrolled in the schools of Pakistan and many of the enrolled pupils live in urban areas.

Sex symbolization through clothing, decoration, and bodily adornment begins in childhood. Feminine alternatives and specialities in this area vary extensively from one place to another and only a few generalities can be offered. Rivaling the sari as a potential national woman's costume is the combination of very full trousers (salwar), tunic, and head veil or dupatta. The feet of peasant women are bare more often than they are covered with embroidered shoes. Bracelets, anklets, earrings or pendants, septum plugs, tattoos, hands and feet stained with henna, and "beauty spots" painted on the face illustrate common means of adornment. Over these the purdah-observing woman adds a black, brown, or white burqa. In its quality and cleanliness, clothing bears a relationship to economic status.

Although the use of jewelry is not rationalized by identifying woman as a symbol of Lakshmi, as among the Hindus, she is not properly attired without precious ornaments. The unornamented woman suggests a neglected woman, who not only fails to display the esteem that her husband or father feels for her but does not symbolize the prestige of the family to which she belongs. That American women with their obviously greater wealth do not wear much jewelry frequently confuses people in Pakistan. Interestingly, the emphasis put on girls' attire and ornaments is sometimes felt to be incompatible with the expectation that she will be retiring and modest. Principals and educational officials, mindful of the latter virtues, may prescribe "simple living" for girls in their charge, including the avoidance of cosmetics or silken clothes. The hair is commonly plaited and dressed with oil or other substance (sugar diluted with water among Afghan transhumants). Doing the hair is in some places a task performed by the wife of the village barber who also carries out similar duties on ceremonial occasions. In

many places women shave both the pubes and under the arms. Reports by Ja' far Sharif, and in Panjab Notes and Queries,[15] claim that certain Jats and the Brahui practice clitoral excision, and it may be more widespread.

Marriage, whose ritual accompaniments will be examined below, ideally constitutes a contract entered into between a man or woman for a consideration. Each party may dictate the terms to safeguard his own interests. For example, the bride may insist on the condition that her husband not take another spouse while they remain married. In practice negotiations do not remain so completely rational, partly because potential spouses are not wholly equivalent nor abundant. At least for a first marriage, details of the marriage contract are negotiated (with the consent of the children) by parents. Generally a monetary consideration is paid immediately by the groom's parents to the bride (as security in event of divorce) or to her parents. Security may, however, be forthcoming to a wife only at a future date.

In addition, the girl's parents settle a trousseau of clothing, jewelry, and sometimes other wealth on their daughter. To this the husband usually enjoys access. Accumulation of the dowry may begin shortly after the girl's birth. Marriage is closely tied to the transfer of relatively large amounts of wealth, the accumulation of which may require the family to shoulder a heavy debt. The size of the heavy monetary consideration is in rare instances reduced through securing a bride by exchanging sisters or, more frequently, by marriage to the daughter of a parent's sibling. Cousins are preferred mates among many Muslims. In two Khattak lineages of Mardan district, North-West Frontier, for which data is available, the mother's brother's daughter was somewhat more often chosen in preference to other cousins.[16] Following the death of her husband, it is considered fitting that a widow marry her husband's brother (who may already have a wife). Otherwise, the children "will feel it" if they should happen to pass into the house of a stranger who "won't treat them properly", as a Punjab farmer put it. A few sources also refer to tests of physical virginity as helping to control a woman's pre-marital sexual behavior.[17]

In association with patrilocal residence, a new bride faces adjustment not only to her spouse but also the members of his family. She is left in their care in cases where the husband quits the village to work in a distant city. Anxiety centers around a husband's faithfulness. Gypsy women in Sind peddle substances deemed to be efficacious in controlling a man's sexual behavior.

No matter how long they have been wed, each spouse remains reluctant to refer directly to the other and women experience great difficulty in speaking the husband's name to another person. The sexes also eat apart.

Although many women come to love the men they have married, despite evidence of sexual jealousy which might suggest the contrary, relations between a married couple seldom become intensely companionable. A man continues to move with, and even sleep among, his friends, with whom he associates in the sitting room or men's house, while much of the woman's day is spent with other women in courtyards.

Like purdah, polygyny promotes a certain amount of opposition in contemporary Pakistan. (Yet indications are that only a small fraction of men live with more than a single wife.) Such conflict is doubtlessly greater in urban than rural areas. Although the sororate form of marriage sometimes occurs, plural wives usually are not related. The arrival of another woman in the household poses a serious problem of interpersonal adjustment that is reflected in the expectation that co-wives will not successfully get along. A husband should treat each of his wives with perfect equality, an ideal neither easily nor always achieved. Other devices to prevent conflict in the polygynous family include separate quarters for the women and their children and rites of deference extended to the senior mistress as her due.

Reproduction, housework, and sometimes helping on the farm, constitute the major categories of work in the adult woman's life. In wealthy households routine manual duties fall to hired hands. Women in such households have much freedom to care for, and play with, children; to embroider or sew; and to talk amongst themselves. The specific elements of the peasant woman's day vary according to season. They have also altered in pace with other cultural changes. The classic picture of the wife rising before dawn to grind flour has disappeared where ox, gasoline, or electric mills can profitably be set up to grind grain on a share basis or for cash. Churning and cutting chaff, along with cooking, remain daily tasks of peasant women but probably fewer gin or spin today than did twenty-five years ago.

Cooking, it may be pointed out, is not a hurried matter; the blending of the cut-up vegetables, spices, and, more rarely, meat, and the making of fresh chapattis occupy much time. In those parts of Pakistan where women help with farming, it is unthinkable that they should plow or sow. In other words, apart from women's role in dairying and sometimes (as in the Punjab) grazing and watering cattle, men carry out the most productive technical tasks. This bears out what a woman near Sialkot told Darling[18]: ". . . on our work there is no blessing. On the work of men there is great blessing: from it comes much produce." Division of labor between the sexes results in valuable cooperation from which each gains. Further cooperation comes from the village menials among whom, as

already suggested, wives possess definite responsibilities in relation to clients, particularly on ceremonial occasions.

The women of an extended family jointly work at tasks like preparing meals and they cooperate in watering animals or caring for one another's children. The size of such a group probably encourages different patterns of leisure than obtain in a nuclear family where, with routine tasks finished, a woman turns to embroidery or sewing. Data, sometimes quantitative, published by the Punjab Board of Economic Inquiry[19] indicate that not only do the sexes eat apart but they also follow somewhat different patterns of diet and indulgence. Women and children, for example, eat many times a day, irregularly in some places, and take less flour. Panjabi men who are engaged in reaping fortify themselves with ghee on chapattis consumed in the morning and evening. Women never use ghee in this way. The former may drink more milk than women while undoubtedly they consume more hemp (in the forms of bhang or charas[20]) or tobacco. Women are by no means wholly strangers to the water pipe or hookah. While they work hard, peasant women do so at a leisurely pace. As in the case of men, no day of the week is given to leisure. Neither does menstruation mean a holiday from work. The period of childbirth, for other reasons as well as because it is regarded as polluting, brings a brief respite from household tasks. Death in the family introduces another interlude when neighbors send food and the female relatives, simply garbed and without cosmetics, remain in the house to receive condolences.

Our survey of woman's role has paid little attention to the specialized patterns found in particular castes or tribes. A discussion of them might include the Brahui woman's work with lamb skins or goat's hair; the Kaffir mother's sojourn in a confinement hut, or colorful Gypsy beggars who virtually ignore purdah when they publicly sing for money.

LEGAL RIGHTS

It is the proud claim of Muslims in Pakistan that the customary law of Islam[21] combined with legislation guarantee women many rights. The opposition replies that frequent failure to observe Sacred Law renders its provisions largely ideal while women in purdah, who received scarcely any schooling, have little opportunity effectively to claim their guaranteed rights. For example, although a woman constitutes a legal personality, eligible to sue in the courts in defense of her interests, the strong convention demanding seclusion and retirement tends to make it difficult for her to redress injuries in this fashion. Furthermore, often she voluntarily surrenders rights, like those pertaining to land ownership, in favor of sons or

husband.

Strong filial obligations to parents and the embarrassment attendant upon talking about so intimate a matter, may override a girl's personal feelings when she is asked to consent to a match which has been arranged for her. Few girls insist, while the marriage contract is being settled, on a monogamous household, although they are entitled to do so and may dread the idea of someday living with a co-wife. In other instances women have successfully secured legal rights desired by only a minority of them. It is not surprising, therefore, that few rural women avail themselves of the franchise. Such rights, therefore, also remain, in a sense, ideal.

Examples of how law guarantees women's interests can be found in the legal norms pertaining to mahr, polygyny, divorce, and inheritance. Woman's relinquishable right to mahr means the understanding that she is entitled to receive from her husband a settlement of wealth in consideration of marriage.[22] We shall follow local usage and refer to this as dower (in distinction to dowry and bride wealth, the latter word designating wealth paid to the bride's parents in consideration of her marriage). Perhaps dower is sometimes replaced by bride wealth. In its specific sense dower indicates woman's right to own wealth and to be independent of her husband as well as constituting protection against divorce. A man will be reluctant, it is thought, to divorce a woman on whom he has settled a high dower, or to whom he has promised it should the marriage terminate by divorce. A similar function may be served by heavy bride wealth. The importance attached to dower is reflected in the belief that a girl's parents should not agree to slight mahr, and in the rule making dower mandatory in temporary marriage (permitted only by one Shi'a sect).

A wife's rights with respect to polygyny have already been mentioned. Commentators generally agree that according to the traditional law, the maximum number of four wives is allowable only under those exceptional circumstances where a man can divide his attention among such women, to the neglect of none. Most proponents of monogamy carefully do not attack polygyny in general, nor advocate its abolition for, as a letter in the Pakistan Times (December 13, 1954) says, this "is a sacred Islamic institution". Opponents of polygyny urge the proper practice of that custom in order that a wife shall not be neglected by a husband who may have wearied of her. They add the further question whether in contemporary times a man can possibly follow the Quranic injunction and treat plural wives with absolute equality.

Legally, a woman is not defenseless with respect to divorce. True, a husband may repudiate his wife without cause, but such behavior is morally

reprehensible and also demands a period of waiting during which, it is hoped, reconciliation may occur. The man's privilege to do so may also be delegated to a wife and when this occurs the woman enjoys a potent weapon with which to protect her interests. Divorce may also occur through mutual consent and, according to Fyzee,[23] it has become increasingly common among the Muslims of South Asia for the suggestion to originate with the wife, sometimes in consideration of surrendering part of the mahr. An unproven charge of adultery levelled against her also confers on a woman the right to sue for divorce. Indian legislation (Dissolution of Marriage Act, 1939) settled on women the right to obtain divorce in the event of mistreatment by a husband, including non-support, disappearance for two years, imprisonment for at least seven, and insanity, leprosy, or venereal disease. A converted woman who renounces Islam automatically dissolves her marriage according to the traditional law.

Hanafi law (which may, however, be neglected in favor of some local customary law), explicitly recognizes the right of women to inherit, generally to the extent of half the share of a male. If a man dies leaving children, his wife is entitled to one-eighth of the wealth. Where there are co-wives, however, this share must be divided equally among them. A man cannot will by specific bequest more than a third of his property, and that never to a female, a provision that may be interpreted as favoring the interest of his wife.

Extending woman's legal rights meets with greatest opposition in areas touching on the value of purdah, modesty, reticence, and a complementary status vis-à-vis the man. A letter in Pakistan Times (January 18, 1955), for example, deplores the extension of suffrage to women on the grounds that "Any sign of women exercising influence in the State is symptom of decay. . . . Women should fulfill the function which Providence has assigned to them. . . ." On the other hand, the press frequently offers evidence of how earnestly urban women are working to extend protection to women's interests and to realize those already achieved.

RITUAL ROLES

Not only do royalty and heroes become targets of ritual but nearly every individual in the course of life has symbolic acknowledgement paid to some aspect of his status. For a girl in Pakistan the ceremonial situation eclipsing all others is her marriage. Attractive garments, special grooming, gifts, a procession undertaken in careful seclusion, and ceremonial interaction with her own and her husband's female relatives celebrate this transition.[24] The bride's role in, and appreciation of, this occasion are

often muted through her modesty.

Another ceremony involving a public announcement occurs at birth. The celebration attending birth is generally more elaborate for a boy than a girl. In Tordher, a village of Mardan district, a Pathan landlord sacrifices two goats for a male child and distributes the flesh with sweetmeats to friends. One animal and no sweetmeats mark a girl's arrival. Differences in birth ritual do not always signify real differences in the pleasure felt when the child is a boy or girl. Ceremonial acts often simulate the sentiments felt to be appropriate on stated occasions. However, the relative elaboration of such acts no doubt helps to symbolize and reinforce the importance which individuals, or their statuses, ideally possess in public estimation. The same functions would seem to be served by the frequency with which ceremony occurs in connection with a particular status. Girls lack parallels for the more elaborate observance of a boy's birthdays and the public celebration of his circumcision. In stressing the relative ideal importance of one sex over the other, ceremonies function to enhance the contrast which, we have emphasized, is felt to exist between the sexes. It is likely that as sexual roles come closer together or become more symmetrical, ceremonial differences will also be reduced.

CULTURAL RELATIONS

We have looked at woman's status, at times closely examining some detail, like purdah or ceremonial role, also asking how that element might be related to other elements of woman's status or to other aspects of culture. To these functional considerations we now propose to add an attempt to explain briefly woman's status in general by seeing it in relation to other parts of the culture of West Pakistan. Such an analysis regards culture as constituting an interdependent system. Feminine status, a part of the system, is interdependent with other parts. Hence we ask in effect: If certain other cultural conditions changed would woman's status also change? The answer constitutes an hypothesis, the testing of which can best be done by some application of the comparative method. It should be understood that the point of view underlying this analysis is closer to correlational than causal thinking. There is no implication that one part of culture causes another.

Woman secluded, kept from the fields and shops, decorated with jewelry, and symbol of her family's station and respect—these patterns represent an investment of wealth and energy. They are, as already pointed out, most elaborated by those people able to afford them. Pakistan is not alone in treating woman as a vehicle for symbolization, surrounding her

with meanings quite independent of her biological nature. Cultures in which such treatment of women is elaborated belong to relatively rich communities (or rich sections of communities), that is, to people who do not live from hand to mouth. Pakistan is able to produce a dependable surplus of goods which can be used to support many women in comparative leisure and to replace woman's labor with hired hands. Compared to other communities which anthropologists have studied, Pakistan is not a poor community. The relative wealth of the country, derived primarily from intensive agriculture aided by plow and irrigation, is of fundamental importance for understanding woman's position. Closer examination would probably reveal what has been suggested, namely that purdah and those other behaviors of woman which reflect her complementary relationship to man, have been most conspicuous in periods of prosperity.

All wealthy communities do not so dramatically set women apart from men nor use them in quite the same manner as prestige symbols. Sometimes woman is emphasized as equal to man; ideally, the sexes work side by side, sexual distinctions being glossed over. Such communities also emphasize rationalism to a degree that much of Asia rejects. Rationalism, denoting a highly objective attitude toward tradition and disregard of what Durkheim called mechanical bonds of social interaction in favor of selecting whoever will be advantageous in pursuing some goal of production and development, is closely tied to industrialization. These elements are practically absent from the culture of rural West Pakistan.

It is precisely those strata of the community wherein rationalism has been fostered by contact with the West that are displacing many of the traditional customs emphasizing women's complementarity to men. Such displacement results in greater symmetry coming to mark relations between the sexes. It is tempting to predict, on the basis of apparent world trends, that growing industrialization will be associated with intensified sexual symmetry in Pakistan. But caution suggests that industrialism added to the traditional South Asian cultural inventory may yield a cultural configuration different from anything in the West.

Other cultural elements helping to explain woman's status as described in previous pages include, of course, the ideology of Islam. The strong male-centrism of Islam together with its stress on sexual modesty represent compatible bases on which to elaborate a set of nonbiological distinctions between men and women. Finally there is people's intense consciousness with regard to relative prestige and social rank. The concern with symbols of social worth is expressed through making woman the embodiment of the esteem commanded by her family.

NOTES

1. Apart from cited sources, information has been derived from field work conducted in three villages: Chiho, near Pad Idan, Nawabshah District, Sind; Chak 41-MB, near Mitha Tiwana, Shahpur District, Punjab; Tordher, Mardan District, North-West Frontier. These villages are briefly described in an out-of-print report, Information for Pakistan (Chapel Hill, 1953). The reader will gather from this paper that a male anthropologist had little opportunity to study directly women's roles. Therefore, much of the field data came through Irma Honigmann's observations. I am also indebted to Herbert H. Vreeland, III for certain information. Terms like "Sind", "Punjab", or "Baluchistan" should be understood as referring to phases of West Pakistan culture which generally correspond to the former provincial boundaries. For aid to continue Pakistan research, grateful acknowledgement is made to the University Research Council and the Institute for Research in Social Science of the University of North Carolina.

2. Mushtaq Hussain, "What's Behind Purdah!", Star, 1951.

3. Ahmad Nadeem Kaasimee, "When I Opened My Eyes," Pakistan Review, Vol. 2, No. 6, 1954, p. 40.

4. Margaret Cormack, The Hindu Woman, New York, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1953, p. 79.

5. Sadiqa Naseem, "Sleepless Nights," Pakistan Review, Vol. 2, No. 7, 1954, pp. 40-42.

6. John J. Honigmann and Marguerite van Doorslaer, Some Themes from Indian Film Reviews, Studies in Pakistan National Culture, No. 2, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina, 1955.

7. Abdul Majeed Bhatti, "The Sublimity of Man!", Pakistan Review, Vol. 2, No. 3, 1954, p. 38. See also letter, Pakistan Times, September 24, 1954.

8. Muhammad Iqbal, The Mysteries of Selflessness, translated by A.J. Arberry, London, 1953, p. 67.

9. M.L. Darling, Wisdom and Waste in the Punjab Village, London, 1934, p. 308.

10. A. de Zayas Abbasi, "The Quranic Concept of 'Hijab'," The Islamic Literature, Vol. 5, 1953, pp. 459, 508-9.

11. Pakistan Times, October 30, 1952.

12. Ibid., August 26, 1954.

13. W. Crooke, Popular Religion and Folklore of Northern India, London, 1896, Vol. II, p. 104.

14. Ibid., p. 229.

15. Ja'far Sharif, Islam in India or the Qanun-i-Islam, London, 1921; Panjab Notes and Queries, Vol. I, Allahabad, 1883-1884.

16. Our designation "cousin" has little meaning to a Pakistan girl who in Sind and Punjab uses a distinct term to designate her father's sister's and mother's brother's children (i.e. her cross cousins) as well as her father's brother's and mother's sister's (her parallel cousins). In other words, taking sex into account, there are eight terms for cousins. In Pashto, things are a bit simpler for Pathans classify together maternal and paternal parallel cousins thus reducing eight cousin terms to six.

17. Edward Balfour, The Cyclopaedia of India, London, 1885, Vol. II, p. 193; Peter Mayne, Journey to the Pathans, Garden City, 1955, p. 20.

18. Darling, op. cit., p. 256.

19. See starred items in bibliography.

20. Bhang designates the crushed leaves of the hemp plant infused in water along with aromatic spices to form a relatively inexpensive narcotic beverage. Charas or ganja is marijuana or the gum of the hemp plant's flower used in tobacco and smoked. Balfour, op. cit., I, pp. 337, 569, 662, and 1173.

21. The Hanafi code prevails in Pakistan since its introduction by the Mughals. See Asaf A. A. Fyzee, Outlines of Muhammadan Law, Calcutta, 1949, p. 36.

22. Ibid., pp. 111-221.

23. Ibid., p. 140.

24. Muslim wedding customs are described in, (Mrs.) Meer Hassan Ali, Observations on the Mussulmauns of India, 2nd ed., London, 1917, Chapter 15; H. A. Rose, editor, A Glossary of the Tribes and Castes of the Punjab and North-West Frontier Province, 1919, pp. 813-88. See also the fictional sketch by Zeenuth Futehally, Zohra, Bombay, 1951, which, although laid in Hyderabad State, probably illustrates more widely shared attitudes and values.

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GLOSSARY*

aman
winter rice crop

Arains*
vegetable growers

Arbab
heritable title

arhat
Persian wheel

ashraf*
nobility

azan
Muslim call to prayer

badal
revenge

badragga
safe-conduct

baht bari
lucky one

bakhra
shares of land

barat
bridegroom's party

beythak
male sitting room

bhang*
narcotic from the hemp plant

bhangi
sweeper

biraderi
paternal kin

biri*
rolled-leaf cigarette

burqa
veil

bustee
slum

camar
leatherworker

chan
beloved one; moon

*Spelling according to Webster.

charas*
narcotic from the hemp plant

chaudharani
eldest woman, or wife, of headman's family

chaudhari
village headman

chel
cloak

chowkidar
watchman

chuddar*
shawl

dādke
father's family

daftari
full-fledged tribal member

dao
large, heavy-bladed knife

dara
village guest house

dessi
native

djan
life

dupatta
head veil

eng
love song

ganja*
narcotic from the hemp plant

Gar
Pathan tribal faction

ghar da kammi
house craftsman

ghayret
dignity

ghee*
clarified butter

gholai
farmyard

ghulam
servant

goonda
anti-social person or hoodlum

goondis
Pathan tribal faction

hadj*
pilgrimage to Mecca

hamsaya
servant

haq mehr
marriage settlement on bride

hijab
modesty

hijira
transvestite

Hir Randja
epic Panjabi poem

hnein
Burmese oboe

hujra
sitting room

iman
faith

izzat
honor or prestige

izzat rakna
to keep respect

jagir*
tax farm grant

jalar
paddle wheel

jhum*
slash and burn cultivation

jhum tauzi
tax collection period

jhumyah
a jhum cultivator

jihad*
holy war

jirga*
tribal council

julahi
female weaver

kachcha
crude

kahol
subclan

kammi
village craftsman

kanjars
sons of prostitutes

kapya
epic song

karbari
village headman

khan*
lord, master

khana-ba-dosh
nomads

khandan
extended family

kharcha
expense money

khassadar
non-uniformed tribal levy

khebadā
personal relationship

khel
clan

khes
quilt

kismat*
fate, destiny

kor
subclan

kos
one and a half miles

kyong
Buddhist temple school

laag
remuneration

lambardar
tax collector

lashkar
war party

lungi
pension

maari deeger
shortly before sunset

maara namaz vela
time for morning prayer

mahr*
marriage settlement on bride

malik*
village headman

mauza
administrative unit

mela*
seasonal fair

melmastia
hospitality

Misir
Egypt

mofussil
rural

mohalla
ward or neighborhood

muajib
tribal subsidy

muhajir
refugee

mulkiet
private land

mullah*
Muslim religious leader

musalli
unskilled laborer

mwi gyong chan
cither

na valeed
issueless

nagah
a fine

nanawati
asylum for fugitives

Nangi-i-Pukhtana
"Way of the Pukhtun"

nänke
mother's family

nänki virsa
matrilineal inheritance

neyk
righteous

nikah
Muslim marriage ceremony

pan*
betel leaf and nut

panchayat
five-man council

parah
village subdivision

parea
village council

patwari*
land registrar

peher
division of time

pir*
spiritual guide or teacher

powindahs
nomads from Afghanistan

Pukhtunwali
Pathan code of honor

pukka
finished

qala
fortified residence

qanat
underground water channel

qaum
tribe

rawaj, rawaj-i-am
customary law

redu
love song

rizk
livelihood

saddhr
desire

salaamee
money gift

salwar
full trousers worn by either men or women

Samil
Pathan tribal faction

serishta
hereditary preservers of custom

seyp
contract

seypees
contracting parties

shamilat
communal land

Sharia*
traditional Islamic law

Spin
Pathan tribal faction

spinziriu
male tribal elders

talak*
divorce pronouncement

talib'ilm
students

tappa
tribal area

tarbur
paternal cousin

tehsil*
district subdivision

tehsildar*
administrator of a tehsil

thana*
police ward

Tor
Pathan tribal faction

ulema*
Muslim learned in the Islamic tradition

Unan
Greece

unani
herb medicine

urs
commemoration of a saint

vesh
redistribution of land

Vilayet
Europe

vilayeti
European

Yaghistan
land of the unruly

zail
revenue circle

zakat
Muslim tithe of 2 1/2 per cent

zamin
land

zamindar*
landowner

zan
sex

zar
gold

zat
caste-like group

zenana*
women's quarters

INDEX

AN OUTLINE OF CULTURAL MATERIALS (OCM)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

The following table of contents serves as an index to the sequence of categories, about seven hundred in number, by which the data on man, his behavior, and his environment are systematically filed.

There are separate files for each distinctive culture or sub-culture and likewise for each major historical period in the case of societies with records extending over periods of substantial cultural change. The files of each participating institution are housed in filing cabinets accommodating paper slips of the dimensions 5" by 8" .

Sources selected for processing are annotated according to the numbered categories of the OCM. Annotation divides the material into logical blocks averaging perhaps a paragraph in length. Such blocks normally contain information pertinent to several categories of the OCM.

Each page of a source is reproduced for filing as many times as there are different categories for which it has been annotated. Thus the files contain, not abstracts, but the literal content of each source processed. In addition, for each file, one copy of every page is placed in Category 116 (Texts). This brings together, in regular page order, the complete text of all sources analyzed. Foreign sources are reproduced both in the original and in translation.

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